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The Muses love alternatives.
— Virgil, Eclogues, Book III
How do scientists form new hypotheses?
Are there general patterns of hypothesis formation?
If so, is the list of patterns humans are capable of limited?
Are there better or worse patterns to form new hypotheses?
Can we simulate processes of hypothesis formation?
How do scientists choose if different patterns are available?
How do hypotheses relate to scientific models?
How do scientists deal with mutually exclusive hypotheses?
Can we rationally endorse mutually exclusive alternatives?
Are hypotheses part of our daily life?
Can we live with uncertainties?
These are the general questions that motivated and led to this disserta-
tion, a tour which took me through various philosophical subdisciplines to
obtain as rich as possible a view of the topic of hypothesis formation in
science.
In this general introduction, I will situate my main topic, give an over-
view of the existing literature and address some common themes. More
specific introductions to the philosophical methods I will use can be found
in the separate introductions to the various parts.
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Topic of the Dissertation
The topic of this PhD thesis is the formation and use of hypotheses in sci-
ence, with a focus on the physical sciences. According to the view I develop,
scientific hypotheses can be defined as follows:
Scientific hypotheses are statements about the empirical world
with an unknown or underdetermined truth status that are ad-
vanced as a tentative answer to a particular research question.
The different aspects of this definition of scientific hypotheses are argued
for and assumed at various places throughout the dissertation, and a full
elaboration of this definition can be found in Section 9.2. In the remainder
of this section, I want to point out some delineating choices and general
features to set the scene. More detailed argumentation will be given in due
course.
Doxastic Attitude In forming a hypothesis an agent adopts at the same
time a specific attitude or cognitive relation towards that hypothesis. As
scientific reasoning should not be considered to be isolated from general
reasoning in every day life, this attitude, which will be determined as a dox-
astic attitude sui generis, can be studied from a more general perspective in
the field of epistemology.
Truth-purposiveness In this thesis, I deal only with truth-purposive hy-
potheses, hypotheses which the agent considers as neither true nor false,
but as unknown or even underdetermined. The agent’s main purpose in
forming such hypotheses is either to determine their truth value or to use
their possible truth for other epistemic purposes. This class of hypotheses
has to be sharply distinguished from truth-denying hypotheses, hypotheses
the agent considers to be false, but which can be useful for her, for instance,
in setting up a thought experiment.
Reference to the Empirical World My topic is further limited by the fact
that I consider only hypotheses that make reference to the empirical world.
In other words, I do not focus on mathematical conjectures or hypothesized
conceptual relations. While the analysis of the epistemological and logical
parts of this dissertation may probably be extended to include this kind of
hypotheses, my analysis of the use of hypotheses in scientific practice is
tailored specifically for hypotheses that refer to the empirical world.
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The Importance of a Research Question Not just any conjectural state-
ment can be considered as a hypothesis. Scientific hypotheses are formed
in response to and in relation with a certain research question, which acts
as a trigger for them. Although hypotheses are sometimes presented more
or less independently at later stages of research, they cannot be fully un-
derstood if they are disconnected from their triggers.
Hypothesis Formation and Rationality In this thesis I assume through-
out the possibility of rational hypothesis formation, both in an absolute and
a relative sense. More precisely, I assume that it can be rationally justified
to suggest a hypothesis in answer to a particular trigger, and I assume that
it can be rationally justified to prefer one method of hypothesis formation
above another one in a particular case. Yet I do not assume that there
is always a difference: two methods can be (equally) rationally justified
in a particular case. Also, rational hypothesis formation does not guar-
antee higher truth probabilities for individual hypotheses. It is assumed,
however, that rational hypothesis formation serves the agent’s epistemic
interests better (largely because of a better understanding and coverage of
the space of possibilities).
Scientific Discovery and Abductive Reasoning In the literature, hypoth-
esis formation in science is generally brought into connection with the con-
cepts of ‘scientific discovery’ and ‘abductive reasoning’. However, as the
precise meaning of these notions can be ambiguous, I will first give an
overview of the literature on hypothesis formation, abduction and scien-
tific discovery and clarify how the main questions of this dissertation con-
nect to the different research challenges presented in this literature. This
will then allow me to specify how the relation between ‘hypothesis forma-
tion’, ‘abductive reasoning’ and ‘scientific discovery’ will be conceived in
this thesis.
1.2 Overview of the Literature on Hypothesis Formation
This part is based on the second section of Gauderis (2013b). The rest of that paper is
included as Chapter 7 of this dissertation.
In this section, I summarize the status quo of research on hypothesis forma-
tion in the philosophy of science by reflecting on how the main questions
of today were shaped over the course of the twentieth century. As already
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suggested in the previous section, this overview relates to both the litera-
ture on scientific discovery and the literature on abductive reasoning.
In the first half of the twentieth century, at the height of logical posi-
tivism, philosophers generally held that the mind’s ability to generate new
hypotheses is situated outside the realm of rational thinking.1 This idea
was crystalized in Reichenbach’s very influential distinction between the
context of discovery and the context of justification (Reichenbach, 1938;
Schickore and Steinle, 2006; Laudan, 1980; Kitcher, 2013), which under-
lies and gives expression to the longstanding prejudice that scientific dis-
covery (and hypothesis formation) were not proper matters of interest for
the philosophy of science (e.g. Popper, 1959; Laudan, 1980, p. 180).
From the different perspective of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peir-
ce had, however, already a few decades earlier advocated the idea that
explanatory hypothesis formation is a distinctive and important form of ra-
tional inference, for which he used the notion ‘abduction’ (Peirce, 1958,
CP 5.172).2 This suggestion was picked up by Hanson, the pioneer of a
generation of philosophers who based their reflections on a thorough famil-
iarity with the history of science (e.g. Hanson, 1958, p. 3). By discussing
how Kepler inferred the hypothesis of elliptical planetary motion from the
observations made by Tycho Brahe, Hanson argued that Kepler’s “keen log-
ical sense” is shown in the sound reasons he cited for every step he made,
steps whose explanatory character prevents us from classifying them as
merely inductive generalizations from the available data (1958, pp. 84-85).
Although Hanson has been rightly criticized for underestimating the role
of theoretical and other constraints in scientific discovery (Nickles, 1980,
p. 23; Darden, 1991, p. 10) and for confusing the actual generation of hy-
potheses with their preliminary evaluation (Schaffner, 1980, p. 179), his
observation that scientific hypothesis formation is a reasonable affair has
been confirmed over and over again by philosophers of science who have
1It was not that these early philosophers of science claimed that full-fledged theories could
originate from bold leaps of the imagination. Rather, as Meheus (1999) shows, they generally
acknowledged and sometimes even discussed the use of rational search methods in scientific
discovery. Only, for them, these methods relied essentially on the input of early hypotheses
and particular interpretations, which could not themselves be derived by rational processes.
2Peirce distinguished abduction, the formation of explanatory hypotheses, not only from
deduction but also from induction, the inference from cases to generalized statements. Al-
though the distinction between abduction and induction can be put into question in its
specifics (Aliseda, 2006, pp. 33-34), Peirce was certainly the first to argue for the rational-
ity of explanatory reasoning (that is not based on generalizations of cases) since the general
acceptance of the fallible nature of science in the mid-1800s.
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extensively studied real historical discoveries (e.g. Franklin, 1993, p. 124;
Darden, 1991, p. 3; Nersessian, 2008, p. 5).
Despite this widespread consensus, however, that scientific discovery
processes and hypothesis formation can be addressed rationally, two things
remain clear: (1) that the notion of ‘abduction’ or ‘abductive reasoning’
has not been broadly accepted, and, more importantly, (2) that the study
of this particular type of inference has not been assigned a central place in
research on scientific processes and discoveries. I distinguish three main
reasons for this turn of events.
First, Peirce’s original ideas on abduction, which were recorded over a
period of decades, underwent several changes and lack a coherent inter-
pretation (Anderson, 1986; Kapitan, 1992, p. 15; Plutynski, 2011). As a
result, the concept of abduction refers to at least three different types of
inference in the present literature: the generation of new (explanatory)
hypotheses (e.g. Gabbay and Woods, 2006; Campos, 2011); the inference
to the (truth of the) best explanation (e.g. Harman, 1965; Lipton, 1991;
Douven, 2011); and the selection of the hypothesis that is most worthy
of pursuit (McKaughan, 2008). Such a situation clearly leads to mutual
misunderstanding if one neglects to specify the type of reasoning one is
discussing.
Second, even if one does agree on the type of inference in question,
there are even more interpretations concerning how broadly abductive rea-
soning should be conceived. Is it a particular and rather constrained formal
reasoning pattern, as it is generally conceived in logics and AI (e.g. Flach
and Kakas, 2000a; Gabbay and Kruse, 2000)? Or is it an all-encompassing
scientific method, as Hanson (1958, 1961) and some proponents of the IBE
view (e.g. McMullin, 1992) held it to be? In such a climate, it is also dif-
ficult to clearly draw the line between abduction and induction (Aliseda,
2006, pp. 33-34) and hardly any effort has been put into clarifying the
relation between abductive reasoning and other well-studied practices in
scientific discovery, such as the construction and refinement of models and
the formation of new concepts. Aliseda, in her monograph on abduction,
summarizes the situation as follows:
Many authors write as if there were pre-ordained, reasonably
clear notions of abduction and its rivals, which we only have to
analyze to get a clear picture. But these technical terms may be
irretrievably confused in their full generality, burdened with the
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debris of defunct philosophical theories. (Aliseda, 2006, p. 34)
Third, Hanson presented the rationality of discovery as if there existed
a unified method of discovery, i.e. abduction, which could be linked to the
old notion of a “logic of discovery” (Hanson, 1958, 1961). But for the
next generation of scholars, it became clear that the old Baconian dream of
a single subject-independent algorithmic procedure of discovery had been
debunked by the complex subtlety of present-day theories, the long and
arduous processes that led to them, and the important role of (previous)
theories in scientific reasoning. Therefore, they distanced themselves from
the Hansonian views in favor of a multitude of discovery methods; some
even argued against the formal logical treatment of any particular pattern
(Nickles, 1980, p. 23-28). This strong criticism led many to regard the liter-
ature on abduction as a more logically and epistemologically oriented side
branch with a somewhat exegetical nature (e.g. Niiniluoto, 1999; Hintikka,
1998) only loosely connected to the mainly historically-oriented stem of re-
search on scientific discovery in the philosophy of science. Still, in recent
years the literature on abduction has, to a certain extent, bridged this gap
by acknowledging the multitude of “patterns of abduction” and attempt-
ing to provide a classification of such formal patterns that can be used to
address real historical cases (Schurz, 2008a).
In the 1960s and 70s, the rise of historicism in the philosophy of sci-
ence showed that scientific confirmation is not the neat logical process it
was once taken to be, and hence not so easily separable from the process
of discovery (Nickles, 1980, p. 2). Around the same time, research in psy-
chology and artificial intelligence showed that there are better and worse
heuristics for problem solving. This opened the way, at least in princi-
ple, for the construction of normative theories for specific problem solving
activities such as scientific discovery (Simon, 1973). These new insights
led to the emergence of a group of philosophers whose research focused
primarily on the process of scientific discovery, the so-called “friends of dis-
covery”. By around 1990, this loosely-knit group agreed on the following
ideas, which still stand today: (1) that scientific research is a gradual step-
by-step process of constant refinement (Darden, 1991, p. 11; Langley et al.,
1987, pp. 57-59; Shah, 2007) and that, as such, there is no strict distinction
between the context of discovery and the context of justification (Nickles,
1980, pp. 8-18; Hoyningen-Huene, 2006); (2) that discovery can be seen
as a problem solving activity, and thus can be addressed rationally (Simon,
Langley and Bradshaw, 1981; Nickles, 1978); (3) that there are no definite
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algorithms or logics of discovery, but only a plethora of heuristics, strategies
and methods that are context- and subject-matter-dependent (Achinstein,
1980; Nickles, 1990; Darden, 1991, p. 11); (4) that both the hypothetico-
deductive and inductive views of the scientific method are obsolete, as the
first retains the old distinction between discovery and justification (Darden,
1991, pp. 9-17) while the second neglects the importance of theoretical
constraints in scientific problem solving (Nickles, 1980, p. 35).
Where does this leave research on scientific discovery, hypothesis for-
mation and abduction today? Although most agree on the central insights
listed above, many different directions are now pursued, each with its own
methodology. (1) Some philosophers have tried to further naturalize the in-
sights about discovery processes by linking the patterns found in studying
historical discoveries to the psychology literature (e.g. Nersessian, 2008;
Thagard, 2012; Magnani, 2001). (2) Others have attempted to specify and
classify the various particular patterns or strategies employed in scientific
discovery in a more stringent way (e.g. Darden, 1991; Schurz, 2008a; Hoff-
mann, 2010), which has led to in-depth studies of lesser-known patterns
or strategies (e.g. Darden and Craver, 2002; but also Gauderis and Van De
Putte, 2012, see Chapter 6). (3) Given the general understanding of sci-
ence as a step-by-step process (e.g. Blachowicz, 1998), some have attended
closely to the construction and refinement of models in science, which they
hold to be key instruments of investigation (Morgan and Morrison, 1999).
Due to the heterogeneity of the class of models, this research varies wildly
and is often subject-dependent, as the literature on mechanistic models in
biology illustrates; it is also partially linked to the psychology literature via
the research on model-based reasoning (e.g. Nersessian, 2008). Finally,
(4) computational philosophers of science have continued to refine artifi-
cially intelligent agents in an effort to determine, in the spirit of Simon,
which heuristics and weak problem-solvers might be efficient instruments
of discovery (for an overview, see Darden, 1997).
Although the field has become disciplinarily fragmented in recent years,
the research challenges that bind these different strands are very similar:3
namely (1) to explicate the various heuristic and often context-dependent
“patterns of discovery”4 and the relation between them, (2) to provide
3Several scholars, such as Thagard and Darden, have contributed to more than one of
these lines of research. In general, the various strands give each other’s results a sympathetic
reading.
4Hanson’s phrase (1958) fits remarkably well here, though it does not refer exactly to the
same thing; Hanson himself was more concerned with the ‘discovery of (conceptual) patterns’
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rational and normative guidance on their use, and (3) to pursue the pos-
sibilities of computational discovery and its relation to human discovery.
All three of these challenges are daunting in scope, yet, given the results
obtained in past decades, should not be considered unaddressable. In this
thesis, I aim to contribute to each of these three challenges.
1.3 Four Parts, Four Approaches
This dissertation assesses the topic of hypothesis formation in science from
four different angles, resulting in four main parts each using the method-
ology of a different subdiscipline of philosophy. The main questions that
I address in each of these parts are motivated both by my own empirical
study of the process of hypothesis formation in science and by the research
challenges stated in the literature and the various branches into which it
split.
Part I: Epistemological Considerations In this first part, I seek to under-
stand the cognitive attitude towards a hypothesis from a broader perspec-
tive. The main question I try to answer in this epistemological part, which
connects hypothesis formation in science with human reasoning in general,
is whether the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis can be understood in
terms of common epistemological doxastic concepts such as ‘belief’, ‘de-
grees of belief’ and ‘acceptance’. A better understanding of the rational
attitude towards hypotheses is a first step towards the goal of providing
rational and normative guidance on their formation (the second research
challenge).
Part II: Logical Patterns In this part, which contributes to the first re-
search challenge of explicating the various patterns of hypothesis forma-
tion, my main goal is to characterize some of the major patterns of hy-
pothesis formation by means of formal logics, while assessing the extent to
which a formal approach of these patterns is possible. At the same time, an
effort is made to translate some of these insights to the context of artificial
intelligence, and so contribute to the third research challenge of computa-
tional discovery.
than with the various ‘patterns of discovery’. My own use of the notions ‘patterns of discovery’
and ‘patterns of hypothesis formation’ is intended in the same sense as Schurz’s ‘patterns of
abduction’ (2008a), though in a somewhat more generalized sense (see Section 1.4).
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Part III: A Historical Case While the previous part focused mainly on the
characteristics of some individual patterns, this historical part aims to pro-
vide some initial, largely descriptive, insights into why agents prefer one
pattern over another in a particular context, by means of an in depth study
of a case from the history of modern physics in which several physicists em-
ployed different patterns of hypothesis formation to solve a single anomaly.
Detailed cases such as this one provide the groundwork and benchmarks
for formulating normative guidance on the selection between the various
patterns of discovery (the second research challenge).
Part IV: Thinking about Models In this final part, I will connect the re-
search on hypothesis formation with the part of the literature that attempts
to understand scientific discovery in terms of the construction and use of
scientific models, by addressing the issue of how hypotheses and models
are interwoven in scientific discovery. In this way, by reconnecting two
diverging directions in the literature on scientific discovery, I am able to
provide a richer perspective that benefits all three of the research chal-
lenges.
1.4 ‘Scientific Discovery’ and ‘Abductive Reasoning’
The overview of the literature has made it clear that the notions ‘scientific
discovery’ and certainly ‘abduction’ have been given several interpretations
in the literature. In this section, I want to specify how I will use these
notions in this dissertation and how they connect to my main topic of hy-
pothesis formation in science.
Hypothesis Formation in Science is a Subtopic of Scientific Discovery
Having shrugged off the old connotations of a ‘logic of discovery’, scien-
tific discovery is considered in the current literature (which is firmly based
on actual scientific cases) as a step-by-step process that encompasses not
only hypothesis formation but also hypothesis selection or the evaluation
of their pursuit worthiness, selection of research questions, data gathering,
scientific experimentation, model construction and refinement, etc.
Hence, the topic of this thesis, hypothesis formation in science, does not
aim to capture the full process of scientific discovery but only the subpro-
cess of hypothesis formation. Although it has been clearly shown that the
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification
is impossible to draw sharply (see Section 1.2), it is still common to dis-
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tinguish between these two contexts in the literature, sometimes with the
inclusion of a third intermediate context of pursuit (Laudan, 1977). Using
this distinction, the topic of this dissertation would be a clear fit in the con-
text of discovery, while occasionally addressing the context of pursuit. Yet
the various case studies will make clear that even for hypothesis formation
we cannot avoid having to deal with justificational aspects, even if we do
not focus on the confirmation of hypotheses at all.
Given this qualification, it should be clear that my aim is to focus only
on ‘patterns of discovery’ that are, in the first place, ‘patterns of hypothesis
formation’.
Hypothesis Formation encompasses Abductive Reasoning In the liter-
ature, hypothesis formation and abductive reasoning – defined by Peirce
in its broadest sense as “the process of forming explanatory hypotheses”
(1958, CP 5.172) – are often considered to be more or less the same. This
can lead to ambiguity, because, as explained in Section 1.2, the notion of
abduction has been given several interpretations in the literature and it
is unclear how broadly this type of reasoning should be conceived. Yet
various parts of this dissertation are contributions to the literature on ab-
duction, so I cannot evade using the notion.
Therefore, let me start by specifying how I will use the notion ‘abduc-
tion’ (and the related notion ‘abductive reasoning’) to avoid any chance of
equivocation.
First, with the notion ‘abduction’, I always mean the inference of gener-
ating or formulating explanatory hypotheses; I will, therefore, not consider
‘abduction’ as a more justificational inference, such as the Inference to the
Best Explanation or the selection of the hypothesis most worthy of pur-
suit. I do assume, however, that some processes of explanatory hypothesis
formation are rationally justified while others are not. Yet the result of a
rationally justified hypothesis formation process is to be considered as a
hypothesis: it involves no inference to its truth or to that it is the most
worthy of pursuit.
Second, I will take the notion of ‘abduction’ as the formation of explana-
tory hypotheses in its broadest sense, i.e. as any instance of hypothesis for-
mation for which the hypothesis is (part of) an explanation for the trigger
or research question, without any further restriction concerning the infer-
ence schema according to which the hypothesis should be formed. Using
this interpretation, I consider the often quoted Peircean schema of abduc-
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tion of 1903:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
(Peirce, 1958, CP 5.189)
in the first place as an inference of or an argument for the rationality of
adopting A as a hypothesis in case it is explanatory, rather than a specific
inference schema to generate the new hypothesis A. This interpretation
would accord with what Peirce writes in the previous paragraph:
Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was rec-
ognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explana-
tory hypothesis – which is just what abduction is – was subject
to certain conditions. Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admit-
ted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would
account for the facts or some of them.” (Peirce, 1958, CP 5.188)
It is, however, not my aim to provide an exegesis of Peirce’s writings,
especially as it is generally acknowledged that they contain multiple inter-
pretations of abduction (see Section 1.2). I do agree that this scheme of
abduction can also be useful if it is interpreted as an inference schema to
form new hypotheses, an interpretation that is more in line with Peirce’s
earlier writings of 1878, in which he defined abduction5 as the “inference
of a case from a rule and a result” (Peirce, 1958, CP 2.623) and illustrated
it with the following famous example:
Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, con-
taining different kinds of beans. On the table there is a handful
of white beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags
contains white beans only. I at once infer as a probability, or as
a fair guess, that this handful was taken out of that bag. This
sort of inference is called making an hypothesis. [...]
5At the time, he actually called this inference “hypothesis”, and later he has also called
it “retroduction”. Peirce insisted, however, that he always meant the same thing, even if, in
retrospect, his interpretations really did evolve over time.
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Rule – All the beans from this bag are white.
Result – These beans are white.
∴ Case – These beans are from this bag.
(Peirce, 1958, CP 2.623)
If we would adopt this interpretation of abduction (as it is common
in several logical and AI approaches), it is clear that abduction is a less
broad concept that encompasses only instances of explanatory hypothesis
formation in which the hypothesis or the elements of which it consists are
already known by the agent.
As this thesis deals with hypothesis formation in science in general, it is
more suitable for my purposes to consider the broadest of these two inter-
pretations, i.e. to take abduction as any inference of explanatory hypothesis
formation, including, therefore, instances of creative abduction in which a
new idea, concept, or object is hypothesized.
Given these two conceptual choices concerning the meaning of the no-
tion ‘abduction’, abductive reasoning (restricted to the context of science)
can be considered as a subtopic of my topic: it deals with hypothesis for-
mation processes that are explanatory in nature.
It could be argued that in a scientific context, any hypothesis raised in
response to a research question or trigger can be considered as explanatory
(at least in a broad sense). I leave it open whether this is the case, as this
is a conceptual issue concerning how broadly the notion of ‘explanatory’
should be conceived. Yet I do consider my topic to be broader than what is
dealt with in the literature on abduction. The main reason is that my start-
ing point is hypothesis formation as it can be observed in actual scientific
case studies. While studying such cases (see e.g. Part III), one encoun-
ters certain types of hypotheses that are never considered in the literature
on abduction, such as suggesting that a particular law or generalization
should be reconsidered or hypothesizing that two variables are somehow
connected. Leaving it open whether such hypotheses should be considered
explanatory or not, I also want to include patterns of hypothesis formation
that lead to these kinds of hypotheses in my analysis, even if they are gen-
erally not included in lists of patterns of abduction in the literature. Hence,
I conceive of ‘patterns of hypothesis formation’ as a notion encompassing
the various ‘patterns of abduction’.
Still, there is no doubt that abductive reasoning constitutes the major
part of hypothesis formation in science. Many parts of this dissertation,
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especially the more logical chapters, will thus also be contributions to the
literature on abduction, though always using the notion ‘abduction’ in the
above delineated sense.
1.5 Some Common Themes
In this section, I discuss some common themes that connect the various
parts and methodologies used in this dissertation.
Empirical Philosophy Although I do reason at times from a priori argu-
ments, the starting point of my investigation is an empirical phenomenon,
i.e. how hypotheses are formed in actual scientific practice. The constraints
resulting from these empirical observations serve as benchmarks for my
philosophical endeavors.
This kind of empirically flavored philosophy always presents an obvious
tension, and this will be apparent in several places: the tension between
description and normativity. Clearly, the main aim of philosophy has al-
ways been normative: as this thesis is meant to qualify as a dissertation
in philosophy, it is my goal to draw normative conclusions concerning how
hypotheses should be formed in science. On the other hand, by focusing
in the first place on the empirical phenomenon of hypothesis formation in
science, my analysis also has a strongly descriptive nature.
It would be presumptuous to claim that I have an answer or method
that resolves this tension. The reader will find that some parts lean more
towards description, others more towards prescription. The only guideline
I could handle in charting the path of my reasoning is coherence between
normative efforts and descriptive claims. I leave it to the reader to judge
whether I have succeeded in this.
Philosophical Interdisciplinarity To assess this single empirical pheno-
menon, I have combined methods from various philosophical subdisci-
plines: epistemology, logic, history and philosophy of science. The ad-
vantage is clear. I am quite convinced that in this dissertation I can present
a richer and broader view of hypothesis formation in science than I could
have presented by focusing on a single method only. On the other hand,
it has a clear disadvantage too: if in general focusing on one method and
topic already leaves ample of opportunity for further in-depth research,
using various methods leaves a multitude of possibilities for further and
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deeper exploration: I could have characterized more patterns of hypothesis
formation, I could have analyzed a second major case study to confirm the
results of my first one, I could have related my research more thoroughly
to other existing questions in the literature, etc.
Obviously, there is no straightforward answer to this trade-off; it de-
pends on the topic, and it is even, to a certain extent, a matter of taste.
Still, in response to those who favor a single approach, I can point out
that for each philosophical discipline, I have contributed to the existing lit-
erature in the form of stand-alone articles that are published or currently
under review. And further, I have to content myself with the idea that time
is finite, and so are dissertations.
Actual Case Studies from Physics As my starting point is actual hypoth-
esis formation in science, this thesis contains a substantial number of actual
case studies. Because a sufficient level of acquaintance with a field is re-
quired to understand the finesses of scientists’ individual reasoning, these
are all taken from my personal area of expertise, i.e. theoretical physics
and astronomy.6 Therefore, my conclusions are in principle tailored only
to hypothesis formation in the physical sciences. I leave it to the reader to
judge how far my conclusions reach in other fields.
Three Perspectives on Hypothesis Formation The process of hypothesis
formation in science can be (and has been) studied from a vast number of
perspectives. These many perspectives can in principle be assembled into
three broad categories according to their main point of focus: the scientific
community, the individual researcher, or the individual reasoning steps.
Each of these three (broad) perspectives highlights different aspects of the
hypothesis formation process.
Using the analogy of a zooming camera, we can first fully zoom out
and study the macro structure in which a hypothesis is formed: the field,
paradigm and research group the scientist is working in. This level de-
termines both the problems or research questions and the general frame-
work to solve these. Next we can zoom in to the level of the individual
researcher. At this level we can distinguish personal preferences, general
experience and metaphysical assumptions that steer the hypothesis forma-
tion process in certain directions. Finally, we can fully zoom in to the micro
6I have made an effort to keep everything understandable for the average philosopher
with an interest in science.
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structure of individual reasoning steps. At this level we can observe the
actual steps of hypothesis formation; yet without looking at the sense of
direction provided by the higher levels we would be unable to understand
how these steps accumulate.
It is clear that every perspective requires its own methods of investi-
gation. While logics and other formal approaches are, for instance, well-
suited to study individual reasoning steps in a generalized way, history and
philosophy of science are more suited to understand how the various per-
spectives relate in a single case. Throughout the various parts of this dis-
sertation, I attempt, by using various methodologies, to address more than
one of these perspectives, though the main focus is on the perspectives of
individual reasoning steps and individual researchers.
Qualitative Approach All of the approaches in this thesis are qualitative.
While the use of quantitative techniques such as Bayesian reasoning can-
not be underestimated for hypothesis evaluation, their use is generally not
crucial to understand the process of hypothesis generation.
1.6 A Note on the Structure of this Dissertation
This thesis is based on a collection of eight research articles, five of which
are published or accepted for publication, two currently under review (De-
cember 2013), and one still in preparation. Each of these articles, of which
one has a co-author, constitutes the main part of one of the following eight
chapters.
Yet, although these eight articles are meant to be stand-alone papers,
I have made a substantial effort to convert them into a single coherent
volume. To this end, I have added this general introduction, a specific
introduction for each main part, a general conclusion, and some additional
sections to keep the papers up to date. Further, some sections and smaller
passages are revised for general consistency of the thesis, and a uniform
style sheet has been applied. Yet, given the stand-alone character of the








In this first part, I will take some distance from hypotheses as they are
understood specifically in the context of science in order to look in general
at what it actually means for an agent to entertain a hypothesis, a query
that brings me to the philosophical discipline of epistemology.
My main goal is to understand how the attitude towards a hypothe-
sis, i.e. entertaining a hypothesis can be analyzed in epistemological terms.
More particularly, I want to specify how this attitude relates to other propo-
sitional attitudes such as belief, having a degree of confidence and accep-
tance.
The core assumption at the heart of this part of the dissertation is that
entertaining a hypothesis is a propositional attitude, more specifically a
doxastic attitude, which could be understood from a broader perspective
than that of scientific reasoning alone.
This assumption should be rather easy to digest. It is clear that once an
agent has formulated a new hypothesis, she has a certain attitude towards
it: she thinks that this proposition might be true, or at least relevant for
her further actions. In other words, she thinks that this idea can possibly
lead her to certain true beliefs. As such, it is clear that there is no a priori
reason to state that this attitude could only be held towards propositions in
a scientific context. Also in daily life, people are confronted with questions
for which they have no direct answers, yet for which they might suggest
possible hypotheses that lead them eventually to such answers.
If we divide the class of propositional attitudes (as is common in the
literature) into a class of belief-like attitudes and a class of desire-like at-
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titudes, it is clear that entertaining a hypothesis is a kind of belief-like
attitude, also called a doxastic attitude (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2 for a more
precise definition). In formulating a hypothesis we intent to represent the
world as it is; we do not, as in the case of desire-like attitudes, intent to
adapt the world to our hypotheses.
strengths and weaknesses of the method
Strengths The main strength of studying hypotheses from an epistemo-
logical point of view is that it allows us to study an aspect of scientific
methodology from a much broader perspective and in connection with
other forms of human reasoning. This gives us certain insights into what
scientists are actually doing and how they perceive hypotheses that would
be hard to obtain by focusing only on scientific practice itself.
Also, the method of conceptual analysis and counterexample, which
constitutes the backbone of analytic epistemology, allows us to analyze to
a very high degree of detail the differences between the various doxastic
attitudes, which gives us in turn a sufficiently refined picture to craft a
normative stance concerning the rationality of adopting these attitudes.
Weaknesses However, the method of conceptual analysis is also often
criticized for considering only very stylized and simple (toy) examples. The
use of such abstract examples to purify the attitudes and boil them down
to their essence gives at times a legitimate reason to question whether this
analysis still applies to real life examples, certainly in such a complex en-
vironment as scientific practice. Mindful of this threat, I have tried, in
crafting my account of the doxastic attitude towards hypotheses, to make
it compatible with actual cases, such as the one studied in Part III.
A final drawback for my purposes is the fact that the field of epistemol-
ogy has paid hardly any attention to the attitude towards hypotheses, as
the field is centered around the core attitudes of belief and knowledge. Yet
as it turns out that the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis is not reducible
to an attitude of belief (see Section 3.2), I have had first to deconstruct
the attitude of belief in order to carve out an epistemological niche for the
attitude towards a hypothesis.
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overview of my contributions
In chapter 2, I construct a new conceptual framework to classify various
doxastic concepts. This framework, which distinguishes between an agent’s
theoretical doxastic attitude, i.e. her credence in a proposition, and her prac-
tical doxastic attitude, i.e. her policy on trusting that proposition, can then
be used to assess the doxastic concept ‘belief’. In the literature on doxas-
tic attitudes, the notion ‘belief’ is used in two different ways: on the one
hand as a coarse-grained notion to indicate any attitude of assent towards a
proposition; on the other, as a fine-grained notion that tries to capture the
folk notion of belief. I show how this folk notion of belief is actually am-
biguous, and how it can be deconstructed in terms of the doxastic reference
framework I sketched.
In chapter 3, my attention shifts to the attitude of entertaining a hy-
pothesis or hypothesizing. First, I show that if the triad of doxastic attitudes
‘belief - disbelief - withholding judgment’ should be regarded as capable of
classifying in a coarse-grained manner every uncertainty present in human
reasoning, it needs to be supplemented with a fourth attitude, one of hy-
pothesizing, which cannot be reduced to the other three attitudes. Next, I
use the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapter to define
such an attitude in a more fine-grained manner.

2Two Distinct Doxastic Attitudes
“Arkady Nikolaitch was telling us just now that
you accept no authorities? Don’t you believe in
them?”
“Why should I accept them? And what am I to
believe in? If they tell me the truth, I agree, that’s
all.”
— Turgenev, Fathers and Sons, 1862
This chapter is based on the paper “On Theoretical and Practical Doxastic Atti-
tudes”, which is currently under review (Gauderis, 2014a). I am indebted to Jan
Willem Wieland, Bert Leuridan, Tim De Mey and several anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
In this paper, two different doxastic attitudes are distinguished, i.e. the theoretical
and the practical doxastic attitude, which roughly refer to an agent’s credence in a
proposition and her policy on trusting it in her practical reasoning. This framework
is then used to dispel some ambiguities between various uses of the doxastic concept
‘belief ’ and to clarify its distinction with other doxastic concepts such as ‘degree of
belief ’ and ‘acceptance’.
The original content of the paper is retained, except for some stylistic adaptations.
2.1 The Notion ‘Doxastic Attitude’
The notion of a doxastic attitude entered the general epistemology litera-
ture in the late 1970s, especially via the works of Goldman (e.g. 1978a;
1978b; 1979), who used it to describe in a generic way the propositional
attitude of either belief or disbelief. Since the 1980s, the notion has be-
come more widely used for this purpose, though one generally now adds a
third option of withholding belief or suspending judgment (e.g. Feldman and
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Conee, 1985; Steup, 1988; Chisholm, 1989; Sosa, 1991; Feldman, 2003;
Steup, 2008). In this way, doxastic attitudes have come to be understood
as the three possible attitudes an agent can intellectually adopt towards a
proposition after considering it. This view has also been called Triad (Turri,
2012, p. 355).
As the notion ‘doxastic attitude’ gained currency, several authors started
to also use it to describe a broader class of belief-like attitudes similar but
not identical to the attitude of belief. From his Bayesian stance, Kaplan
started this evolution by calling degrees of confidence – also often referred
to as degrees of belief – doxastic attitudes (1981, p. 310). The attitude of
acceptance, which was introduced in the literature by Van Fraassen (1980,
p. 4), also generally came to be regarded as a doxastic attitude (e.g. Wein-
traub, 1990, p. 165). Kapitan (1986, p. 235) called the attitudes of pre-
suming, feeling and taking for granted lower-level doxastic attitudes; unlike
‘belief’, these notions do not imply the agent’s ability to articulate their
content explicitly. Williams (1989, p. 124) even extended the idea further
by calling hypothesizing and suspecting doxastic attitudes.
Already in 1983, Searle argued for the need to consider these belief-
like attitudes, for some purposes, as a single category, and grouped them
under the label BEL, in contrast with desire-like attitudes, which he called
DES (Searle, 1983, pp. 29-36). Williams (1989, p. 124) made the same dis-
tinction, but named his groups ‘doxastic attitudes’ and ‘orectic attitudes’.
Leaving aside the question of whether all propositional attitudes can be re-
duced to (a combination of) elements of these two groups, it is commonly
accepted in contemporary epistemology that ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are two ba-
sic exemplars, each of them representative of and (for many purposes) in-
terchangeable with a large group of similar propositional attitudes (Oppy,
1998). It is also common practice to call the group of belief-like attitudes
‘doxastic attitudes’ (Engel, 2012; Goldman, 2010, pp. 2, 26).
As we can observe, the notion ‘belief’ has been used in two different
ways in the literature on doxastic attitudes. On the one hand, ‘belief’ is
used as a coarse-grained technical concept designating any doxastic atti-
tude that has an affirmative stance towards its content. This is the case,
for instance, in the Triad position, mentioned above, according to which,
as Turri (2012, p. 361) explains it, an agent chooses to take an attitude of
assent, dissent or neutrality towards a given proposition. If one chooses an
attitude of assent, it is called ‘belief’, irrespective of the intensity, degree,
purpose or circumstances of this assent. For many analytical purposes, this
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abstraction from situational details can safely be made.
On the other hand, in the exploration of the various doxastic attitudes
or belief-like attitudes, ‘belief’ is also employed as a fine-grained concept
designating a specific doxastic attitude intuitively assumed to be more or
less equivalent to a folk psychological notion of belief. This is clearly not
the same use of ‘belief’ as in its coarse-grained meaning, as this fine-grained
meaning is used to explain the other doxastic attitudes and contrast them
with ‘belief’ precisely in terms of differences in intensity, degree, purpose or
circumstances. Furthermore, as a general taxonomy of doxastic attitudes
is lacking,1 the other belief-like attitudes are often defined in terms of or
with respect to such a specific fine-grained notion of belief, which is then
regarded as a primitive and the most central doxastic attitude.2
While this double meaning of ‘belief’ should not itself, if properly con-
ceived, pose a genuine problem, a tendency to conflate these two distinct
uses in the literature has obscured the fact that the fine-grained notion of
‘belief’ is, unlike the rather precise and technical coarse-grained notion,
utterly ambiguous and its specific distinctiveness in relation to other fine-
grained doxastic attitudes is far from clear. As I will show, the example
uses of the notion ‘belief’ in, for instance, the literature on ‘acceptance’
and in the literature on ‘degrees of belief’, seem to point to two different
fine-grained notions.
I address these problems by proposing a taxonomy for specific doxas-
tic attitudes that is not dependent on any specific fine-grained notion of
‘belief’. I base this taxonomy on the idea that each agent actually has
two quite distinct doxastic attitudes towards a given proposition, a theo-
retical and a practical one, corresponding respectively to her credence in
the proposition and her policy on accepting it. This framework, in which
the primitive doxastic concepts are ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘acceptance’, en-
ables me to analyze other specific fine-grained doxastic concepts in terms
of these two, including the intended meaning of a fine-grained notion of
‘belief’, i.e. a meaning that tries to capture the folk notion of belief. It will
turn out that the folk notion of belief is a complex notion that specifies
to a certain degree both an agent’s theoretical and her practical doxastic
attitude towards that proposition. The observed ambiguity in the use of
a fine-grained notion of belief can therefore be attributed to the tendency
1Although a first attempt, from a somewhat different angle, can be found in Engel (2012).
2An exception to this is the literature on ‘degrees of belief’, which often takes the latter
as the central notion, and defines the notion ‘belief’ in terms of it (see Section 2.6).
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of different authors to stress one or the other part of this dual meaning of
‘belief’.
After defining and explaining this doxastic framework in Sections 2.2
and 2.3, and using it to structure the various doxastic concepts in Sec-
tion 2.4, I will use this framework in the final sections to re-assess two
important debates in the literature on doxastic attitudes: namely the dis-
tinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’ (Section 2.5) and the distinction
between ‘(plain) belief’ and ‘degrees of belief’ (Section 2.6).
This elaboration will allow me to defend my reductionist stance to keep
the notion of ‘belief’ philosophically only in its coarse-grained technical
sense (as exemplified in the Triad view), while reducing it to an appropri-
ate expression in terms of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘acceptance’ in cases that
require analysis of a particular and more specific notion of belief.
2.2 Doxastic Attitudes and Doxastic Concepts
I will start by addressing a minor conceptual issue to prevent confusion
later on. In the literature, the notion ‘doxastic attitude’ is actually used in
two senses. On the one hand, one can speak of the doxastic attitude of
an agent towards p: although it gives us no further information about the
nature of this attitude, because it is generic, it refers to the agent’s attitude
itself. On the other hand, one can speak of, for example, ‘assuming’ as a
doxastic attitude. In this case, it refers to the type of an agent’s doxastic
attitude. I will avoid this confusion by using the notion ‘doxastic concept’ for
the different types, and, henceforth, ‘doxastic attitude’ only for the generic
attitude itself. In these terms, we can say, for example, that the nature
of an agent’s doxastic attitude towards p can be specified by choosing an
appropriate doxastic concept such as ‘accepting’, ‘assuming’, ‘being certain’,
etc.3 Moreover, I will restrict my use of the term ‘concept’ to this technical
sense and use the term ‘notion’ for general purposes.
To evade reference to the notion of belief, let me define doxastic atti-
tudes in terms of the notion of direction of fit. This notion, first applied in
the context of propositional attitudes by Searle (1983, p. 7), is a commonly
3It has been suggested to me that the type-token distinction could be used to capture this
difference, but I am afraid that this might cause confusion here: on the one hand, a ‘doxastic
concept’ is a specific interpretation of a generic ‘doxastic attitude’ (hinting that ‘doxastic con-
cepts’ are tokens of the type ‘doxastic attitude’); on the other hand, ‘doxastic concepts’ are still
abstract types of attitudes, while the generic notion ‘doxastic attitude’ is often used to refer to
the (unspecified) token attitude of a particular agent.
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acknowledged way to distinguish doxastic attitudes from other proposi-
tional attitudes, because the direction of fit is regarded as the main differ-
ence between ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, the two basic (coarse-grained) exemplars
of propositional attitudes (Williams, 1989, p. 124; Oppy, 1998).
In adopting a propositional attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit
(for instance, an attitude of belief), an agent aims to match the content of
her attitude to the external world. In case of a mismatch, it is the content
of the attitude that should be adapted. Accordingly, these attitudes can be
judged to be true or false. In adopting a propositional attitude with a world-
to-mind direction of fit (for instance, an attitude of desire), the agent aspires
to match the world to the content of her attitude. In case of a mismatch,
this cannot be remedied by changing the content of the attitude; it is, in a
sense, the world that should be different. Accordingly, these attitudes can
only be judged to be fulfilled or unfulfilled.
I define doxastic attitudes (and, hence, doxastic concepts) to be proposi-
tional attitudes (or concepts) that satisfy the following criteria:
(a) they have a mind-to-world direction of fit;
(b) they have no world-to-mind direction of fit;
(c) they are defined only in terms of criteria that are internal with respect
to the agent holding the attitude.
I have added conditions (2) and (3) to the colloquial definition of a
doxastic attitude in terms of ‘direction of fit’ in order to exclude both propo-
sitional attitudes with a double direction of fit (e.g. ‘fearing that p’, which
involves both thinking that p is credible (mind-to-world) and wanting that
¬p is the case (world-to-mind)) as well as attitudes that depend somehow
on external criteria such as ‘knowing that p’ (for which it is commonly
accepted that this implies, at least, that p is true; a criterion that is inde-
pendent of the agent).
2.3 The Theoretical and the Practical Doxastic Attitude
By considering the various doxastic concepts, one can observe that in fact
they specify two different doxastic attitudes. This has already been noted
by scholars working on the notion of acceptance (e.g. Engel, 2012, pp. 20-
21). Given a proposition p and an agent S, I define these two attitudes as
follows:
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(TDA) the theoretical doxastic attitude: the credence S gives to p or the
confidence S has in the truth of p.
The nature of an agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude towards p can be
found out by asking her: “How likely is it, do you think, that p is true?” Her
response can vary from the expression of a gut feeling to a fully reasoned
answer. In any case, the agent’s attitude will be the result of an assessment
of the truth of p, based on what she regards as relevant evidence for it, and
its expression can range gradually from an absolute disbelief in p to a total
conviction concerning p’s truth.
(PDA) the practical doxastic attitude: the policy S has on trusting p and
relying on its content.
The nature of an agent’s practical doxastic attitude can be found out by
asking her: ‘In which type of circumstances would you let your reasoning
and actions depend on this proposition, and in which not?’ Her response
can vary from a vague reference to some archetypical contexts to a precise
demarcation criterion in terms of a specific property of the circumstances.
Accordingly, S ’s attitude will be the result of an assessment by her of the
practical consequences of relying on the truth of p, and can range from
a willingness to assume p only in hypothetical arguments to accepting p
under any circumstances.
In the event that the context or circumstances are given, let us call
them C, the practical doxastic attitude reduces to the following derivative
attitude:
(PDAC) the practical doxastic attitude in a context: the policy S has on
trusting p in the particular context C, i.e. whether or not she relies
on p in the context C.
This time, an agent’s attitude will be the result of a yes-or-no decision
as to whether she is willing to let her reasoning and actions depend on
p in some given particular situation. As such, the premises for practical
reasoning are constituted by the agent’s practical doxastic attitudes in the
context at hand.
Let me add five further clarifications. Where confusion might arise con-
cerning which variant of the doxastic attitudes is intended, I will add the
relevant acronym, namely TDA, PDA or PDAC.
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First, it is clear that given any proposition and any agent, one can con-
struct an answer to both of the questions stated in the explanations of (TDA)
and (PDA) above. Although these answers may be expressed at different
levels of detail, it is possible to speak both of an agent’s theoretical and
of her practical doxastic attitude towards a particular proposition. These
descriptions are clearly not the same thing: the judgment of a proposition’s
truth (TDA) can be a very balanced report, which is quite independent of
the circumstances one finds oneself in at that moment. On the other hand,
whether one lets one’s reasoning depend on that proposition in a particular
context (PDAC), is a yes-or-no decision which may well turn out differently
in different types of circumstances or for different types of possible actions.
As such, a very subtle policy (PDA) can be generated.
Second, the demarcation between contexts in which the agent relies on
a proposition and those in which she does not (PDA) is determined at least
by the positive consequences the agent foresees in case she is right and the
negative ones she is willing to accept in case she is mistaken. These conse-
quences, which are considered only from the agent’s perspective (in other
words, irrespective of the actual consequences), can vary a great deal and
are often hard to compare. In accordance with Bayesian decision theory,
the weighted sum of the relevant consequences can be called the expected
utility for the agent of relying on a certain proposition in a certain context.
But as it is not needed for our purposes that agents actually make such cal-
culations, it suffices to assume that agents can compare the consequences
they foresee qualitatively.
Third, the attitudes are defined descriptively without reference to ra-
tional behavior or to any normative theory. For rational agents, theoretical
and practical doxastic attitudes are of course related: propositions of which
one is fairly confident that they are true will be relied on in a wide variety
of circumstances, while propositions that one suspects of being false will be
relied on only in contexts in which the penalty of being mistaken is rather
low.
In fact, Bayesian decision theory provides a method for calculating the
most rational practical doxastic attitude in a certain context (PDAC) given
an agent’s degrees of belief towards the relevant propositions (a quantita-
tive description of her TDA) and (quantified) expected utilities of relying
on those propositions in that context. However, agents are clearly not al-
ways able to perform these quantifications and calculations effectively. This
explains why in everyday circumstances, even if an agent intends to be ra-
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tional, her theoretical and practical attitudes will sometimes appear to be
at odds. Also, even rational agents differ in their perceptions of the util-
ities: two agents having the same degree of confidence in a proposition
might rely on it differently in similar circumstances. This explains why the
various folk notions describing doxastic attitudes allow for independent de-
scriptions of an agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitude towards
a certain proposition (see Section 2.4).
Fourth, the theoretical doxastic attitude resembles what classical epis-
temologists typically have in mind when talking about doxastic attitudes
(as it reports the agent’s perception of the truth of a proposition). To them,
the practical doxastic attitude may seem an awkward addition. Yet it is a
genuine doxastic attitude. For recall the three requirements stipulated in
the definition of doxastic attitudes. First, the theoretical doxastic attitude
clearly has a mind-to-world direction of fit: an agent adopts a policy to trust
p depending on how she perceives the world and what might happen in it,
and therefore her policy reflects her perception of the world.4 Secondly,
there is no world-to-mind direction of fit with respect to p: in purely spec-
ifying the circumstances in which she trusts p, an agent does not express
any desire that the world should confirm to the content of p. Thirdly, the
attitude is defined solely in term of the agent’s internal perception of the
circumstances, the consequences she herself foresees and her assessment
of the trustworthiness of the proposition, all of which are criteria internal
to her.
Fifth, it is common to define the philosophical notion of ‘degrees of
belief’ technically in terms of dispositions to bet, which would reduce the
theoretical doxastic attitude (TDA) to a mere variation of the practical dox-
astic attitude (PDA). Such an operationalist view, which has proven to be
an excellent starting point for rational decision theory, is, however, not
a problem for the framework I am proposing here. My goal is to distin-
guish two qualitatively distinct human modes of assessing a proposition,
resulting in two doxastic attitudes, which can be independently described
in a qualitative way, a distinction that is reflected in the various doxastic
4To clarify this point, consider the following example: an agent S decides to accept the
proposition p, having no specified theoretical attitude towards it, for a certain research context
(a context in which the consequences of being mistaken are negligible; see Section 3.3 for a
more precise definition). Suppose that during this research, S gathers evidence that p is very
unlikely. Apart from specifying S ’s theoretical doxastic attitude towards p, this evidence will
also lead S to adapt her practical doxastic attitude: S will now accept p in hardly any context
(where before she was willing to trust it for research contexts). In other words, the agent
aims to match her policy (her attitude) to the perceived external world.
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folk notions (see Section 2.4). I accept that, for the theoretical attitude, it
may be possible that humans can only make qualitative comparisons, and
that, if the attitude needs to be operationalized quantitatively (for use in
a normative theory of decision making), this can probably be done only
by equating theoretical attitudes (TDA) with practical doxastic attitudes for
certain artificial and purified contexts (PDAC) such as “no strings attached”
bets.5 Yet though it can be argued that the quantitative operationaliza-
tion of the notion ‘degrees of belief’ is, in a technical sense, an (artificial)
practical doxastic attitude, the notion can still be used qualitatively as a
primitive doxastic concept to describe the theoretical doxastic attitude, as
this operationalization is not required for describing various folk notions of
doxastic attitudes.
In summary, then, and taking the agent’s evidence to be fixed at a cer-
tain moment, the theoretical doxastic attitude (TDA) is a context-insensitive
doxastic attitude that allows for a range of degrees of confidence in the
truth of p, while the practical doxastic attitude (PDA) is a context-sensitive
attitude that reduces to a yes-or-no decision in each context (PDAC) de-
pending on the expected utility of the two options in that context. For
rational agents, these two attitudes towards a certain proposition are re-
lated, but the nature of this relation depends on how each particular agent
balances her theoretical appraisal with expected utility.
2.4 Three Categories of Doxastic Concepts
The many known doxastic concepts, such as ‘doubting’, ‘accepting’, ‘as-
suming’, ‘having some confidence’, ‘suspending judgment’, ‘hypothesizing’,
‘being certain of’, ‘suspecting’ and ‘believing’ (in its specific and intuitive
folk psychological meaning) may all be regarded as (partial) descriptions
of the nature of either one or both of the two doxastic attitudes I have
distinguished.
Of these doxastic concepts, some, such as ‘having a particular degree of
confidence in (the truth of) p’, ‘giving p some credit’ or ‘being (un)certain
of p’ give a clear description of the nature of the theoretical doxastic at-
titude of the agent towards the proposition. They specify up to a certain
level of detail how the agent judges the truth of p, but give hardly any in-
5In real life, winning or losing a bet has not only monetary consequences, but also psycho-
logical and social ones in the form of joy, sadness, self confidence boosts or dips, gain and/or
loss of social prestige, etc. Therefore, it is hard to call the bet contexts used to define ‘degrees
of belief’ actual real-life contexts.
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formation about when the agent intends to let her reasoning depend on p.
For instance, suppose that an agent acknowledges that her chances of re-
covering from a disease are fifty-fifty (TDA). In other words, her degree of
confidence in the truth of either possibility, of recovering or not, is equally
large. This information tells us nothing about her practical doxastic atti-
tudes (PDA). An optimistic person might base all her practical reasoning
and actions on the premise that she will recover, while a pessimist might
do the opposite. As concepts of this type describe only the theoretical dox-
astic attitude of an agent towards p, they can be called, in short, theoretical
doxastic concepts. Of these, ‘having a particular degree of confidence in the
truth of p’ can be regarded as the basic or primitive notion, because it al-
lows for a description of any theoretical doxastic attitude by specifying ‘a
particular degree’ qualitatively. For example, ‘being certain’ means having
full confidence, while ‘giving some credit’ means that one takes ‘a particular
degree’ to mean a substantial amount, but generally less than the amount
of confidence in the other option.
Other doxastic concepts, such as ‘accepting that p is the case’, ‘suspend-
ing judgment as to whether p is the case’, ‘taking p to be a relevant possi-
bility’ are examples of practical doxastic concepts. They indicate the type of
circumstances or contexts in which the agent will let her reasoning depend
on p (or not) (PDA), while giving hardly any further information about
exactly how much confidence the agent has in the truth of p (TDA). For
instance, in most circumstances, people accept that in general their part-
ner will not lie to them (PDA), but if asked how certain they are about this
(TDA), some would answer that they have some doubts whether this is re-
ally the case, while others would be fully confident. Similarly, if an agent
suspends judgment as to whether p is the case, and thus does not rely on
p in any context (PDA), one does not know whether, theoretically, p or
¬p seems more plausible to her (TDA). Of the practical doxastic concepts,
‘accepting’ can be considered the primitive notion, because it allows for a
description of any practical doxastic attitude (PDA) by specifying in which
contexts the agent accepts the proposition (PDAC).
Finally, some doxastic concepts, such as ‘believing that p’, ‘doubting
whether p’, ‘being ignorant about p’ have both a theoretical and a practical
meaning, or, in other words, describe to some degree the nature of both the
agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitude towards p. For instance,
when an agent believes p (in its intuitive folk meaning), we certainly know
that she has a high degree of confidence in the truth of p (TDA), but we also
know (because people state their beliefs when prompted to give reasons for
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their actions) that she will be willing to base her practical reasoning on p
as a premise in a large range of circumstances (PDA). The ambiguity of this
notion arises from the fact that one can emphasize one part or the other,
the theoretical or the practical, as we will see in the following sections.
The remainder of this chapter will examine how to understand this dual
nature, both theoretical and practical, of the folk notion of ‘belief’. This will
be done by applying the conceptual framework presented thus far in or-
der to reassess two important debates in epistemology: namely concerning
the difference between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’ and the difference between
‘(plain) beliefs’ and ‘degrees of belief’.
The main goal of this analysis will be to show that ‘belief’ cannot be
retained as a specific fine-grained primitive doxastic concept (apart from
its technical coarse-grained meaning). If one tries to capture the intuitive
sense of the folk notion of belief, one obtains a complex and, hence, sec-
ondary notion, reducible to a suitable expression of ‘degrees of confidence’
and ‘acceptances’. I will argue that these two concepts are far better suited
than ‘belief’ to be considered as primitive doxastic concepts, because each
of them specifies only one of the two doxastic attitudes. Still, precisely
because of this dual nature of the folk notion of belief, the notion of ‘be-
lief’ can be retained in its coarse-grained philosophical sense, as denoting
any doxastic attitude (either practically or theoretically) that assents to its
content, as long as one takes care to specify the attitude more precisely in
detailed philosophical analysis.
2.5 Belief and Acceptance
The notion ‘acceptance’ was introduced by Van Fraassen (1980, p. 4) to
describe the attitude of scientists towards their most empirically adequate
theories. According to him, acceptance of a theory does not necessarily en-
tail that one believes it (1980, p. 9, 46), yet at the same time encompasses
more than belief, because the attitude of acceptance has the pragmatic di-
mension of commitment to a theory, which is a question not of truth but of
usefulness (1980, p. 88).
Given the importance of the notion of acceptance in general and its
difference from belief, it soon became a research topic for epistemology.
The most influential epistemological account to date has been given by
Cohen, who defines acceptance of p as having or adopting
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[...] a policy of deeming, positing or postulating that p – i.e.
of including that proposition or rule among one’s premises for
deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or
not one feels it to be true that p. (Cohen, 1992, p. 4)
Cohen further states that acceptance, unlike belief, is more or less under
an agent’s voluntary control (1992, p. 20) and acknowledges implicitly that
acceptance is a context-dependent notion (1992, p. 14). These two char-
acteristics are also stressed by other authors such as Bratman (1992, pp. 5,
9) and Engel (1998, pp. 145-148). Engel further holds that, while truth is
the criterion for evaluating beliefs, utility is the criterion for acceptances.
A final explanation of the distinction between these two notions is given
by Lehrer (2000, p. 209), who approaches the topic from a somewhat dif-
ferent point of view. According to him, belief is a first-order doxastic state,
while acceptance is a second-order “metamental” state based on a reflec-
tive evaluation of one’s first-order beliefs. Yet I am tempted here to follow
Engel (2012), who notes that Lehrer’s account neglects the important prag-
matic aspect of acceptance as well as the idea of trust, which is inherent
in the notion. Therefore, I do regard acceptance as a first-order attitude
having propositions as its content, not beliefs. Yet this does not prevent
one from regarding beliefs, in the spirit of Lehrer’s view, as constitutive in
the formation of one’s acceptances. If the acceptance towards a proposi-
tion is consciously formed (by e.g. applying a kind of decision theory), this
decision will clearly have taken into account beliefs about this proposition
and related ones, such as the foreseen consequences of particular actions.
Using the framework introduced in this chapter, it seems at first sight
possible to describe the distinction between these two notions as the differ-
ence between a theoretical doxastic concept (‘belief’) and a practical one
(‘acceptance’). Of the four contrasting features between beliefs and ac-
ceptances that are pointed out in the literature, the context-sensitivity of
acceptances (and practical doxastic attitudes in general) and utility as their
evaluation criterion have already been discussed in previous sections. The
other two contrasting features relate to the fact that an agent’s practical
doxastic attitude (PDAC) can be the result of a decision. Given that such a
decision takes into account the agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude (TDA),
among other things such as an assessment of the circumstances, it can be
understood why acceptances are more under an agent’s voluntary control
and influenced by her theoretical doxastic attitudes.
Notwithstanding the prima facie plausibility of this first analysis of the
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distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’, Frankish argues convincingly
that distinguishing these attitudes as such – in our framework, considering
belief as a theoretical doxastic concept and acceptance as a practical one –
is problematic, because it “suggests that acceptance is not a form of belief
at all, but a wholly different attitude” (2004, p. 86). He agrees that there
are acceptances that are not beliefs, but maintains that “it would be per-
verse to claim that none of them are” (2004, p. 87). In other words, people
do believe some (if not most) of the states present in their conscious prac-
tical reasoning. Frankish’s concern is a genuine one. It may be pointed
out in response that regarding beliefs and acceptances as distinct attitudes
does not imply that an agent could not hold both of them towards a sin-
gle proposition. But the fact that beliefs can serve as premises even if no
form of decision theory or other form of conscious consideration is applied
suggests that the adoption of a new belief must in itself directly imply the
acceptance of this newly believed proposition for certain circumstances. In
other words, acceptance for certain circumstances is part of the meaning
of the attitude of believing, such that the folk notion of ‘belief’ cannot be a
purely theoretical doxastic concept.
Frankish explains this problem by classifying plain beliefs as a sub-
species of acceptances, i.e. those that are “epistemically motivated and un-
restricted as to context” (2009, p. 86). His explanation, however, seems
at least a little awkward, because context-dependency is an inherent fea-
ture of Cohen’s definition of acceptance, which Frankish himself embraces.
Frankish’s idea of unrestrictedness as to context implies that a belief can
serve as a premise for practical reasoning in any context. But if a believed
proposition may be considered a true premise in any context, this is the
same, it seems, as adopting a policy of trusting the belief in any context:
for there is no longer any demarcation between contexts in which one can
trust the belief and those in which one cannot. This view is hugely prob-
lematic. Kaplan (1996, p. 104), who calls it the act view, argues that it
is fallacious – a fact of which Frankish (2009, p. 82) is aware – because
agents are not certain of their beliefs. Hence, they will, for example, not
bet on the truth of their beliefs if the stakes are too high, even if they are
fully convinced. The act view would instruct them to always trust their
belief and accept any bet.
The initial explanation of the distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘accep-
tance’, outlined above, can be modified as follows in order to cope with
Frankish’s concern. ‘Acceptance’ is, as noted, a purely practical doxastic
concept, but the folk notion of ‘belief’ actually has both a theoretical and
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a practical meaning. On the one hand, it means that an agent has at least
a rather high degree of confidence in the truth of the proposition. Exactly
how high need not be numerically expressible, but a decent amount that
is clearly larger that the amount of confidence in the opposite proposition
is always minimally implied. On the other hand, it also means that the
agent is willing to base her practical reasoning on this proposition in at
least all contexts where the negative consequences in case she is mistaken
seem acceptable to her.6 This includes contexts where she cannot or does
not assess these consequences, but where she has no reason to think that
much depends on whether she trusts this proposition or not.
Keeping this in mind, one can identify the well-known examples in the
literature on ‘acceptance’, in which an agent does not act or reason on her
beliefs, as contexts where these negative consequences are unacceptable
for the agent. Consider the following example, often cited and originally
developed by Cohen (1992, p. 25): an attorney accepts that her client is
innocent in the context of a particular trial, even though her own belief
is that he is guilty. She does not accept her own belief in the context of
the trial because the negative consequences of acting on that belief are
unacceptable in this context, not only for her personal career but also,
and more importantly, for the social institution of the judicial system. In
contexts where the negative consequences of accepting her own belief are
not so prominent, for example when she talks about the case with her
husband/wife, the attorney might express and reason upon her own belief.
In conclusion, the folk notion of ‘belief’ describes the nature of both the
theoretical and the practical attitude of an agent towards a certain proposi-
tion, and should therefore be handled with care. This double meaning – on
the one hand, having a sufficiently high degree of confidence in the propo-
sition’s truth (TDA), and on the other, being willing to rely on it in at least
all contexts where the consequences of being mistaken seem to be accept-
able (PDA) – also explains the diverging views one finds in the debate about
‘belief’ and ‘acceptance’, because it is possible to lay the emphasis more on
the theoretical or on the practical aspect of belief. When Van Fraassen,
Cohen and others try to identify the differences between acceptances and
beliefs, they appeal to intuitions about the theoretical meaning of ‘belief’,
6Of course, holding a belief might entail that one accepts it in many more contexts. For
instance, if I come to believe that there are no cars coming down the road by having a look in
both directions, I will accept this proposition in the present context in which I have to decide
whether I will cross the road, even though the consequences of being mistaken – being hit by
a car – are not at all acceptable to me.
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a meaning which ‘acceptance’ lacks. But when Frankish rightly points out
that some acceptances actually are beliefs, he appeals to existing intuitions
about the practical meaning of ‘belief’.
2.6 Belief, Degrees of Belief and the Bayesian Challenge
The conceptual framework of this chapter and the double meaning of the
folk notion of belief can also help explain the distinction between the con-
cepts ‘(plain) belief ’ and ‘partial belief ’, the attitude of having a particular
degree of confidence or degree of belief in a proposition, as well as the re-
quirement put on any explication of this distinction by the Bayesian Chal-
lenge. This is the name given by Kaplan (1996, pp. 89-101) to a problem
that has been formulated in various ways by different authors; see for ex-
ample Jeffrey (1970, pp. 158-161) for an early formulation and Frankish
(2009, p. 76) for a fairly recent one. Let us consider Frankish’s formulation
here. As he writes:
Bayesian decision theory teaches us that the rational way to
make decisions is to assign degrees of probability and desirabil-
ity to the various possible outcomes of candidate actions and
then choose the one that offers the best trade-off of desirability
and likely success. [...] How can flat-out belief and desire have
the psychological importance they seem to have, given their ap-
parent irrelevance to rational action? (Frankish, 2009, p. 76)
It is my own view, and the view of the authors who have formulated the
Bayesian Challenge, that any account of the relation between plain belief
and degrees of belief must also give a satisfying answer to this challenge.
Generally speaking, three strategies to specify the relation between ‘plain
belief’ and ‘partial belief’ are discernible in the literature.
A first strategy, and the one that has been most extensively explored, is
what Foley has called the Lockean Thesis:
To say that we believe a proposition is just to say that we are
sufficiently confident of its truth for our attitude to be one of
belief. (Foley, 1992, p. 111)
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Yet this strategy, which, in our framework, identifies ‘believing that p’ as a
theoretical doxastic concept and defines it in terms of a threshold for the
degree of belief in p, faces two severe threats.
First, this strategy has to cope with the famous lottery and preface para-
doxes (Kyburg, 1961, p. 197; Makinson, 1965), which show that the Lock-
ean thesis can yield inconsistent beliefs when combined with the aggrega-
tion principle for beliefs (which states that the conjunction of two beliefs is
also a belief). These paradoxes are typically met by softening or qualifying
the aggregation principle,7 but this is generally done by introducing some
context-sensitivity, which is hard to bring into accordance with the idea that
degrees of belief (to which beliefs can, according to the Lockean thesis, be
reduced) are, like all theoretical doxastic concepts, context-independently
defined.8
Second, this strategy also fails to meet the Bayesian Challenge, given
that this challenge to explain the psychological importance of plain beliefs
appeals particularly to intuitions of ‘belief’ as a practical doxastic concept.
Theoretically, there may be a very minimal difference between an acquired
belief and a proposition that falls just short of the threshold for belief, as
degrees of belief are considered to be on a continuous scale. The Bayesian
view perfectly explains how even a small difference in this regard can lead
to widely divergent decisions based on this belief. It cannot explain, how-
ever, why agents, once they have acquired a belief, tend to take it into ac-
count in the most diverse situations, even situations to which the acquired
belief is only marginally significant. This behavior can only be understood
if we assume that an agent does not run a full Bayesian analysis for any
decision but simply adopts a policy to start relying on a belief in a large set
of contexts once she has acquired it.
A second common strategy to specify the relation between ‘(plain) be-
lief’ and ‘partial belief’ is to regard ‘plain belief’ as a kind of behavioral dis-
position arising from an agent’s partial beliefs, e.g. a disposition to assert
the belief as a proposition (Kaplan, 1996, p. 109) or to accept it (Frankish,
2009, p. 86). These strategies identify belief solely as a practical doxastic
concept. However, while this identification may meet the Bayesian Chal-
7See Douven (2002, 2008) for some alternative approaches.
8It might be argued that if degrees of belief are defined in terms of betting behavior, they
are in fact context-dependent. But the artificial context of a “no strings attached” bet, which
is created to operationalize the idea of degrees of belief and has no real occurence, should not
be confused with the context in which a real agent is situated and in which she needs to take
a decision. Her degree of belief in a proposition is independent of this actual context.
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lenge, it fails to accord with our common (theoretical) intuitions about the
context-insensitivity of beliefs. As long as there are no changes in the ev-
idence an agent perceives, she will likely suppose that her beliefs hold in
any context she may find herself in, while a characterization of ‘belief’ as
a practical doxastic concept requires – to avoid the pitfall of the aforemen-
tioned act view – that one limits the set of circumstances in which the belief
holds.
Finally, some authors, such as Bratman (1992) and Jeffrey (1970), seem
implicitly to deny the existence of plain beliefs and reduce them in every
case either to a degree of belief or to an acceptance in certain contexts.
To implement this third strategy explicitly seems to me the best pro-
posal. The intuitive folk notion of belief entails both, theoretically, that
the agent has a sufficiently high context-insensitive degree of confidence in
the truth of the proposition and, practically, that the agent has adopted a
policy of relying on this proposition in at least all circumstances where the
consequences of being mistaken seem acceptable to her.
This duality in the meaning of the notion can give rise to ambiguity,
hence making it unfit for the philosophical analysis of doxastic concepts.
Consider again some of the examples described above, which pop up in the
literature. Take the attorney who believes that her client is actually guilty:
does this mean that, although the attorney is quite confident about her
client’s guilt (TDA), she practically bases all her reasoning on his innocence
(PDA)? Or does it mean that, except for her public appearances in court,
she reasons on the basis of his guilt to determine her strategy (PDA)? Or
consider another example, of a woman who believes that her husband/wife
is not cheating on her. Does this just mean that she takes this to be the case
without questioning it (PDA), although she has to admit that she cannot
be fully certain (TDA)? Or does it mean that she is also wholeheartedly
confident about it (TDA)? Clearly, the notion of ‘belief’ is not precise enough
to describe the particular attitudes in these examples.
In light of these considerations, it seems clear that we can gain precision
in our analyses of doxastic concepts by replacing any fine-grained specific
concept of ‘belief’ with the more precise and primitive concepts of ‘degrees
of confidence’ and ‘acceptance’, for using the latter concepts makes it pos-
sible to clarify whether the theoretical, the practical or both attitudes are
meant. Still, when agents report on their doxastic attitudes towards p, the
attitudes of ‘having a high degree of confidence in p’ and ‘being willing to
rely on p if the negative consequences seem acceptable’ are often present
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together. Therefore, I see no problem in retaining the folk notion of ‘belief’
as a somewhat ambiguous but sufficiently clear shorthand to denote both
attitudes in daily life. Also, precisely because of its rather broad meaning,
‘belief’ in a coarse-grained sense can be retained as a technical concept re-
ferring to any doxastic concept that expresses an attitude of assent to its
content. In detailed philosophical analysis, however, much precision can
be gained by eliminating altogether the idea that there exists a specific and
unambiguous fine-grained doxastic notion of ‘belief’.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown that, in the literature on ‘doxastic attitudes’,
the notion of ‘belief’ is used both in a coarse-grained sense to indicate any
doxastic attitude that indicates assent towards a proposition, and in a more
specific, fine-grained sense to be contrasted with other doxastic concepts
such as ‘acceptance’ or ‘having a specific degree of belief’. I have argued
that, while the coarse-grained meaning of ‘belief’ is technically sound and
useful for philosophical analysis, the fine-grained meaning, which draws
on the intuitive folk notion of belief, is utterly ambiguous.
In order to dispel this ambiguity, I have presented a new framework for
describing fine-grained doxastic attitudes which is not reliant on a specific
and intuitively clear fine-grained concept of ‘belief’. In this framework, I
distinguish between an agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude (her credence
in p) and her practical doxastic attitude (her policy on trusting p to be used
as a premise for her practical reasoning). Given this distinction, all well-
known doxastic concepts can be placed into one of three categories: theo-
retical doxastic concepts (of which ‘having a certain degree of confidence’
is the primitive notion), practical doxastic concepts (of which ‘acceptance’
is the primitive notion) and doxastic concepts that describe both attitudes,
such as the folk notion of ‘belief’.
After introducing this framework, I have argued for a reductionist stance
concerning the idea of an unambiguous and specific fine-grained notion of
‘belief’ and showed that much precision can be gained in philosophical
analysis by using a suitable combination of ‘degrees of belief’ and ‘accep-
tances’ whenever the folk notion of ‘belief’ is intended.
The applications of this new framework need not, and should not, be
restricted to the analysis of ‘belief’. An interesting question for further
research is whether this framework can provide us with insights into the
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specific nature of other important doxastic concepts, such as ‘suspending
judgment’ and various forms of ignorance. In the following chapter, I will
show how this framework can be fruitfully applied to explicate the doxastic
attitude of ‘entertaining a hypothesis’. Furthermore, it needs to be investi-
gated whether this reductionist stance on a specific fine-grained notion of
belief might also give us more precision in other epistemological debates
that rely heavily on the notion of belief, such as debates about rationality,
justification and the theory of knowledge.

3The Attitude of Entertaining aHypothesis
I can live with doubt and uncertainty and not
knowing. I think it’s much more interesting to live
not knowing than to have answers which might be
wrong.
— Richard Feynman, BBC Horizon, 1981
This chapter is based on an unpublished paper. I am indebted to Jan Willem
Wieland, Tim De Mey, Christoph Kelp, Bert Leuridan, Atocha Aliseda and Maarten
Van Dyck for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, terminology and presentations.
In this paper, it is first argued that the classical epistemological triad ‘belief - disbe-
lief - withholding (judgment)’ should be supplemented with the attitude of entertaining
a hypothesis or hypothesizing, after which this last doxastic attitude is characterized
by means of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2.
3.1 Uncertainties and Doxastic Attitudes
Psychological uncertainties, i.e. propositions of which an agent is not cer-
tain whether they are true or false, figure prominently in human reason-
ing.1 They arise not only when information is obtained from dubious or
unreliable sources. Human reasoning consists also in a large part of defea-
sible inferences, such as induction or abduction, and each of these add in
general some uncertainty to the propositions present in one’s reasoning.
Yet it is commonly accepted that uncertainty does not prevent us from
rationally relying on such uncertain propositions as premises for our further
1Two different kinds of (un)certainty can be distinguished: a belief is psychologically cer-
tain if the agent is fully convinced of its truth (yet might be mistaken), whereas it is epistemi-
cally certain if it has the highest possible epistemic status, generally including a warrant for its
truth (Reed, 2011). This chapter deals only with psychological certainties and uncertainties.
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reasoning or for determining our course of action. For example, somebody
who just finds out that her wallet is no longer in her pocket, will generally
infer that it might have been stolen. She will then trust this conclusion
sufficiently to base some of her actions on it, such as calling the issuer of
her credit cards to block them, something she would never do if she was
certain that her wallet was not stolen. But she is also not certain that it is
actually stolen; it might not even be the most probable explanation: she
could have lost it in her office where a colleague found it, or maybe her
memory is failing her and she simply forgot it at home. Still, in this situa-
tion, it is rationally justified to perform particular actions on the uncertain
premise that it has been stolen. In general, keeping particular uncertain
propositions in mind and basing part of our actions on them is beneficial
for us, even we have no firm belief in these propositions and even if they
are not the most likely statements or explanations.
In epistemology, one’s doxastic attitude towards a proposition,2 can be
described in a coarse-grained manner by identifying it as one of the fol-
lowing triad of doxastic concepts: belief (if the agent’s attitude is one of
assent, or, in other words, she takes the proposition to be true), disbelief
(if she takes it to be false, which is generally considered to be the same
as believing its opposite) or withholding judgment (if she takes neither the
proposition nor its opposite to be true).3 Although this triad of technical
concepts is the basis of many qualitative formal approaches to modeling
human beliefs and human reasoning (e.g. doxastic logics), these three con-
cepts are limited and somehow insufficient to describe an agent’s attitude
towards the uncertainties in her reasoning.
Describing certainties in human reasoning presents no problem: if we
are certain of a proposition, we will regard it as true. The certainties in an
agent’s reasoning can thus be considered as a subset of her beliefs. Uncer-
tainties in human reasoning, on the other hand, are not so easy to describe
with sufficient accuracy in terms of this triad of doxastic concepts. Cer-
tainly, some uncertainties can be counted as beliefs. For instance, an agent
might believe that her children are at school on a regular school day, or
2This is roughly the nature of an agent’s opinion about that proposition after being con-
fronted with it. For a more precise definition of doxastic attitudes, see Section 2.2. For the
distinction between coarse-grained and fine-grained descriptions of a doxastic attitude, see
Section 2.1.
3For references to the literature on this Triad view, see Section 2.1. In describing doxastic
attitudes in a coarse-grained manner, it is, as explained in Chapter 2, not necessary to make a
distinction between an agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitudes.
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that her colleagues will, as they usually do, go for a drink on Friday. Yet, if
pressed, the agent in these cases has to admit that she is not certain about
these statements as they are the result of inductive reasoning. There are
also uncertainties that can be accurately described as disbeliefs. For exam-
ple, an agent might not believe that her 16-year old daughter never kissed
a boy (even if she has no indication at all), or that her colleague never
drinks alcohol (even if she has never seen her doing so).
But not all uncertainties in an agent’s reasoning qualify for one of these
two categories. The main reason is that uncertainties are often mutually
exclusive: there might be several contradicting explanations for an obser-
vation, or there might be several scenarios possible. In such situations,
agents often reason further and act on the basis of several of these op-
tions without making any commitment to the truth of any of these. They
are, therefore, not expressing genuine beliefs or disbeliefs. Consider the
following example:
This morning, I found out (p1) that the mailman has not come
by. My initial thought was (p2) that the book I ordered had not
yet arrived and there was no other mail. But when I saw my
neighbor a bit later, she told me (p3) that the mailman didn’t
look too well yesterday. So, at that point I realized that it was
also possible (p4) that the mailman is sick today.
At first, it is certainly rational for the agent to believe p2. But this attitude
towards p2 is dynamic: after getting the information p3, she has to re-assess
and adjust her attitude towards p2, as p4 has emerged as a possible option
as well. Although the explanations p2 and p4 are not strictly mutually
exclusive, the agent will generally not believe both of them at the same
time (as either one of them alone suffices to explain p1). Neither will she,
if she has no further information, disbelieve both of them (as they both are
reasonable explanations for p1). She could believe one of them in favor
of the other, but this is definitely not, epistemically, her only option. It
would even be counterproductive for her. She would better neither believe
nor disbelieve any of them, yet take both of them as relevant premises to
reason and act upon. For instance, if the agent needs the book she ordered
urgently, it is most rational for her to contact both the book retailer to
confirm whether the book has been sent, and the post office to inform
whether the mailman is sick and whether, in case he is sick, she can pick
up her mail at the post office.
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The main reason why people do not and should not form a belief in one
of several mutually exclusive options, is that they generally lack resources,
interest or time to really form a (rationally justified) belief in one of the
possibilities. In our example, the agent actually does not care about the
exact explanation of why the book has not yet arrived, she just wants to
make sure that she has done everything she could to receive the book as
quickly as possible. To make this point even more clear, consider the fol-
lowing example. Suppose you find a box of chocolates in the coffee room
at the office. There may be many explanations: it could be someone’s birth-
day, it is perhaps a leftover from some kind of celebration last night, maybe
somebody bought them for his wife, but forgot them, etc. But if there is no
one around to ask and you have no particular interest, these options will
remain open and uncertain, while you (grab a chocolate and) go back to
focus on your own work. The awareness of the options, although they are
all uncertain, is still valuable: it reassures you that the box of chocolates
is perfectly explainable and does not require any further action on your
part. Now compare this situation with one in which you find a suspicious
looking package that clearly does not belong there. Now it is clear that you
should take some action and, for instance, report it. This action is then
based on the awareness of some possible explanations for the package’s
presence. Yet you do not necessarily have the epistemic duty to find the
actual explanation and form a belief in it. You are perfectly allowed to just
perform an action (report it) based on your uncertain possible conclusions,
but forgo any investigation into the package’s actual origin. While, in this
case, lack of resources such as time or interest can be a valuable excuse
for not forming a belief, it is not an excuse for taking no action (as action
based on uncertainties can be justified).
The kind of uncertainties described in the previous examples can and
should clearly not be (epistemologically) described as beliefs or disbeliefs.
But is the third attitude from the triad, withholding (judgment), appropri-
ate to describe such uncertainties? At first sight, this seems to work: as
such uncertainties figure in the agent’s reasoning, she has been confronted
with them, after which she formed neither a belief nor a disbelief in the
proposition. In fact, this is how the attitude to such propositions would be
modeled in many formal approaches.4
Yet, this analysis misses an important part of the picture. A withheld
4For instance, in a standard doxastic logic with a belief-operator Ba, the doxastic attitude
of an agent a towards the uncertainty p would be modeled as ¬Bap∧¬Ba¬p.
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judgment is a perfectly symmetrical attitude towards p and its opposite ¬p.
The attitudes towards the uncertainties in the previous examples and their
opposites are not symmetrical. While an agent probably will acknowledge
that their opposites are possibly true, these opposites will have no further
relevance for the agent. On the other hand, the adopted doxastic attitudes
towards the uncertainties in these examples have genuine epistemic and
pragmatic value for the agent: they can (temporarily) meet a need for
explanation (epistemic), they can figure as a ground for action (pragmatic)
or they can be a motive to further pursue the truth value of the proposition
(epistemic and pragmatic).
Let me explain the value of these adopted doxastic attitudes by means
of the examples. That the box of chocolates on the table might be for
someone’s birthday will in general sufficiently fulfil the agent’s need for ex-
planation that might have arisen upon seeing that box (even if she knows
that there are more possibilities); the opposite statement, i.e. it is nobody’s
birthday, will, although also possible, have no epistemic value for the agent.
This statement would only have some value for her if she came to believe it,
i.e. take it to be true (in which case she would be again in need of some ex-
planation for the box of chocolates). Realizing the possibility of a package
bomb is a sufficient and rational ground to report the package; realizing the
possibility of the opposite statement, i.e. that there is no package bomb, is
no ground for any action on the agent’s part at all. Considering the pos-
sibility that the mailman is sick is a good basis to start pursuing it and to
contact the post office; the possibility that he is not sick is irrelevant and
not a ground for any further action.
In conclusion, if we want to describe the doxastic attitude towards ev-
ery type of uncertainty in human reasoning, the classical epistemological
triad ‘belief - disbelief - withholding’ does not suffice, and needs to be sup-
plemented with a fourth attitude, which I will call entertaining a hypothesis
or, in short, hypothesizing. This is the doxastic attitude an agent adopts
towards a proposition which she does not take to be true or false as such,
but of which the possible truth makes it relevant enough to take it into
further consideration or pursue it, to let it figure as a ground for action, or
to let it sufficiently fulfil a need for explanation. In other words, acquir-
ing a hypothesis and keeping it in mind has both epistemic and pragmatic
value, which cannot accurately be described by the concepts ‘withholding’
and ‘belief’.5
5The term ‘hypothesis’ is sometimes used to indicate a mere logical possibility. It should
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‘Hypothesis’ is of course not a new concept, and it is well-recognized
that hypotheses are part of human reasoning. Therefore, it might be ar-
gued that, although a proper characterization of the attitude towards them
is in order – I will attempt to offer one in Section 3.3 – it is not really
necessary to supplement the triad ‘belief - disbelief - withholding’ with this
attitude. For many purposes, one may argue, a hypothesis can be described
with sufficient accuracy as a withholding of judgment, especially if its more
specific properties, such as its plausibility or relevance for the agent, do not
matter. If these properties do matter, this can be properly expressed by a
related belief of forms such as “it is probable that p” or “it might be that p”.
Above, I have already argued why it is not a good idea to character-
ize a hypothesis as a withholding of judgment: the doxastic attitude an
agent holds towards a hypothesis is different from the attitude she holds
towards the opposite of that hypothesis, something the symmetrical atti-
tude of withholding judgment cannot capture. In the next section, I will
show that the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis can also not be ana-
lyzed as or reduced to a related belief in a way that uniformly applies to all
hypotheses.
3.2 Hypotheses and Beliefs
In this section, I will investigate the relation between the doxastic concepts
‘entertaining a hypothesis’ and ‘holding a belief’ and see whether the for-
mer can be specified in terms of the latter or whether they are independent.
Some technical preliminaries are, however, in order.
The concept of belief that I use for this analysis is ‘belief’ in its technical
coarse-grained meaning, as used in the classical epistemological triad ‘be-
lief - disbelief - withholding’. In this meaning, ‘believing that p’ can denote
any attitude of assent towards p, or, in other words, any attitude that takes
p to be true.6
The concept of hypothesizing that I use for this analysis, is the folk
notion of entertaining a relevant hypothesis. The use of a non-technical
folk notion should not worry us here, because at this point my aim is only
to show the need for a notion of hypothesizing to supplement the triad
be clear that my analysis does not extend to this meaning (see also Section 3.2). My analysis
is aimed at capturing the folk notion of entertaining a hypothesis relevant to the agent.
6It is necessary to use such a broad (technical) definition of belief, because the more
specific folk notion of belief can lead to ambiguity (see Chapter 2).
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‘belief - disbelief - withholding’, and to argue that such a notion is not
reducible to this triad. In Section 3.3, I will then try to characterize the
folk notion of entertaining a hypothesis in the framework of theoretical
and practical doxastic attitudes, developed in Chapter 2.
Finally, it is sometimes hard to avoid intuitions about the relation be-
tween ‘hypothesis’ and ‘belief’ that originate in the way the attitude of en-
tertaining a hypothesis is referred to in natural language, especially written
language. For instance, a common way for an agent to express that she en-
tertains the hypothesis p is to state that “it might be that p”. Yet this very
statement also indicates that the agent believes the expression “it might be
that p”. As any affirmative statement can be considered as one that the
author takes to be true, any expression of an attitude that takes the form of
an affirmative statement (which occurs, certainly in written language, for
all kinds of attitudes such as desires, fears, hopes, etc.) can be considered
as an expression of belief in that statement. Yet, the fact that our (written)
language cannot express every attitude in its own particular way should
not be seen as an a priori reason to assume that all kinds of propositional
attitudes are reducible to beliefs in related propositions. At most, it shows
that such an attitude implies a belief in a related statement. To illustrate
this point: it is not inconceivable, in spoken language, to use a somewhat
higher tone to express hypotheses, in order to display one’s uncertainty,
while using a firm, affirmative tone to express beliefs. In this way, different
attitudes towards a single proposition are clear from the different modes
of expression.
I will now survey the various strategies that can be used to analyze the
attitude of entertaining a hypothesis in terms of related attitudes of belief,
and show that every such attempt misses part of the essence of hypotheses.
Of course, most of these strategies will capture the attitude towards some
hypotheses, but none of them captures the attitude towards any hypothe-
sis. As such, it is not possible to reduce the attitude of hypothesizing in a
uniform way to related attitudes of belief.7 I can of course not guarantee
that my list of reduction strategies is exhaustive, yet I think that I have cov-
ered most of the plausible options. To reduce intuitions that originate from
our use of written language, I will uniformly denote the attitude towards
a hypothesis with the expressions “entertaining the hypothesis p” and “hy-
pothesizing that p” (by which I mean the act of keeping the hypothesis p in
7It might be argued that this speaks against the possibility of a uniform characterization
of the folk notion of a relevant hypothesis. Yet I will present such a characterization (which is
not reducible to related beliefs) in Section 3.3.
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mind once it has been formed) as counterparts of the expressions “holding
the belief p” and “believing that p”.
Entertaining a hypothesis is possibly believing that proposition A first
strategy originates from the observation that hypotheses are often proposi-
tions that the agent does not believe yet, but of which she thinks she might
come to believe them later on. Hence, it could be said that hypotheses are
possible (future) beliefs, i.e. propositions that will become actual beliefs if
certain actualization conditions are fulfilled. Yet to assert that this same
relation applies to the attitudes of hypothesizing and believing would be a
category mistake. The concepts ‘possible’ and ‘actual’ refer only to the belief
status of that proposition, not to all attitude statuses: an agent entertaining
a hypothesis has not only a possible attitude towards that proposition, but
also an actual and real attitude towards that proposition, though not one
of belief.
Entertaining a hypothesis is a derivative attitude from believing a dis-
junction A second strategy consists in denying that the attitudes towards
hypotheses are isolated attitudes and arguing that they are always related
to the other possible options the agent conceives in the context at hand.
Hence, one could argue that conceiving of multiple options in a context
implies the thought that one of these options is true; in other words, believ-
ing their disjunction. ‘Entertaining a hypothesis’ is then merely a derivative
concept that describes the attitude towards a single disjunct of a believed
disjunction.
The main argument for this strategy is the common view that the main
criterion for believing a particular hypothesis is the elimination of the other
hypotheses or options. If this elimination is conceived as the sequential
application of the logical rule disjunctive syllogism, this view implies that
initially the disjunction of all options should be believed.
Certainly, in many practical contexts, this view is convincing and a good
normative procedure to update one’s doxastic attitudes. For example, if I
do not have my wallet in my pocket, I do believe either that someone took
it, or it fell out of my pocket at some point, or I did not bring it in the first
place. When I retrace my steps and find my wallet neither along the way
nor at home, I will normally come to believe that someone took it.
However, there is no a priori reason why the agent always should have
formed a belief in the disjunction of the various options apparent to her.
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Unless the agent has some justification for why the disjunction of the op-
tions she has in mind is exhaustive, she generally will not and certainly
does not have to believe the disjunction of the ideas she has in mind, pre-
cisely because she is aware of the fact that there are further options she
cannot think of at that moment. In such a case, the best attitude towards
the disjunction of the various options in a certain context is to consider that
disjunction also simply as a hypothesis. Take the example of the mailman.
There might be numerous other reasons why the mailman did not come
by this morning: there might be a strike at the post office; his daily route
might have been adjusted, which causes him to come by later; the book re-
tailer might have written the wrong address on the package, etc. So there
is no reason why the agent should have formed a belief in the disjunction
of the two options she has in mind.
A second reason why entertaining a hypothesis should not be consid-
ered as a derivative attitude towards a disjunct of a believed disjunction is
that agents evaluate the relevance of hypotheses individually according to
the context at hand. Reducing them to a single believed disjunction treats
all possible options as equal. This would make it hard to explain why, with
just a slight adjustment in the situation, an agent retains some hypotheses
while considering others as suddenly irrelevant. For instance, in the exam-
ple of the mailman, the hypothesis that the mailman is sick is only relevant
because the agent saw her neighbor who told her that the mailman did not
look too well the other day. She would not have considered this hypothesis
as relevant if she did not meet her neighbor. Yet the hypothesis that the
package has not arrived yet would be relevant in either case.
Entertaining a hypothesis is believing a related proposition A third
strategy to analyze the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis in terms of
related attitudes of belief is to argue that entertaining the hypothesis p is
nothing more than believing a related proposition. I will survey some of
the most plausible candidates. Particularly in this section we must take care
not to be misled by intuitions coming from our use of language, because
almost all of these candidates are in certain contexts suitable ways for an
agent to express that she entertains a particular hypothesis.
Entertaining the hypothesis p is believing that “it is possible that p”
There are actually many ways to spell out the notion of possibility, but we
can assume that what an agent expresses when she states that p is possible
is that p is compatible with her set of background beliefs. We should take
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care, however, not to exclude the possibility of hypotheses that conflict
with some beliefs the agent holds. For instance, in facing an anomaly an
agent already realizes that some of her beliefs are incompatible with her
observation and that she will most likely have to revise some of them. In
order to do so, she must be capable to entertain hypotheses that conflict
with some of her beliefs. Therefore, believing that “p is possible” could be
best interpreted as believing that “p is compatible with the major part of
an agent’s set of (background) beliefs”.
This reduction neglects the aspect that hypotheses must somehow be
relevant for an agent. Even amongst the statements that are fully compat-
ible with all of an agent’s beliefs, there are many highly improbable and
irrelevant options. If I cannot find my wallet, it would be compatible with
(the major part of) my beliefs that some form of extraterrestrial intelli-
gence pulled a prank on me, or that I am actually just a brain in a vat and
something went wrong with the wiring. Clearly, such options should not
be entertained as rational hypotheses in the context of an agent who lost
her wallet.8 But also more mundane possibilities, such as that it is possi-
ble that there are exactly 923 Roman Catholic churches in Rome or that
the author of this thesis might have got precisely three new grey hairs this
very morning should not be rationally entertained as hypotheses, because
hypotheses need to be somehow relevant for the agent, i.e. they need to
contribute in some way to purposes the agent values, such as leading to
justified beliefs, suggesting ways out of an impasse, suggesting actions that
could possibly prevent some harm or bring some benefit, or indicating that
something puzzling is explainable even if no real explanation could be pro-
vided. Mere possibilities have no merit in any of these roles, and should,
therefore, not be called hypotheses. Just as for the doxastic attitude of
belief, there is a normative component in judging whether a proposition
should be entertained as a hypothesis in a particular context or in general.
Entertaining the hypothesis p is believing that “it is sufficiently
probable that p” As highly unlikely possibilities were the main problem
for the previous suggestion, we could, by characterizing “entertaining the
hypothesis p” as believing that “p is sufficiently probable”, make sure that
the hypothesis has at least some merit relevant to the main reason why we
attribute value to hypotheses, i.e. they can conduct us to justified (true)
beliefs.
8Unless, perhaps, she is an academic philosopher.
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To assess this suggestion, we should first make clear which type of prob-
ability is meant. There are at least four different interpretations of proba-
bility in the literature: three objective interpretations (frequency, propensity
and chance) and one subjective interpretation in terms of degrees of belief
(Williamson, 2005, pp. 7-13).
Of the objective interpretations, the frequency interpretation (in short,
that probability is the limit of the frequency of positive occurences) is the
most straightforward and undisputed. Yet it is applicable only to repeatable
contexts, and not all statements that one might entertain as hypothesis are
related to such a repeatable context. Even if the context is repeatable and
has occurred several times before, a problem can arise, as various relevant
hypotheses would be assigned a probability of zero according to this in-
terpretation. Consider, for instance, the following case. An agent arrives
home at the end of the day, and finds the back door open. At first, she only
entertains the hypothesis (and maybe even believes) that her husband/wife
left it open when (s)he left. But, suddenly, she realizes that there is also
another option: a burglar might have broken into her house. The first hy-
pothesis she entertains might be connected to a degree of probability. If her
husband/wife, absent-minded as (s)he is, happens to leave the back door
open on a regular basis, she can calculate or estimate this probability. But,
given that (in our example) no one has previously broken into her house,
the probability of the second hypothesis can, according to the frequency
interpretation, only be judged to be zero.
To account for the probability of hypotheses in non-repeatable contexts
(or contexts, like the burglar case, that are judged to have too few occur-
rences to allow for a correct estimation of the frequency limit), one might
turn to one of the other two objective interpretations of probability: propen-
sity or chance. Each of these, in their own way, attempts to generalize
the basic idea of the frequency interpretation to single and non-repeatable
cases by relating these cases to a larger class of cases. The technical details
of how this related class is constructed does not matter for our purposes
and are subject to various problems, but let us grant that this can be done.
For instance, in our burglar case, the agent could refer to crime statistics
of the neighbourhood or city she lives in to assign a non-zero probability
to the hypothesis that a burglar might have broken into her house. Yet this
operation could only be called a rationalization that the agent constructs
afterwards. At the moment she arrives at her house and hypothesized the
possibility, she might have been entirely unaware of the rate of crime in
her neighbourhood.
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Finally, it might be argued that the attitude of hypothesizing should
not be linked with objective probability, but with subjective probability. In
other words, one could claim that an agent entertains the hypothesis p if
and only if she has a sufficient degree of confidence (or degree of belief) in
the truth of p to entertain it as a hypothesis.
This thesis is fully analogous to the Lockean thesis for the attitude of
belief (see Section 2.6). Although it is actually not an analysis of the con-
cept ‘hypothesis’ in terms of the concept ‘belief’, but in terms of ‘degrees of
belief’, it seems appropriate to discuss this suggestion here.9
Analyzing hypotheses in terms of a sufficient degree of belief implies
(supposing we have a reliable way to quantify degrees of belief) that a
threshold should be specified. While this task is already not easy for the
Lockean Thesis for belief (for which any value in the half-open interval
]0.5,1] can be argued for), it is impossible to uniformly impose a threshold
for entertaining a hypothesis because such a threshold would depend on
the context. For instance, if I plan to go for a walk and estimate my degree
of confidence in the fact that it will rain during that walk at about 0.01, I
will not consider this as a relevant hypothesis (and, hence, not bother to
take an umbrella); yet, my degree of confidence in the fact that my house
will burn down next year may perhaps be quantified as 0.0001. Still, I do
consider this as a relevant hypothesis (otherwise I would not have insured
my house). Therefore, the doxastic attitude of entertaining a hypothesis
cannot be purely analyzed in terms of a sufficient degree of confidence in
its truth, since whether we entertain a proposition as hypothesis depends
on the circumstances.
Entertaining the hypothesis p is believing that “it is plausible that
p” or that “it might well be that p” Finally, since all previous attempts
seem to maroon on the fact that they do not somehow take into account
the relevance of the hypothesis for the agent, we could maybe analyze the
attitude of entertaining a hypothesis in terms of a belief in a statement that
9As I argued in Section 2.6, I have my reservations about the viability of the Lockean thesis
for beliefs (considered either as a coarse-grained notion, or as the folk notion). But, even if the
Lockean thesis were applicable to both the attitudes of belief and hypothesizing, the analysis
of these two doxastic attitudes in terms of a suitable degree of belief would not be a sufficient
reason to argue against the need to supplement the triad ‘belief - disbelief - withholding’ with
a notion of hypothesis. In fact, as I will discuss in Section 3.3, I do consider (the folk notion of)
‘hypothesis’ to be reducible, not to ‘degrees of belief’ alone, but to a combination of ‘degrees
of belief’ and ‘acceptances’ (like the folk notion of belief, see Chapter 2).
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expresses this relevance, such as “p is plausible”, “it is to be kept in mind
that p is possible” or “it might well be that p”.
But such statements are actually expressions of the fact that the agent
has already developed an attitude towards p of entertaining it as a hypoth-
esis. In other words, beliefs of this kind are second-order doxastic attitudes,
i.e. doxastic attitudes the content of which is an expression or report of a
doxastic attitude itself. In essence, believing that “p is plausible” is equiva-
lent with believing that “I entertain the hypothesis p”.
Such second-order beliefs are formed when the agent expresses or re-
ports on her doxastic attitudes. After having been confronted with a propo-
sition p and having formed a doxastic attitude towards p, an agent can by
means of introspection report on it and state, for instance, “I consider p as
a relevant hypothesis”. Yet in expressing a (doxastic) attitude report in an
affirmative way, the agent also expresses that she believes that affirmative
statement, i.e. that doxastic attitude report. Hence, expressing attitudes
in an affirmative way (which is possible for many attitudes) implies at the
same time the formation of a second-order belief towards that expression,
yet such beliefs are not the same as the first-order attitudes themselves.
My argument for that this is the case for beliefs in statements of the form
”p is plausible” (or a similar form) takes the form of a reductio argument.
In order to analyze the attitude of entertaining the hypothesis p (which
is, if p contains no doxastic attitude reports itself, a first-order attitude)
in terms of a belief in a statement of the form “it is plausible that p” (or
a similar form), two conditions should be met: (1) a belief of that form
should be held for every proposition that is entertained as a hypothesis,
and vice versa (otherwise the suggestion was not a viable candidate to
reduce the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis to in the first place); and
(2) a belief in a statement of that form has to be a first-order doxastic
attitude (otherwise we would reduce a first-order attitude towards p to a
second-order attitude).
Let us take the conjunction of these two conditions as the reductio hy-
pothesis, more precisely (for any proposition p that contains no doxastic
attitude reports):
(H1) An agent entertains a hypothesis p if and only if she also holds the
uniquely related belief that “it is plausible that p”.
(H2) Believing that “it is plausible that p” is a first-order belief.
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On the one hand, as any entertained first-order hypothesis, according
to H1, uniquely relates to a held belief that is, according to H2, a first-order
doxastic attitude, the size of the set of an agent’s entertained first-order
hypotheses has to be smaller than or equal to the size of the set of her held
first-order beliefs. More formally, for every agent a, taking P to be the set
of all propositions (in the considered language) that contain no doxastic
attitude reports and Bap and Haq operators indicating that the agent a
holds the belief p and entertains the hypothesis q respectively:
|{p | p ∈ P ∧Hap}|6 |{p | p ∈ P ∧Bap}| (3.1)
On the other hand, holding the first-order belief p will, if the agent is
minimally rational, also imply a belief in the statement “it is plausible that
p”. This is, by virtue of the reductio hypothesis H2, a first-order belief of
the agent, and, moreover, according to H1, a belief that is uniquely related
to an entertained first-order hypothesis, i.e. p. Therefore, any first-order
belief in a statement implies that that proposition is also entertained as a
hypothesis. Hence, the set of an agent’s held first-order beliefs is a subset
of her set of entertained first-order hypotheses, or more formally:
{p | p ∈ P ∧Bap} ⊆ {p | p ∈ P ∧Hap} (3.2)
From (3.1) and (3.2) we can conclude that:
{p | p ∈ P ∧Bap} = {p | p ∈ P ∧Hap}
In other words, the set of an agent’s held first-order beliefs is the same as
the set of her entertained first-order hypotheses – a contradiction with the
fact that hypotheses need not be believed.
Therefore, the reductio hypothesis H1 ∧H2 does not hold, and, hence,
either ¬H1, i.e. believing that “it is plausible that p” is not the same as
entertaining the hypothesis p (in which case the attitude of hypothesizing
should clearly not be reduced to a belief in such an expression) or ¬H2, i.e.
believing that “it is plausible that p” is a higher-order doxastic attitude the
content of which is a doxastic attitude report itself. In our case, the only
attitude the expression ”it is plausible that p” could be a report of is that
the agent entertains the hypothesis p. Hence, the attitude of entertaining
the hypothesis p can clearly not be reduced to such a belief.
Conclusion Through my overview of various strategies to reduce the dox-
astic attitude of entertaining a hypothesis to related attitudes of belief, I
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have shown that entertaining a hypothesis is a genuine doxastic attitude,
which is sui generis. This implies that, as the attitude of hypothesizing is not
reducible to the other attitudes of the triad ‘belief - disbelief - withholding’,
and as the triad appeared to be inadequate to describe the doxastic attitude
towards the uncertainties in an agent’s reasoning (which we identified as
hypotheses), we can conclude that the triad should be supplemented with
a notion of hypothesis to make it adequate to describe the agent’s doxastic
attitude towards the various statements present in her reasoning.
3.3 The Doxastic Attitude of Entertaining a Hypothesis
So far, I have used a folk notion of the attitude towards a (relevant) hypoth-
esis. In this section, I will specify this notion more precisely by drawing on
the framework I constructed in Chapter 2 to describe doxastic attitudes in
a more fine-grained manner.
As the various examples I used throughout this chapter already suggest,
I take the folk notion of a (relevant) hypothesis to be a doxastic concept
that specifies both the theoretical and practical doxastic attitude of an agent
towards a proposition, just like the folk notion of belief (see Chapter 2).
In the case of entertaining a hypothesis, the practical meaning is clearly
the dominant one of these two: to entertain a hypothesis is in the first
place to adopt a policy to rely on that statement in specific contexts or
circumstances. Yet to some extent the theoretical doxastic attitude is also
specified: to be able to entertain a proposition as hypothesis, the agent
must have a degree of confidence in it that is strictly greater than having
zero confidence. In other words, the agent must at least acknowledge that
it is possibly true. It is, however, not possible to raise this threshold for
confidence, because (as we have seen in the previous discussion of whether
the attitude towards hypotheses could be analyzed in terms of a sufficient
degree of belief) hypotheses that have an immense impact on an agent’s life
are often entertained even with extremely low degrees of belief (see, for
instance, the hypothesis that a suspicious package is a package bomb). The
only thing that is really required regarding the theoretical doxastic attitude
is that the agent has a non-zero degree of confidence in the possible truth
of the hypotheses she entertains.
Having some (non-zero) degree of confidence in the truth of a propo-
sition is clearly not enough to entertain it as a hypothesis, as one could
also adopt an attitude of withholding judgment or disbelief. For instance,
towards the proposition that “there are 923 Roman Catholic churches in
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Rome”, I would adopt an attitude of withholding judgment. It might be the
case that it is so, but it could also be a few dozen more or less than 923,
and, unless I have some special interest in the accuracy of this number, it
does not matter for me at all. Hence, my attitude towards this proposition
will be symmetrical with my attitude towards any other proposition stating
a reasonable number; in other words, it would be an attitude of withhold-
ing. For an example of disbelief, suppose I have a degree of confidence
of 0.01 in the proposition (p) “it will start to rain in the next hour” and
I have decided to go for a walk now. Then my attitude towards p would
normally be one of disbelief. The possible occurrence of p is clearly rele-
vant for me, but my low degree of confidence causes me to form a belief
in its opposite ¬p, and, basing my reasoning on this belief, I decide not to
take an umbrella with me. Compare this with the case in which my degree
of confidence in p is 0.25. In this case, I typically would neither form a
belief nor disbelief in p. Yet, as the possible truth of p is clearly relevant for
me, my attitude towards p is now not one of withholding judgment, but of
entertaining it as a hypothesis; and this hypothesis can cause me to decide
to take an umbrella during my walk.
Hence, the doxastic concept ‘entertaining a hypothesis’ is a description
not only of the agent’s theoretical doxastic attitude, but also of her practical
doxastic attitude. In order to specify this, let me start by defining a few
types of contexts.
I define a research context as a context that satisfies the following three
criteria:
(a) the context is clearly constrained in space, time and resources.
(b) in this context, the agent’s main purpose is to improve her doxastic
attitudes; in other words, the agent’s intentionality is mind-to-world.
(c) the actions available to an agent are limited to those that have, from
the agent’s perspective, negligible negative consequences in case these
actions are based on wrong assumptions, except for the possible loss
of the invested resources.
Scientific research is obviously an example of such a context, yet many
everyday situations can also be accurately described as a research context,
such as (in our mailman example) calling the post office to inform whether
the mailman is sick and whether the package has already arrived.
I define a context requiring action in face of uncertainty about p as a
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context that satisfies the following criteria:
(a) in the context, the agent has a clear option to perform a certain action.
(b) from the perspective of the agent, performing this action has, in case
p turns out to be true, a clear benefit or prevents a clear harm.
(c) the agent perceives the negative consequences of this action in case
p turns out to be false as clearly not weighing up to the benefit of
her actions in case p turns out to be true, scaled by her degree of
confidence in p
A clear example of such a context is, for instance, the discovery of a suspi-
cious package, in which case the trouble of reporting it does not offset the
harm that could be caused in case it is a bomb, even if the agent consid-
ers this possibility to be very unlikely. But also more mundane situations fit
this definition. For instance, if I have a 0.25 degree of confidence in the fact
that it will start to rain in the next hour, the trouble of having to carry an
umbrella does not match the trouble of being soaked given the substantial
degree of confidence I have.
By means of these two types of contexts, I can now specify the practical
doxastic meaning of entertaining the hypothesis p as adopting a policy
to rely on the proposition p for research contexts and contexts requiring
action in face of uncertainty about p.
In summary, the notion of ‘hypothesis’ can be defined as a doxastic con-
cept that specifies both the theoretical and practical doxastic attitude of an
agent towards a proposition. Entertaining the hypothesis p means both that
the agent has a non-zero degree of confidence in the truth of p, and that
the agent has a policy to rely on p or trust p in research contexts and in
contexts requiring action in face of uncertainty about p.
3.4 Hypotheses and Science, Rationality and Skepticism
The view sketched in this chapter, i.e. considering the attitude towards a
hypothesis as a necessary supplement to the classical epistemological triad
‘belief - disbelief - withholding’ and my characterization of this attitude in
terms of the agent’s theoretical and practical doxastic attitude towards that
proposition opens up various ways for future research concerning particu-
lar epistemological issues.
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Connection between Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science The
main goal of including this epistemological part in my dissertation has been
to understand the attitude towards a hypothesis not merely as a matter
of scientific methodology, but also more generally as a common human
doxastic attitude.
It can be easily observed that my definition of scientific hypotheses (in-
troduced in Chapter 1), i.e. statements about the empirical world that have
an unknown or underdetermined truth status and that are advanced as ten-
tative answers to particular research questions,10 fits the characterization
of the attitude towards a hypothesis presented in this chapter. As scientific
hypotheses have an unknown truth status, scientists do not take them to be
true as such and have, therefore, not adopted an attitude of belief towards
them.11 But, as they consider them as tentative answers to the research
questions they pursue, scientists certainly have a non-zero degree of con-
fidence in the possible truth of scientific hypotheses. For the same reason,
these scientific hypotheses are also clearly relevant and valuable to them.
Therefore, scientists are inclined to trust scientific hypotheses for research
contexts that are aimed at improving their doxastic attitudes towards these
hypotheses.
The fact that scientific hypotheses are a specific type of the common
doxastic attitude of entertaining a hypothesis justifies why important as-
pects of hypotheses formation and their role in science can also be stud-
ied in subfields of philosophy that aim to capture human reasoning more
broadly, such as epistemology or logic.
The Dynamics of Human Reasoning As human thinking is in constant,
vigorous flux, the doxastic attitude of an agent towards a certain statement
may change quickly depending on new information or further reasoning:
hypotheses can become beliefs if the available alternatives turn out to be
impossible; beliefs can become hypotheses if one is confronted with a new
idea; a proposition towards which one has so far withheld judgment, might
prove relevant after all and become a hypothesis; a hypothesis might prove
10For an elaboration of this position, see Section 9.2.
11The intended notion of belief in this context is its coarse-grained technical meaning of
“taking a proposition to be true”. It does happen that scientists, certainly in later stages of
research, develop an attitude towards their hypotheses that could be described as belief in
its folk meaning. Yet, it has been argued (e.g. Van Fraassen, 1980) that belief (in its folk
meaning) is an inappropiate attitude in scientific research, as the goal of scientists should
be to construct well-accepted theories (an attitude of acceptance by many scholars for the
contexts of their intended application).
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to be so unlikely that it becomes, on further consideration, a disbelief; or
hypotheses and beliefs may lead to a quest for confirmation which in turn
might result in knowledge.
To model these dynamics, one can conceive of ‘hypothesizing’ as a dox-
astic attitude towards a proposition that is weaker than ‘belief’ (in the same
way that ‘belief’ is weaker than ‘knowledge’), but which still expresses a
genuine and positive doxastic attitude towards a proposition and which
is clearly more than having no opinion or withholding judgment about it.
This leaves open the possibility of constructing a normative theory about
which requirements a rational hypothesis should further fulfill in order to
be considered as a justified belief.
Conceiving the relations between hypotheses, beliefs and knowledge in
this way makes it possible to construct doxastic-hypothetic logics or even
epistemic-doxastic-hypothetic logics, in which human reasoning that incor-
porates both hypotheses and beliefs (and maybe even knowledge) could be
modeled. Traditionally, the attitudes of belief and knowledge are modeled
by means of modal box operators: B or B for belief and K or K for
knowledge (Hintikka, 1962). Such a box operator could certainly not be
used to model the attitude of entertaining a hypothesis, as it can be ratio-
nal to entertain mutually exclusive hypotheses. Yet, what might work is a
diamond operator ♦H , for which the axiom ♦HA ⊃ ¬B¬A holds. While
the construction of such a logic is already a worthy challenge in itself, it
also makes it possible to create logics that can model in a qualitative way
transitions from one doxastic attitude to another. For instance, such a logic
could be capable of the (non-monotonic) abduction of particular hypothe-
ses given certain sets of beliefs. While the logic MLAss of chapter 4 is clearly
not intended to be such a doxastic-hypothetic logic (it has only one modal
operator), it might give an idea of how this can be worked out, as in this
logic hypotheses are modeled with the aid of a diamond operator.
A skeptical attitude and living with uncertainties Acknowledging the
existence of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition that does not ratio-
nally imply a disbelief in the other options, yet recognizes the value of the
proposition’s possible truth (such that it can be a basis for further action
or reasoning), also allows us to specify better the existence of a skeptical
attitude.
A skeptical attitude can be considered as an attitude to form beliefs only
if they are rational, or, in other words, if they are sufficiently warranted.
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Of course, the nature of this warrant and the level of its threshold are a
matter of debate, ranging from a minimally critical attitude to a full-blown
Pyrrhonism, which denies the rationality of any belief whatsoever.
A key problem for skeptical attitudes that require high warrants is often
that they lack sufficient ground for actions, as it is generally assumed that
(conscious) actions require certain evaluative stances or beliefs (Wieland,
2012). If an agent only very hesitatingly adopts new beliefs or even no
beliefs at all, it appears that she will have problems functioning and acting
normally in society. An often cited example, apparently originating from
Sextus Empiricus, is that skeptics cannot help someone so long as they can-
not bring themselves to form a belief that this person is indeed in distress.
For skeptical attitudes with high warrants but that accept the possibility
of sufficiently warranted beliefs (hence, not full-blown Pyrrhonism), the
doxastic attitude of entertaining hypotheses might explain how normal ac-
tion is still possible, because, as we saw, hypotheses can be a sufficient
ground for action in certain contexts. The classic example of the person in
distress poses no problem in this case, because as soon as the agent real-
izes that someone might be in distress, she can consider the context as a
context requiring action in face of uncertainty about whether that person
is actually in distress.
However, use of the attitude of hypothesizing cannot solve this problem
for the actual Pyrrhonist, because, as Wieland (2012) shows, a Pyrrhonist
is not only unable to form the belief that someone is in distress, but also
unable to form the belief that people in distress should be helped. As a
Pyrrhonist has suspended all his beliefs, he has also suspended his beliefs
concerning desirable outcomes or what he should do. Therefore, in my
conceptual framework, a Pyrrhonist cannot judge whether a context is a
context requiring action in the face of uncertainty.
The doxastic attitude of entertaining a hypothesis, as I defined it, clearly
depends on the existence of beliefs. More precisely, it requires certain be-
liefs about which ends are valuable and relevant for the agent. This should
not, however, necessarily contradict the idea that rational beliefs are hy-
potheses that are sufficiently warranted. As I explained above, the doxas-
tic attitude towards a proposition is dynamic, which means that rational
consideration can lead one not only to consider a hypothesis as a belief,
but also the other way around, to entertain a previously held belief again
as a mere hypothesis. Given that no human agent, in becoming rational,
starts from a blank slate, previously held beliefs about the value of certain
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ends, which may or may not be rational, can initially act as the background
against which new hypotheses can be entertained. Yet, as rational thinking
develops, hypotheses, beliefs and values could become more and more ra-
tionally justified and aligned. Of course, it remains for future research how
such a process could exactly develop over time.
In conclusion, I want to state that the most important advantage of
carving out an epistemological niche for the attitude of entertaining a hy-
pothesis is that doing so allows people to rationally endorse and settle with
their uncertainties, without making them incapable of normal and moral







In this part, I will zoom in to the perspective of individual reasoning steps.
Focusing on the micro structure of hypothesis formation processes shows
us that the reasoning steps at the core of these processes are often similar.
Therefore, we can describe these steps in terms of generalized patterns, by
abstracting away from the specific content of the reasoning and retaining
only the formal structure of the inferences – a structure, which can then
be studied by means of suitable logics. As a result, although it focuses on
the micro structure of human hypothesis formation, this is the most formal
part of the dissertation.
My main goal is to formally explicate some of the more common pat-
terns of hypothesis formation in science by applying existing logical tools.
At the same time, I will make use of my own contributions to reflect criti-
cally on the prospects and shortcomings of this project.
The core assumptions at the heart of this part of the dissertation are
(1) that such patterns can be found in the micro structure of the human
reasoning processes of hypothesis formation; (2) that such patterns can be
studied formally; and (3) that this can be done by using logics as a tool.
Let us turn to the motivation for adopting each of these assumptions.
Patterns of Hypothesis Formation In the historical introduction to the
literature on discovery and abduction (Section 1.2), we saw that the quest
to characterize rational discovery in science under a single schema was
abandoned around 1980. The main reasons were that such attempts (e.g.
Hanson’s proposal to call abduction “the logic of discovery”) often did not
provide much detailed guidance for actual discovery processes, and that
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even these general attempts always captured only a part of the discovery
process (e.g. Inference to the Best Explanation describes only the selection
of hypotheses, not their formation).
Around the same time, research from different fields such as philoso-
phy of science based on historical cases, artificial intelligence and cognitive
science resulted in a new consensus that there is a plenitude of patterns,
heuristics and methods of discovery, which are open to normative guid-
ance, yet this guidance might be content-, subject-, or context-dependent.
My first assumption, i.e. that these patterns in hypothesis formation ex-
ist, could be defended by simply referring to this part of the literature. Yet
I want to use this opportunity to add some qualification to my claim. Try-
ing to formally explicate particular patterns of hypothesis formation would
have little impact were there an infinity of rather seldom and ad hoc pat-
terns. Hence, I assume not merely that such patterns exist, but also that the
majority of instances of hypothesis formation can be described by a rather
limited number of such patterns.1
To substantiate this claim, I start by referring to the literature on abduc-
tion (which I take, as explained in Section 1.4, to be a subcase of hypothe-
sis formation in general), in which various authors have tried to provide
classifications of patterns of abduction (Thagard, 1988; Schurz, 2008a;
Hoffmann, 2010). Although these attempts differ slightly, some general
patterns clearly stand out.
Before I give my personal classification of these major patterns found in
abductive reasoning, it is important to note that abductive inferences form
explanatory hypotheses for observed facts using the agent’s background
beliefs (or knowledge). Therefore, these patterns have the structure of the
inference of a hypothesis (HYP) from some observed facts (OBS) and some
of the agent’s background beliefs (or knowledge) (BBK).
In line with the Fregean tradition, I consider factual statements as state-
ments of a concept with regard to one or more objects (or a logical combina-
tion of such statements). For instance, the statement “There was a civil war
in France in 1789” can be analyzed as the concept “civil war” with regard to
“France in 1789”. A fact is a true factual statement. As such, concepts can
1As I do not argue for this claim on a priori grounds, I do not assume that an exhaustive
set of such patterns can be given. In fact, I see no arguments against the a priori possibility
of constructing new patterns of hypothesis formation, whether by humans or by artificially
intelligent agents.
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also be considered as the class of all objects (or tuples of objects) for which
the concept with regard to that object (or tuple of objects) is a fact. An
observed fact is a factual statement describing an agent’s observation that
she considers to be true. This can be broadly conceived to include also, for
instance, a graph or a table of measurements in an article. Together, the
observed facts form the trigger for the agent.
In my semi-formal description of these patterns, I express that p should
be considered as a hypothesis by using a formulation of the form “It might
be that p”; beliefs and observed facts can be expressed simply by stating
their content. Concepts are denoted by uppercase letters, objects by low-
ercase letters. Addition of a subscript denotes a finite list of objects or con-
cepts (including, unless stated otherwise, the possibility of a single object
or concept).
1. Abduction of a Singular Fact
(OBS) F with regard to xi
(BBK) E with regard to some objects explains F with regard to those
objects
(HYP) It might be that E with regard to xi
Some examples of this pattern, which has also been called “simple ab-
duction” (Thagard, 1988), “factual abduction” (Schurz, 2008a) and
“selective fact abduction” (Hoffmann, 2010), are:
• the inference that the hominid who has been dubbed Lucy might
have been bipedal, from observing the particular structure of her
pelvis and knee bones and knowledge about how the structure
of pelvis and knee bones relates to the locomotion of animals.
• the inference that two particles might have opposite electric
charges, from observing their attraction and knowledge of the
Coulomb force.
2. Abduction of a Generalization
(OBS) F with regard to all observed objects of class D
(BBK) E with regard to some objects explains F with regard to those
objects
(HYP) It might be that E with regard to all objects of class D
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Some examples of this pattern, which has also been called “rule ab-
duction” (Thagard, 1988), “law abduction” (Schurz, 2008a) and “se-
lective law abduction” (Hoffmann, 2010), are:
• the inference that all hominids of the last three million years
might have been bipedal, from observing the similar structure
of the pelvis and knee bones of all observed hominid skeletons
dated to be younger than three million years and knowledge
about how the structure of pelvis and knee bones relates to the
locomotion of animals.
• the inference that all emitted radiation from a particular chem-
ical element might be electrically neutral, from observing in all
experiments conducted so far that radiation emitted by this ele-
ment continues in a straight path in an external magnetic field
perpendicular to the stream of radiation and knowledge of the
Lorentz force and Newton’s second law.
3. Existential Abduction, or the abduction of the existence of unknown
objects from a particular class
(OBS) F with regard to xi
(BBK) the existence of objects yi of class E would explain F with
regard to xi
(HYP) It might be that there exist objects yi of class E
Some examples of this pattern, which was already called “existential
abduction” by Thagard (1988), and has also been called “first-order
existential abduction” (Schurz, 2008a) and “selective type abduction”
(Hoffmann, 2010), are:
• the inference that a hominid of the genus Australopithecus might
have lived in this area, from observing a set of vulcanized foot
imprints and the belief that these foot imprints are of an Aus-
tralopithecus.
• the inference that there might be other charged particles in the
chamber, from observing deflections in the path of a charged
particle in a chamber without external electric or magnetic fields
and knowledge of the Coulomb and Lorentz forces and Newton’s
second law.
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4. Conceptual Abduction, or the abduction of a new concept
(OBS) Fi with regard to multiple xj individually
(BBK) No known concept explains why Fi for all xj
(HYP) It might be that there is a similarity between the xj , which
can be labeled with a new concept E, that explains why Fi
with regard to all the various xj individually
Some examples of this pattern, which largely coincides with the vari-
ous types of “second order abduction” Schurz (2008a) suggests,2 and
several of the types of “creative abduction” conceived by Hoffmann
(2010), are:
• the inference that there might be a new species of hominids,
from observing various hominid fossils that are similar in many
ways and believing that these fossils cannot be classified in the
current taxonomy of hominids.
• the inference that there might exist a new type of interaction,
from observing similar interactive behavior between certain ty-
pes of particles in similar experiments and believing that this be-
havior cannot be explained by the already known interactions,
properties of the involved particles and properties of the exper-
imental setup.
Using the terminology of Magnani (2001) and following the distinction
of Schurz (2008a), the first two patterns, abduction of a singular fact and
abduction of a generalization, can be considered as instances of selective ab-
duction, as the agent selects an appropriate hypothesis in her background
knowledge, while the latter two, existential abduction and conceptual ab-
duction, can be called creative abduction, as the agent creates a new hypo-
thetical concept or object.3
2It was Schurz who pointed out that this pattern is rational and useful for science only if
the observation concerns several objects each individually having the same or similar proper-
ties, so that some form of conceptual unification is obtained. Otherwise, for each fact it could
be suggested that there exists an ad hoc power that explains (only) this single fact.
3Hoffmann (2010) would dispute this distinction, as he sees the third pattern (existen-
tial abduction) in the first place as the selection of an already known type (e.g. the genus
Australopithecus), and not so much as the creation of a new token (someone of this genus of
which his/her existence is now hypothesized).
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As stated before, my list is not exhaustive. Further patterns have been
identified, such as the abduction of a new perspective (Hoffmann, 2010),
e.g. to suggest that a problem might have a geometrical solution instead
of an algebraic one; “analogical abduction” (Thagard, 1988), e.g. explain-
ing similar properties of water and light, by hypothesizing that light could
also be wave-like; or “theoretical model abduction” (Schurz, 2008a), i.e.
explaining some observation by suggesting suitable initial conditions given
some governing principles or laws. Some have even considered “visual ab-
duction”, the inference from the observation itself to a statement describ-
ing this observation, as a separate pattern (Thagard and Shelley, 1997).
For some of these patterns (or instances of them), it is possible to argue
that they are a special case of one of the patterns above. For instance,
the suggestion of the wave nature of light can also be seen as an instance
of conceptual abduction, in which the (mathematical) concept ‘wave be-
havior’ is contructed to explain the similar properties of water and light;
yet it is true that the analogical nature of this inference makes it a special
subpattern with interesting properties in itself.4
Perhaps more important to note is that these patterns are not mutually
exclusive given a particular instance of abductive reasoning. For instance,
the inference that leads to the explanation of why a particular piece of iron
is rusted can be described both as singular fact abduction (this piece of
iron underwent a reaction with oxygen) or as existential abduction (there
were oxygen atoms present with which this piece of iron reacted). But
in essence it describes the same explanation for the same explanandum.
Also, combinations occur. For instance, if a new particle is hypothesized
as an explanation for an experimental anomaly,5 then we have both an
instance of existential abduction (there is a not yet observed particle that
causes the observed phenomenon) and an instance of conceptual abduction
(these hypothesized particles are of a new kind).6 Yet in the mind of the
scientist, this process of hypothesis formation might have occurred in a
single reasoning step.
We should not, however, be too worried about these issues, if we re-
member that these patterns are categories for linguistic descriptions of ac-
tual reasoning processes. Any actual instance of hypothesis formation can
4This is also how Schurz (2008a) presents it; in his classification, analogical abduction is
one of the types of second order existential abduction he conceives of.
5See, for instance, Wolfgang Pauli’s suggestion in the case of the β spectrum (Chapter 7).
6I think this particular combination coincides with Hoffmann’s (2010) pattern of “creative
fact abduction”.
73
be described in several ways by means of natural language, and some of
these expressions can be formally analyzed in more than one way. There-
fore, I do not think that we should focus too much on the exact classifi-
cation of particular instances of hypothesis formation. Yet this does not
render meaningless the project of explicating various patterns of hypoth-
esis formation. The goal of this project is to provide normative guidance
for future hypothesis formation. If particular problems or observations can
be looked at from different perspectives and, therefore, expressed in var-
ious ways, it is only beneficial for an agent to have multiple patterns of
hypothesis formation at her disposal.
So far, I have argued only for my first assumption, i.e. that the majority
of instances of hypothesis formation can be described by means of a lim-
ited number of patterns, for the case of explanatory hypothesis formation
or abduction. The following patterns of hypothesis formation are normally
not mentioned in the literature on abduction, as the inferred hypotheses
tend to be seen as non-explanatory. But also for non-explanatory instances
of hypothesis formation – I leave it open whether these patterns or their
instances are really non-explanatory – there are some very general pat-
terns, the most common ones being suggested belief revision and inductive
generalization.
5. Suggested Belief Revision
(OBS) F with regard to xi
(BBK) G with regard to xi
(BBK) F with regard to xi is apparently in contradiction with G with
regard to xi
(HYP) It might be that G should be revised so that F with regard to
xi is not in contradiction with G′ with regard to xi
Some examples of this pattern, which is common in cases where the
trigger is an anomaly and which is related to what is studied in the
field of Belief Revision (though the inference is weaker, as it is only
hypothesized that a belief should be revised), are:
• to suggest that the idea that apes not belonging to the genus
Homo are not bipedal should be revised, upon observing that
Lucy (of the genus Australopithecus) is bipedal and noticing that
this is in contradiction with this idea.
• to suggest that the principle of energy conservation might not
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hold in the case of β decay, upon observing energy curves of
the emitted β particles and noticing that these are apparently
in contradiction with the belief that the conservation of energy
holds in all cases.7
6. Inductive Generalization
(OBS) F with regard to all observed objects of class D
(HYP) It might be that F with regard to all objects of class D
Some examples of this well-studied inductive pattern are:
• the inference that all members of the genus Australopithecus are
bipedal, from observing that Lucy and all other fossils found of
this genus are bipedal.
• the inference that all oppositely charged particles attract each
other, from observing the attraction between all observed oppo-
sitely charged pairs so far.
Again, further patterns might be discerned, and various instances of
hypothesis formation can often be described according to various patterns.
Also, it should not be assumed that suggested belief revision is the only
pattern that occurs when scientists encounter anomalies or contradictions.
It often happens that scientists confronted with anomalies suspend their
judgment with regard to the contradicting parts of their belief set, while
pursuing other patterns that involve parts of their belief set that are consis-
tent with the observation.
Formal Patterns By listing these various patterns, I already implicitly il-
lustrated the second core assumption of this part of the dissertation, i.e.
that all of these patterns of hypothesis formation can be formally described
by a pattern schema that abstracts from the specific context. This seems
to be at odds, however, with the consensus that has been reached in the
literature on discovery, which stresses the context and content dependency
of the various methods of discovery. The main worry for the project of this
part of the dissertation is that if patterns are so dependent on the field,
discipline or context, this project would have little impact.
7This is in essence Niels Bohr’s suggestion in the case of the β spectrum (see Chapter 7).
75
Yet one should note that the patterns of hypothesis formation are not
the same methods, procedures and heuristics that are described in the dis-
covery literature. The listed patterns differ in two important aspects from
those in the discovery literature.
First, I consider only the formation or generation of hypotheses, which
is only a part of scientific discovery. It is clear that various other parts
of discovery, such as hypothesis selection or the search for relevant data,
are content and discipline dependent. Second, it is true that there may
exist quite specific patterns for hypothesis formation in particular fields or
paradigms. For instance, in particle physics, given certain observations,
it is common practice to presume the possible existence of a new type of
particle. But if one considers carefully the actual structure of such methods,
one sees that they are often more specific instances of one of the more
abstract patterns detailed above. These field dependent patterns have their
value in scientific practice, but pose no argument against the possibility of
a formal description of patterns of hypothesis formation.
The use of formal logics This brings us to the third, and maybe most sur-
prising core assumption of this part of the dissertation: that these patterns
can be modeled using formal logics. To those who might be surprised, I
want to stress that I do not mean that any of these patterns is a valid infer-
ence in classical logic or any other (non-trivial) deductive logic. To model
defeasible reasoning steps such as hypothesis formation, one has to use
non-monotonic logics: logics for which an extension of a premise set does
not always yield a consequence set that is a superset of the original conse-
quence set. Or, put more simply, logics according to which new information
may lead us to revoke old conclusions.
It is important to note that my purpose in using logics is not the classical
purpose of the discipline of logic. Classically, the discipline of logic studies
the correct way to infer further knowledge from already known facts. The
correct way should guarantee the truth of the new facts, given that the old
facts are true. Accordingly, this has motivated the search for the right (de-
ductive) logic (whether it be Classical Logic or another one). My purpose,
however, is to model or explicate human reasoning patterns. As these pat-
terns are fallible, leading to conclusions that are not necessarily true even
if the premises are true, it should be possible to revoke previously derived
results; hence, my use of non-monotonic logics. Also, because there are
many patterns of human reasoning, I naturally conceive of a plenitude of
logics in order to describe them.
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Let me explain this a bit more formally. A logic can be considered as
a function from the power set of the sentences of a language to itself. So,
given a language L and the setW of its well-formed formulas:
L : ℘(W )→ ℘(W )
Hence, a logic determines for every set of sentences (or premise set) Γ
which sentences can be inferred from it (CnL(Γ ) =df L(Γ )). Therefore, as a
reasoning pattern is nothing more than the inference of some statements
given some initial statements, in principle, a logic can be devised to model
any reasoning pattern in science.8 If this pattern can be formally described,
description by a formal logic is in principle possible.
Deductive logics, such as Classical Logic (CL), have the property of
monotonicity, i.e. for all premise sets Γ and Γ ′:
CnL(Γ ) ⊆ CnL(Γ ∪ Γ ′)
Most patterns of human reasoning, however, do not meet this criterion.
For instance, if an agent infers a hypothesis, she is well aware that it might
need to be revoked on closer consideration of the available background
knowledge or in light of new information.
Although non-monotonic reasoning has typically received less attention
in the field of logic than monotonic reasoning, various frameworks for de-
feasible reasoning and non-monotonic logics are available. For this disser-
tation, I use the adaptive logics framework, which was created by Diderik
Batens (Ghent University) over the past three decades.9 This framework for
devising non-monotonic logics has some advantages that suit the project of
this part of the dissertation well.
First, the focus in the adaptive logics program is, in contrast with other
approaches to non-monotonic reasoning, on proof theory. For these logics,
a dynamic proof style has been defined in order to mimic to a certain extent
actual human reasoning patterns. More in particular, these dynamic proofs
display the two forms of revoking previously derived results that can also
8In reality, scientific and human reasoning include not only sentences or propositions,
but also direct observations, sketches and various other symbolic representations. Yet for the
purpose of modeling particular reasoning patterns, we can generally represent those sources
by suitable propositions.
9For an extensive overview and thorough formal introduction, see Straßer (2013) or the
online available manuscript of Batens (n.d.).
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be found in human reasoning: revoking old conclusions on closer consid-
eration of the available evidence (internal dynamics) and revoking them in
light of new information (external dynamics).10
Second, over the years, a solid meta-theory has been built for this
framework, which guarantees that if an adaptive logic is created accord-
ing to certain standards (the so-called “standard format”), many important
metatheoretical properties are generically proven. This creates an opportu-
nity for projects such as mine to focus almost exclusively on the application
of these formal methods without having to worry too much about proving
their meta-theoretical characteristics.
Finally, as the framework is presented as a unified framework for non-
monotonic logics, it has been applied in many different contexts. Over
the years, adaptive logics have been devised for paraconsistent reasoning,
induction, argumentation, deontic reasoning, abduction, etc. This gave
me plenty of inspiration and the foundations on which to build my own
project.11
To this I want to add that from a logician’s point of view, my logical ap-
plications might look somewhat unfamiliar as both of the logics I define (in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) have a rather restricted modal language schema;
the first logic even has a restriction on possible premises. This should be
understood from the perspective that my purpose is to provide an expli-
cation of reasoning patterns, not to explore all possible derivations in a
certain logic. My modal extensions of the language of first-order logic are
the simplest possible ones to model the studied hypothesis formation pat-
tern in a sensible way (given that the propositions occurring in the pattern
can be described in the language of first-order logic). This method has the
further advantage that, for instance, the first logic I define (in Chapter 4)
has a lower complexity than standard adaptive logics (because, as it will be
explained, it uses the simple strategy instead of the more common reliabil-
ity or minimal abnormality strategies), which makes it fit for applications
10One should not be misled, however, by this idea of dynamic proofs in thinking that the
consequence set of adaptive logics for a certain premise set depends on the proof. Adaptive
logics are proper proof-invariant logics that assign for each premise set Γ exactly one conse-
quence set CnL(Γ ).
11Most applications of the adaptive logics framework have been studied at the Centre for
Logic and Philosophy of Science (Ghent University). At the Centre’s preprints list (http://
logica.ugent.be/centrum/writings/pubs.php), references can be found to many papers
in various contexts. The reference works mentioned earlier, Straßer (2013) and Batens (n.d.),
also give a good overview of the various applications.
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in the context of artifical intelligence (see Chapter 5).
strengths and weaknesses of the method
Strengths Explicating patterns of hypothesis formation by means of for-
mal logics has a clear advantage: by reducing patterns to their formal and
structural essence, an insight into the pattern’s precise conditions and ap-
plications is gained that is hard to achieve purely by studying different
cases. This is illustrated in Chapter 6, where I devise a logic for the abduc-
tion of generalizations, a pattern for which so far no formal characteriza-
tion has been given.
In this way, the formal explication of patterns can provide the basis of
normative guidance in scientific methodology, yet of a sophisticated type.
The project of Logical Empiricism, which envisioned the full logical and
normative explication of scientific methodology, has clearly faced its limits
during the historical turn in the philosophy of science. The present ap-
proach of explicating various patterns, is strongly benchmarked on actual
historical cases and open to the emergence of new patterns in the history
of science. Yet by explication and rational consideration, it can still aspire
to provide some normative guidance for scientific practice.
Another great advantage of the formal explication of human reasoning
patterns is that it allows for the possibility to provide artificially intelligent
agents (which in general lack the human capacity for context awareness
unless it is explicitly provided) with formal patterns to simulate human
reasoning. In the case of hypothesis formation, this possibility has presently
already found applications in the AI subfields of abduction (diagnosis),
planning and machine learning (as is also illustrated in Chapter 5).
Weaknesses The method of explicating patterns of hypothesis formation
by means of formal adaptive logics also has certain drawbacks, however.
First, formal logics are expressed in terms of a formal language, in
which not all elements of human reasoning processes can be represented.
This leads inevitably to certain losses. A very obvious example is that in
general only propositions can be represented in logics. That means that all
observations, figures or other symbolic representations must be reduced to
descriptions of them.
A more important example for my project is the implication relation.
The adaptive logics framework I use is, certainly for ampliative logics such
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as those for abduction or induction, largely built around the use of a classi-
cal material implication (mostly to keep things sufficiently simple).12 As a
result of this, I have to represent all relations between a hypothesis and the
observations that led to their formation (their triggers) by material implica-
tions. It is clear that this is a strong reduction of the actual richness of such
relations. Hypotheses do not have to imply their triggers: they can also
just be correlated with them or be probabilistically likely; or the relation
can be much more specific, as in the case of an explanatory or causal rela-
tion. Problems of this nature lead me to argue in Chapter 6 for the formal
representation of an “explanatory framework” in the language of any logic
for abduction. Finally, even if an implication is the suitable description of
the relation, it is well-known that the material implication has its limits in
describing actual human reasoning.
Related to this is the problem that it is hard to model an agent’s inten-
tionality in formal logics. Hypotheses are not always proposed to relate
directly to their triggers; agents might have other purposes in mind in sug-
gesting hypotheses.
Second, if one sets out to model actual historical human reasoning pro-
cesses by means of dynamic logical proofs (as the adaptive framework al-
lows us to do), one quickly finds that it is no easy task to boil down those
actual processes to the micro structure of their individual reasoning steps.
As human agents often combine individual steps and seldom take note of
each individual step, this type of models always contains an aspect of sim-
ulation.
Human reasoning also does not proceed linearly step by step as proofs
do: it contains circular motions, off-topic deviations and irrational connec-
tions that cannot be captured by formal logics. Therefore, models of such
reasoning processes are always to a great extent idealized.
Natural languages are also immensely more complex than any formal
language can aspire to be. Therefore, models of human reasoning are un-
avoidably simplifications. Furthermore, as formal logics state everything
explicitly, any modeler of human reasoning has to simplify deliberately the
actual cases, only to achieve a certain degree of comprehensibility.
Altogether, it is clear that formal models of human reasoning processes
12This is an issue relevant beyond the field of adaptive logics. Paul (2000, p. 36) has
claimed that most approaches to abduction use a material implication that is implicitly inter-
preted as some kind of explanatory or causal relation.
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are, in fact, only models: they contain abstractions, simulations, simplifica-
tions and idealizations. And although these techniques are the key charac-
teristics of models, such as those used in science (see Chapter 9), it is not
always easy to evade the criticism that formal logics can only handle toy
examples.
Third, certain patterns of creative hypothesis formation, i.e. those that
introduce the hypothetical existence of new concepts, cannot be modeled
by first-order logics. They require the use of second-order logics, and this
is a possibility of which, at present, the adaptive logics framework is not
capable.
Fourth, as we are purely concerned with hypothesis formation and not
with hypothesis selection, formal methods will generate sets of possible hy-
potheses that grow exponentially in relation to the growth of the agent’s
background knowledge. It is clear that this also poses a limit to the appli-
cation of these methods to real world problems.
Finally, one might question the normativity of this project (and more
generally of the adaptive logics program). By aiming to describe actual hu-
man reasoning processes, this branch of logics appears to put a descriptive
ideal first, which contrasts sharply with the strongly normative ideals in the
field of logic in general. The standard answer to this question is that adap-
tive logics attempt to provide both: on the one hand, they aim to describe
actual reasoning patterns; on the other, once these patterns are identified,
they aim to prescribe how these patters should be rationally applied. Yet
this does not answer how the trade-off between these two goals of descrip-
tion and normativity should be conceived: is it better to have a large set of
logics that is able to describe virtually any pattern actually found in human
reasoning, or should we keep this set trimmed and qualify most actual hu-
man reasoning as failing to accord with the highest normative standards?
Therefore, it remains a legitimate criticism that the goals of description and
prescription cannot be so easily joined: how their trade-off should be dealt
with needs further theoretical underpinning.
overview of my contributions
Various approaches such as inductive logics, abductive logics and belief
revision have addressed the formal explication of different patterns of hy-
pothesis formation. My contributions all concern the explication of patterns
of abduction. So far, most research in abductive reasoning has focused on
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singular fact abduction. I have made an effort to extend this analysis to log-
ics for the abduction of generalizations. In addition, I have tried to better
tailor the existing work on singular fact abduction to abductive reasoning
as it is actually found in scientific practice.
In Chapter 4, I devise the logic MLAss for singular fact abduction that
is particularly well suited for scientific reasoning, as it presents a natural
way to handle the problem of multiple explanatory hypotheses in science.
To illustrate this, a small case study concerning the origin of the moon is
included.
In Chapter 5, a set-based approach to the proof theory of adaptive logics
is presented. Translation of the syntax of the logic MLAss to this framework
allows for a consideration of the problem of abduction as it is conceived in
the field of artificial intelligence. The main issue in modeling abduction in
AI (which is always conceived as singular fact abduction), is how to handle
fast growing knowledge bases, a problem the present logic excels at given
its simple strategy and rather low complexity.
In Chapter 6, I present the logic LAr∀ for the abduction of generaliza-
tions, a pattern of hypothesis formation that has, so far, not received any
formal explication. Also, in this chapter the notion of “explanatory frame-
work” is introduced, and it is argued that this notion is a valuable asset for
any logic that aims to model abduction.

4Singular Fact Abductionin Science
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to
hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same
time, and still retain the ability to function.
— F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Crack-up, 1936
This chapter is based on the paper “Modelling Abduction in Science by means of a
Modal Adaptive Logic”, published in Foundations of Science (Gauderis, 2013a). I am
indebted to Mathieu Beirlaen, Hans Lycke, Joke Meheus, Bert Leuridan, Peter Verde´e,
Erik Weber, Dagmar Provijn, Atocha Aliseda and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
In this paper, a new logic for singular fact abduction in a scientific context is
presented. Unlike other logics for singular fact abduction, it deals with the problem
of multiple explanatory hypotheses in a natural way. The modeling capability of this
logic is illustrated by including a small case study on the origin of the moon.
The content of the original article is retained, except for the addition of section 4.6,
which is the result of a recent discussion with Peter Verde´e, and I need to thank him
for pressing me on this issue. For general consistency with the remainder of this dis-
sertation, small stylistic corrections have been made (including a change in spelling to
American English).
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present a new adaptive logic, called MLAss,
that enables us to model abductive reasoning processes. The goal of these
processes is to derive possible explanatory hypotheses (explanantia) for
puzzling phenomena (explananda). For that purpose, this logic contains, in
addition to deductive inference steps, defeasible reasoning steps based on
an argumentation schema known as Affirming the Consequent (combined
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with Universal Instantiation):
(∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)),B(β)/A(β)
By using this schema I restrict my field of application in two ways. First,
I consider abduction only in a strict sense, which means that the condi-
tional linking explananda and explanantia must be given. In other words,
the modeling of any sort of creative abduction – in which conditionals are
created – is beyond the scope of this chapter.1 Second, I opt for a predicate
logic. This is so because I use a material implication to model the relation
between explanans and explanandum. As it is well known that B `CL A ⊃ B,
a propositional logic would allow us to derive anything as a hypothesis.
In the predicative case, the use of the universal quantifier can avoid this.2
Moreover, it raises no major problem for modeling real life situations, as
the case study illustrates.
Adaptive Logics This logic is constructed by means of the techniques of
the adaptive logics program.3 The reasons why an adaptive logic is fit for
this job are threefold.
First, it allows for a direct implementation of defeasible reasoning steps
(in casu applications of Affirming the Consequent). This makes it possible
to construct logical proofs that nicely integrate defeasible (in this case am-
pliative) and deductive inferences. This corresponds to natural reasoning
processes.
Second, the formal apparatus of an adaptive logic instructs exactly
which formulas would falsify a (defeasible) reasoning step. As these for-
mulas are assumed to be false (so long as one cannot derive them), they
are called abnormalities in the adaptive logic literature. So, if one or a
combination of these abnormalities is derived in a proof, it instructs in a
formal way which defeasible steps cannot be maintained. This possibility
of defeating previous reasoning steps mirrors nicely the dynamics found in
actual human reasoning.
Third, for all adaptive logics in standard format, such as the presented
logic MLAss, there are generic proofs for most of the important metatheo-
1For a more elaborate discussion of creative abduction, see Schurz (2008a, pp. 212-231).
2For example, compare `CL B(β) ⊃ (A(β) ⊃ B(β)) with 0CL B(β) ⊃ (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)).
3The general characteristics of adaptive logics will be explained in the next section. A
systematic and thorough overview can be found in Batens (2007).
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retical properties (including soundness and completeness).4
The Problem of Multiple Explanatory Hypotheses This is not the first
attempt to explicate abductive reasoning by means of an adaptive logic
and this result draws on earlier suggestions. However, these earlier at-
tempts did not completely deal with the problem of multiple explanatory
hypotheses.
To explain this problem, consider the following example. Suppose we
have to explain the puzzling fact P a while our background knowledge con-
tains both (∀x)(Qx ⊃ P x) and (∀x)(Rx ⊃ P x). There are two ways in which
one can proceed. First, we can construct a logic in which we can derive
only the disjunction (Qa∨ Ra) and not the individual hypotheses Qa and
Ra. This first way, called practical abduction5 and adequately modeled by
the logics LAr and LArs,
6 is suitable for modeling situations in which one
has to act on the basis of the conclusions before having the chance to find
out which hypothesis actually is the case. A good example is how people
react to unexpected behavior. If someone suddenly starts to shout, peo-
ple will typically react in a hesitant way, taking into account that either
they themselves are somehow at fault or that the shouting person is just
frustrated or crazy and acting inappropriately.
Second, someone with a theoretical perspective (for instance, a scientist
or a detective) is interested in finding out which of the various hypotheses
is the actual explanation. Therefore it is important that she can abduce the
individual hypotheses Qa and Ra in order to examine them further one by
one. Although there exist adaptive logics that model this theoretical kind of
abduction7, these logics have a quite complex proof theory. This is because,
on the one hand, one has to be able to derive Qa and Ra separately, but on
the other, one has to prevent the derivation of their conjunction (Qa∧Ra),
because it seems counterintuitive to take the conjunction of two possible
hypotheses as an explanation. Moreover, if the two hypotheses are actually
incompatible, it would lead to explosion in a classical context.
Capturing Hypotheses as Logical Possibilities There is actually a more
elegant and natural way out of this problem by adding modalities to the
4An overview of these can be found in Batens (2007).
5According to the definition suggested in Meheus and Batens (2006, pp. 224–225) and
used in Lycke (2009).
6See Meheus and Batens (2006); Meheus (2007, 2011).
7See, for instance, Lycke (2009) and another solution of Lycke (personal communication).
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language and deriving the hypotheses ♦Qa and ♦Ra. As (♦Qa∧♦Ra) does
not imply ♦(Qa∧Ra) in any standard modal logic, the conjunction problem
is automatically solved. This new approach, which I will adopt in what
follows, also nicely coincides with the common idea that hypotheses are
possibilities. These features make the logic MLAss
8 very suitable for the
modeling of actual theoretical abductive reasoning processes as the case
study will illustrate.
Structure of the chapter In the next section, I will first introduce the
main characteristics of an adaptive logic in standard format for readers not
familiar with the adaptive logics program. The approach will be general
and not limited to abductive contexts. In section 4.3, I provide the ground-
work for the logic MLAss by stipulating the deductive framework, i.e. the
language schema and the non-defeasible reasoning steps of the logic. The
fourth section will introduce in an informal way the defeasible part of the
logic MLAss with examples that illustrate how this logic fulfills the differ-
ent desiderata for modeling abductive reasoning contexts. This informal
approach is chosen to give more insight into the functioning of the logic.
A formal presentation of the logic MLAss is given in Section 4.5, followed
by some philosophical considerations about its consequence set in the next
section. Finally, in Section 4.7, I will use this logic to model a more elabo-
rate example taken from the recent history of astronomy.
4.2 General Characterization of Adaptive Logics
Definition An adaptive logic in standard format is defined by a triple:
(i) A lower limit logic (henceforth LLL): a reflexive, transitive, mono-
tonic and compact logic that has a characteristic semantics.9
8MLAss stands for Modal Logic for Abduction. The subscript s is added to indicate that
this logic captures the singular fact variant. Like all names of adaptive logics in standard
format, the superscript indicates the strategy used (see Section 4.2) – the simple strategy in
this case.
9Strictly speaking, the standard format for adaptive logics requires that a lower limit logic
contains, in addition to the LLL-operators, also the operators of CL (Classical Logic). How-
ever, these operators have merely a technical role (in the generic meta-theory for adaptive
logics) and are not used in the applications presented here. Therefore, given the introduc-
tory nature of this section, I will not go into further detail. In the logics presented in this
dissertation, the condition is implicitly assumed to be satisfied.
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(ii) A set of abnormalities Ω: a set of LLL-contingent formulas (formulas
that are not theorems of LLL) characterized by a logical form, or a
union of such sets.
(iii) An adaptive strategy.
The lower limit logic LLL specifies the stable part of the adaptive logic.
Its rules are unconditionally valid in the adaptive logic, and anything that
follows from the premises by LLL will never be revoked. Apart from that,
it is also possible in an adaptive logic to derive defeasible consequences.
These are obtained by assuming that the elements of the set of abnormal-
ities are “as much as possible” false. The adaptive strategy is needed to
specify “as much as possible”. This will become clearer further on.
Dynamic Proof Theory As stated before, a key advantage of adaptive
logics is their dynamic proof theory which models human reasoning. This
dynamics is possible because a line in an adaptive proof has – along with a
line number, a formula and a justification – a fourth element, i.e. the condi-
tion. A condition is a finite subset of the set of abnormalities and specifies
which abnormalities need to be assumed to be false for the formula on that
line to be derivable.
The inference rules in an adaptive logic reduce to three generic rules.
Where Γ is the set of premises, Θ a finite subset of the set of abnormalities
Ω and Dab(Θ) the (classical) disjunction of the abnormalities in Θ, and
where
A ∆
abbreviates that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, the inference
rules are given by the generic rules:
PREM If A ∈ Γ : ... ...
A ∅




B ∆1 ∪ . . .∪∆n
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B ∆1 ∪ . . .∪∆n ∪Θ
The premise rule PREM states that a premise may be introduced at any
line of a proof on the empty condition. The unconditional inference rule
RU states that, if A1, . . . ,An `LLL B and A1, . . . ,An occur in the proof on the
conditions ∆1, . . . ,∆n, we may add B on the condition ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪ ∆n. The
strength of an adaptive logic comes from the third rule, the conditional in-
ference rule RC, which works analogously to RU, but introduces new con-
ditions. So, it allows one to take defeasible steps based on the assumption
that the abnormalities are false.10 Several examples of how these rules are
employed in actual proofs can be found in section 4.4.
The only thing we still need is a criterion that defines when we consider
a line of the proof to be defeated. At first sight, it seems straightforward
to mark11 lines of which one of the elements of the condition is uncondi-
tionally12 derived from the premises. But this strategy, called the simple
strategy, usually has a serious flaw. If it is possible to derive uncondition-
ally a disjunction of abnormalities Dab(∆) that is minimal, i.e. if there is no
∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that Dab(∆′) can be unconditionally derived, the simple strat-
egy would ignore this information. This is problematic, however, because
at least one of the disjuncts of the ignored disjunction has to be true. There-
fore, more advanced strategies have been developed. The best-known of
these are reliability and minimal abnormality. We can use the simple strat-
egy only in cases where
Γ `LLL Dab(∆) only if there is an A ∈ ∆ such that Γ `LLL A
with Dab(∆) any disjunction of abnormalities out of Ω. For adaptive log-
ics in standard format, the first letter of the name of the strategy (simple
strategy, reliability or minimal abnormality) is added in superscript to the
name of the logic.
10The rule also makes clear that any adaptive proof can be transformed into a Fitch-style
proof in the LLL by writing down for each line the disjunction of the formula and all of the
abnormalities in the condition.
11Defeated lines in a proof are marked instead of deleted, because, in general, it is possible
that they may later become unmarked in an extension of the proof.
12Unconditionally derived is to be understood as derived on the empty condition.
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4.3 The Deductive Framework
Formal Language Schema Let L be the standard predicative language of
classical logic CL with logical symbols ¬,⊃,∧,∨,≡,∀ and ∃. I will further
use C, V , F andW to refer respectively to the sets of individual constants,
individual variables, all (well-formed) formulas of L and the closed (well-
formed) formulas of L.
LM , the language of the logic, is L extended with the modal operator
. WM , the set of closed formulas of LM is the smallest set that satisfies
the following conditions:
1. if A ∈W , then A, A ∈WM
2. if A ∈WM , then ¬A ∈WM
3. if A,B ∈WM , then A∧B,A∨B,A ⊃ B,A ≡ B ∈WM
It is important to notice that there are no occurrences of modal operators
within the scope of another modal operator or a quantifier.
I further define the setWΓ , the subset ofWM the elements of which can
act as premises in the logic, as:
WΓ = {A | A ∈W}
It is easily seen thatWΓ ⊂WM .
Lower Limit Logic The LLL will be the predicative version of D, re-
stricted to the language schema WM . D is characterized by a full axioma-
tization of predicate CL together with two axioms, an inference rule and a
definition:
K (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
D A ⊃ ¬¬A
NEC if ` A, then `A
♦df ♦A =df ¬¬A
This logic is one of the weakest normal modal logics that exist and is
obtained by adding the D-axiom to the axiomatization of the better-known
minimal normal modal logic K.
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The semantics for this logic can be expressed by a standard possible
world Kripke semantics where the accessibility relation R between possible
worlds is serial, i.e. for every world w in the model, there is at least one
world w′ in the model such that Rww′.
Intended Interpretation As indicated in the introduction, explanatory
hypotheses – the results of abductive inferences – will be represented by
formulas of the form ♦A (A ∈ W). I will use formulas of the form B to
represent explananda, other observational data and relevant background
knowledge. Otherwise, this information would not be able to revoke de-
rived hypotheses.13 The reason why I choose D instead of K is that I as-
sume that the explananda and background information are together con-
sistent. This assumption is modeled by the D-axiom.14
4.4 Informal Presentation of the Logic MLAss
Abductive Contexts and the Set of Abnormalities In specifying the set
of abnormalities and the strategy, we have to check whether they allow us
to model abductive reasoning according to our expectations.
Apart from the fact that by means of this logic we should be able to
derive hypotheses according to the schema of Affirming the Consequent, we
have to make sure that we cannot derive – as a side effect – random hy-
potheses which are not related to the explanandum. In addition, it is quite
straightforward to demand that a logic for hypothesis formation can handle
contradictory hypotheses. Finally, as I pointed out in the introduction, it is
a nice feature of adaptive logics that they enable us to integrate defeasible
and deductive steps. Therefore, we may require that the logic can handle
further predictions (based on earlier derived hypotheses) and evidence for
or against them in a natural way.
Since the final form of the abnormalities is quite complex – although
the idea behind it is straightforward – I will first consider two more basic
proposals that are constitutive for the final form and show why they are in-
sufficient. Obviously, only closed well-formed formulas can be an element
of any set of abnormalities. This will not be explicitly stated each time.
13For instance, ¬A and ♦A are not contradictory, whereas ¬A and ♦A are.
14For instance, the premise set {¬P a, (∀x)P x} is a set modeling an inconsistent set of
background knowledge and observations. However, in the logic K, this set would not be con-
sidered inconsistent, because we cannot derive anything from this set by Ex Falso Quodlibet.
To be able to do this, we need the D-axiom.
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First proposal Ω1 This first proposal is a modal version of the set of
abnormalities of the logic LArs.
15 In this and the further definitions, the
meta variables A and B represent (well-formed) formulas, α a variable and
β a constant of the language L.
Ω1 = {((∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))∧ (B(β)∧¬A(β))) |
No predicate that occurs in B occurs in A}
This means that a derived hypothesis will be defeated if one shows explic-
itly that the hypothesis cannot be the case. The second line in the definition
is to prevent self-explanatory hypotheses.
Simple Strategy For this logic we can use the simple strategy, which
means, as stated before, that we have to mark lines for which one of the
elements of the condition is unconditionally derived. We can easily see that
the condition for use of the simple strategy, i.e.
Γ `LLL Dab(∆) only if there is an A ∈ ∆ such that Γ `LLL A,
is fulfilled here. Since all premises have the form A, the only option
to derive a disjunction of abnormalities would be to apply addition, i.e. to
derive (A∨B) fromA (orB), because it is well-known that(A∨B) 0
A∨B in any standard modal logic.16
Contradictory hypotheses The following example shows that this
logic allows us to derive hypotheses according to the schema Affirming the
Consequent and is able to handle contradictory hypotheses without causing
explosion.
1 (∀x)(P x ⊃Qx) -;PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(¬P x ⊃ Rx) -;PREM ∅
3 Qa -;PREM ∅
4 Ra -;PREM ∅
5 ♦P a 1,3;RC {((∀x)(P x ⊃Qx)∧ (Qa∧¬P a))}
6 ♦¬P a 2,4;RC {((∀x)(¬P x ⊃ Rx)∧ (Ra∧¬¬P a))}
7 ♦P a∧♦¬P a 5,6;RU {((∀x)(P x ⊃Qx)∧ (Qa∧¬P a)),
((∀x)(¬P x ⊃ Rx)∧ (Ra∧¬¬P a))}
15As proposed in Meheus (2011).
16It is also possible to derive a disjunction from the premises by means of the K-axiom. For
instance, (A ⊃ B) ` ¬A∨B, but the first disjunct will always be equivalent to a possibility
(♦¬A) and can, hence, not be an abnormality.
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♦P a and ♦¬P a are both derivable hypotheses because the conditions on
lines 5-7 are not unconditionally derivable from the premise set. It is also
interesting to note that, because of the properties of the lower limit D, it is
not possible to derive from these premises that ♦(P a∧¬P a). The conjunc-
tion of two hypotheses is never considered as a hypothesis itself, unless
there is further background information that links the two hypotheses in
some way.
Predictions and Evidence Suppose I extend the premise set with
an additional implication.17 Then, we can continue the example to see
whether the logic can handle further predictions and (counter)evidence
for these predictions in a natural way:
8 (∀x)(P x ⊃ Sx) -;PREM ∅
9 ♦Sa 5,8;RU {((∀x)(P x ⊃Qx)∧ (Qa∧¬P a))}
With the extra implication we can derive the prediction ♦Sa. As long
as we have no further information about this prediction (for instance, by
observation), it remains a hypothesis derived on the same condition as ♦P a.
If we would test this prediction, we would have two possibilities. On the
one hand, if the prediction turns out to be false, the premise¬Sa could be
added to the premise set. In this case, we can subsequently derive ¬P a,
which would falsify the hypothesis ♦P a. This is indicated in the proof by
marking the now defeated lines with a Xi-sign, where i indicates the line










10 ¬Sa PREM ∅
11 ¬P a 8,10;RU ∅
12 ((∀x)(P x ⊃Qx)∧ (Qa∧¬P a)) 1,3,11;RU ∅
On the other hand, if the prediction turns out to be true, the premise
Sa could be added, but this extension of the premise set would not allow
us to derive P a. Since true predictions only corroborate the hypothesis
17Strictly speaking, this is not what is actually done. What I actually do is start a new proof
with another premise set (the extended set). But it is easily seen that I can start this new proof
with exactly the same lines as the old proof. This way, it looks as if I extended the old proof.
This qualification needs to be considered each time I speak about “adding premises”.
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and do not prove it, while false predictions directly falsify the hypothesis,
one can say that this logic handles predictions in a Popperian way.18
Contradictions One way a logic of abduction could generate random
hypotheses as a side effect is by allowing for the abduction of contradic-
tions. How this is possible and how the logic prevents this is illustrated in
the following example.
1 Qa -;PREM ∅
2 (∀x)((P x∧¬P x) ⊃Qx) -;RU ∅
3 ♦(P a∧¬P a) 1,2;RC {((∀x)((P x∧¬P x) ⊃Qx)∧ X4
(Qa∧¬(P a∧¬P a)))}
4 ((∀x)((P x∧¬P x) ⊃Qx)∧ 1;RU ∅
(Qa∧ (¬P a∨ P a)))
Tautologies Still, there are other ways to derive random hypotheses
that are not prevented by the first proposal for the set of abnormalities Ω1.
For instance, Ω1 does not prevent that random hypotheses can be derived
from a tautology, as illustrated by the following example. As it is impossible
to unconditionally derive the abnormality in the condition of line 3 from
the premises, the formula of line 3, the random hypothesis ♦P a, remains
derived in every possible extension of the proof.
1 (Qa∨¬Qa) -;RU ∅
2 (∀x)(P x ⊃ (Qx∨¬Qx)) -;RU ∅
3 ♦P a 1,2;RC {((∀x)(P x ⊃ (Qx∨¬Qx))∧
((Qa∨¬Qa)∧¬P a))}
Therefore, let me adjust the set of abnormalities to obtain the second
proposal Ω2.
Second proposal Ω2 No hypothesis can be abduced from a tautology if
the abnormalities have the following form:
Ω2 = {((∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α))∧ (B(β)∧¬A(β)))
∨(∀α)B(α) |
No predicate that occurs in B occurs in A}
18It needs to be remembered that I devised a logic for modeling abduction and handling
explanatory hypotheses, not a formal methodology of science. This logic has nothing to say
about the confirmation of theories.
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It is clear that we can keep using the simple strategy with this new set of
abnormalities. It is also easily seen that all of the advantages and examples
described above still hold. Each time we can derive an abnormality of Ω1,
we can derive the corresponding abnormality ofΩ2 by a simple application
of addition. Finally, the problem raised by the tautologies, as illustrated in
the previous example, is solved in an elegant way, because the form of the
abnormalities makes sure that the abnormality will always be a theorem
in case the explanandum is a theorem. So, nothing can be abduced from
tautologies.
Most parsimonious explanantia Still, there is another way to derive
random hypotheses that cannot be prevented byΩ2. Consider, for instance,
the following proof.
1 Ra -;PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(P x ⊃ Rx) -;PREM ∅
3 (∀x)((P x∧Qx) ⊃ Rx) 2;RU ∅
4 ♦(P a∧Qa) 1,3;RC {((∀x)((P x∧Qx) ⊃ Rx)∧
(Ra∧¬(P a∧Qa)))∨(∀x)Rx}
5 ♦Qa 4;RU {((∀x)((P x∧Qx) ⊃ Rx)∧
(Ra∧¬(P a∧Qa)))∨(∀x)Rx}
The reason why we can derive the random hypothesis ♦Qa is the ab-
sence of a mechanism to ensure that the abduced hypothesis is the most
parsimonious one and not the result of strengthening the antecedent of an
implication. Before defining the final and actual set of abnormalities that
also prevents this way of generating random hypotheses, I have to intro-
duce a new notation to keep things as perspicuous as possible.
Notation Suppose AP CN (α) is the prenex conjunctive normal form of
A(α). This is the equivalent form of A(α) where all quantifiers are first
moved to the front of the expression and where, consequently, the remain-
ing (quantifier-free) expression is written in conjunctive normal form, i.e.
as a conjunction of disjunctions of literals.
AP CN (α) = (Q1γ1) . . . (Qmγm)(A1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α))
and ` AP CN (α) ≡ A(α)
with m > 0,n > 1,Qi ∈ {∀,∃} for i 6 m, γi ∈ V for i 6 m, α ∈ V and Ai(α)
disjunctions of literals in F for i 6 n.
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Then, I can introduce the new notation A−1i (α) (16 i 6 n) so that I have
a way to take out one of the conjuncts of a formula in PCN form. In cases
where the conjunction consists of only one conjunct (and, obviously, no
more parsimonious explanation is possible), the substitution with a random
tautology will make sure that the condition for parsimony, added in the
next set of abnormalities, is satisfied trivially.
if n > 1 : A−1i (α) =df (Q1γ1) . . . (Qmγm)(A1(α)∧ . . .∧Ai−1(α)∧
Ai+1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α))
with Aj (16 j 6 n) the jth conjunct of AP CN (α)
if n = 1 : A−11 (α) =df >
with > any tautology of CL
Final proposal Ω With this notation I can write the logical form of the
set of abnormalities Ω of the logic MLAss.




(∀α)(A−1i (α) ⊃ B(α)) |
No predicate that occurs in B occurs in A}
This form might look complex, but its functioning is quite straightfor-
ward. I have actually constructed the disjunction of the three reasons why
we should refrain from considering A(β) as a good explanatory hypothesis
for the phenomenon B(β), even if we have (∀α)(A(α) ⊃ B(α)). The disjunc-
tion will make sure that the hypothesis A(β) is rejected as soon as one of the
following is the case: (i) when ¬A(β) is derived, (ii) when B(β) is a tautol-
ogy (and obviously, does not need an explanatory hypothesis) or (iii) when
A(β) has a redundant part and is therefore not an adequate explanatory
hypothesis.
From now on, I will unambiguously shorten this logical form of the
abnormalities as
!A(β) . B(β)
which could be read as “A(β) is not a valid hypothesis for B(β)”. For the
same reasons as stated in the description of Ω2, we can keep using the
simple strategy and all of the advantages and examples described above
will still hold.
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Example For instance, let’s have a look at how the new set of ab-
normalities solves the previous problem. To make things more clear, the
condition will be written out fully for the first time. As such, it is clear that
the third disjunct is actually a premise, and that, hence, the abnormality is
unconditionally derivable.
1 Ra -;PREM ∅
2 (∀x)(P x ⊃ Rx) -;PREM ∅
3 (∀x)((P x∧Qx) ⊃ Rx) 2;RU ∅
4 ♦(P a∧Qa) 1,3;RC {((∀x)((P x∧Qx) ⊃ Rx)∧
(Ra∧¬(P a∧Qa)))∨(∀x)Rx
∨(∀x)(P x ⊃ Rx)
∨(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)} X5
5 !(P a∧Qa) . Ra 2; RU ∅
4.5 Formal Presentation of the Logic MLAss
I can now present the logic MLAss in a formally precise way.
19 Like any
adaptive logic in standard format, the logic MLAss is characterized by the
triple of a lower limit logic, a set of abnormalities and an adaptive strategy.
In this case, the lower limit logic is D, the strategy is the simple strategy
and the set of abnormalities Ω is, relying on the previously introduced
abbreviation, defined by
Ω = {!A(β) . B(β) | No predicate that occurs in B occurs in A}
Proof Theory The proof theory is characterized by the three generic in-
ference rules introduced in section 2 and the following definitions.
Within adaptive logics, proofs are considered to be chains of subsequent
stages. A stage of a proof is a sequence of lines obtained by application of
the three generic rules. As such, every proof starts off with the first stage
which is an empty sequence. Each time a line is added to the proof by
applying one of the inference rules, the proof comes to its next stage, which
is the sequence of lines written so far extended with the new line.
Definition 4.1 (Marking for the simple strategy). Line i with condition ∆
is marked for the simple strategy at stage s of a proof, if stage s contains a
line of which an A ∈ ∆ is the formula and ∅ the condition.
19This section is limited to what I need to present this specific logic. For a more general
formal presentation of adaptive logics in standard format, see Batens (2007).
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Definition 4.2. A formula A is derived from Γ at stage s of a proof if and
only if A is the formula of a line that is unmarked at stage s.
Definition 4.3. A formula A is finally derived from Γ at stage s of a proof
if and only if A is derived at line i, line i is not marked at stage s and line i
remains unmarked in every extension of the proof.20
Definition 4.4 (Final Derivability). For Γ ⊂WΓ : Γ `MLAss A (A ∈ CnMLAss(Γ ))
if and only if A is finally derived in a MLAss-proof from Γ .
Semantics The semantics of an adaptive logic is obtained by a selection
on the models of the lower limit logic. With the simple strategy, for in-
stance, this selection includes only those models that verify the abnormali-
ties that are derivable (by means of the lower limit logic).
Definition 4.5. A D-model M of the premise set Γ is simply all right if and
only if {A ∈Ω |M  A} = {A ∈Ω | Γ `D A}.
Definition 4.6 (Semantic Consequence). For Γ ⊂ WΓ : Γ MLAss A (A is a
semantic consequence of Γ ) if and only if A is verified by all simply all right
models of Γ .
The fact that MLAss is in standard format warrants that the following
theorem holds:21
Theorem 4.7 (Soundness and Completeness). Γ `MLAss A if and only if
Γ MLAss A.
4.6 Modeling Human Reasoning and Consequence Sets
As argued in the general introduction to the logical part of this dissertation,
my main goal in employing adaptive logics is to model patterns of hypoth-
esis formation in a formal way. Therefore, my main focus in constructing
these adaptive logics is on their proof theory, because, as the examples
so far have shown, this allows me to set up proofs that model an actual
hypothesis formation process in a step by step fashion.
20This definition is slightly different from the more general definition that is used for the
other strategies because, using the simple strategy, it is not possible that a marked line be-
comes unmarked at a later stage of a proof.
21An overview of all meta-theoretic properties of adaptive logics in standard format (and
their proofs) can be found in Batens (2007).
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Yet, as already noted several times, adaptive logics in standard format
are also decent logics in the sense that they map any premise set to a unique
set of consequences that are finally derivable from that premise set, inde-
pendent of the proofs that are used to obtain these consequences. But if
we look in more detail at the final consequence set of the logic MLAss, we
see that this set contains far more consequences than one might expect for
a logic for abduction. Apart from the explanatory hypotheses and deduc-
tive consequences of the premises, this set also contains a large number of
possibilities (formulas of the form ♦A) that are deductive consequences of
conditionally inferred hypotheses. In the suggested interpretation of the
syntax of the logic, all these formulas should be considered as hypotheses.
For instance, if we look at the proof on page 92, in which we illustrated
how the logic handles predictions, we see that, if no counter evidence were
found, both the original hypothesis ♦P a and its deductive consequence ♦Sa
would be finally derivable.
This should not, however, be conceived as a problem. The rational at-
titude to adopt towards these formulas is to entertain them as hypotheses.
If we entertain p as a hypothesis and take p ⊃ q to be true, than none of
the other doxastic attitudes of the quadruple ‘belief - disbelief - withold-
ing - hypothesizing’ (see Chapter 3) would be a suitable attitude to adopt
towards q: belief and disbelief are obviously too strong, withholding judg-
ment is clearly too weak. Hence, we should also entertain q as a hypothesis.
In other words, the logic MLAss can certainly be thought of as a logic for
hypothesis formation.
For those specifically interested in the actual explanatory hypotheses
inferred by means of an abductive reasoning process, it might be suggested
that it is always possible to look at specific proofs that model these abduc-
tive reasoning steps to observe which hypotheses are initially inferred. Yet
one should be warned. As will become clear in the case study of Part III,
the explanatory hypothesis that scientists advance in a certain case is sel-
dom the first idea they inferred by an abductive inference. Far more often,
the proposed explanatory hypothesis is a consequence of such an initial
idea that expresses their suggestion in connection with other parts of their
background knowledge to make the explanatory link clear.
A further reason why the inclusion of deductive consequences of initial
hypotheses in the consequence set should not be considered a problem is
that such consequences have (as we have seen in the example of a pre-
diction) the property that, if they are refuted, the initial hypothesis is also
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refuted. In a sense, by performing an abductive step, one infers a set of
related propositions that all have the same condition. Therefore, if one of
them is revoked, all the related hypotheses, which have the same condition
in common, will also be revoked. Flach and Kakas (2000a) express this
idea by using the notion of an abductive extension, i.e. a coherent extension
of a classical consequence set with one or more abductive hypotheses and
their consequences, such that as many observations of the original premise
set as possible are explained.
Although the main purpose of the case study in the next section is to
illustrate the modeling capacity of the logic MLAss, the idea of an abductive
extension is also already displayed. In Chapter 5, I will discuss this notion
further and show how one can keep track of different abductive extensions.
4.7 Case Study: The Origin of the Moon
In the first decades after NASA was founded in 1958, lunar exploration
was one of its most prestigious goals. These efforts have led to the Apollo
program that included six lunar landing missions between 1969 and 1972.
There was widespread expectation that the Apollo exploration
of the moon would settle the question of its origin; this had
been cited frequently as one of the scientific goals of the Apollo
program. (Wood, 1986, p. 18)
As history has taught us, this goal was not achieved. Seen in retrospect,
one of the most important reasons for this lack of success was
[. . . ] the concentration on three classical theories of lunar ori-
gin: (1) Capture – capture of a planetesimal, formed elsewhere
in the solar system, into Earth’s orbit; (2) Fission – sponta-
neous ejection of upper mantle material into a circumterrestrial
swarm due to rotational instability, probably during core forma-
tion; (3) Coaccretion – formation of the moon by accretion in a
circumterrestrial nebula. (Hartmann, 1986, p. 579)
The main reasons22 why these hypotheses were considered untenable
can be summarized as follows. First, capture (H1) of a planetesimal – ac-
cording to the laws of celestial mechanics – can occur only if the original
22As listed, for instance, in the review article of Wood (1986).
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trajectory of this planetesimal is within very limited constraints which in-
clude the constraint that this proto-moon should have originated at about
the same (radial) distance from the sun and at about the same time as the
earth. But if the moon and earth originated at the same time at roughly the
same spot in the circumsolar nebula, the moon should have more or less
the same chemical composition as the earth. This is not the case, because
the moon contains hardly any iron, one of the heavier elements in the solar
system that is abundant in the core of the earth. Second, fission (H2) can
neither explain the depletion of volatile elements on the moon’s surface (in
comparison with the earth’s surface) nor account for the abnormally high
angular momentum of the Earth-Moon system (in comparison with other
planetary systems in our solar system). Finally, coaccretion (H3) – which
was until then the most supported hypothesis – can account neither for iron
depletion nor for the high angular momentum.
Coming to this point, several scientists in the mid-seventies were try-
ing to figure out a new hypothesis. Soon, a fourth hypothesis was pro-
posed independently by Hartmann and Davis (1975) and Cameron and
Ward (1976). Our attention here will be devoted to the thought process
displayed in the latter paper.
Cameron and Ward started by focusing on the angular momentum of
the Earth-Moon system.
A key constraint on the origin of the Earth-Moon system is the
abnormally large value of the specific angular momentum of
the system, compared to that of the other planets in the solar
system. (Cameron and Ward, 1976, p. 120)
Reasoning in terms of the elementary dynamics of physical bodies – in
which a collision with another body can lead to an increase in angular
momentum – they abduced the following hypothesis.
This spin was presumably imparted by a collision with a major
secondary body in the late stages of accumulation of the earth,
with the secondary body adding its mass to the remainder of
the proto-earth. (Cameron and Ward, 1976, p. 120)
After determining the characteristics of such a second body – a body roughly
the size of Mars, approaching at 11 km/s and hitting the earth off center
– to account for the specific angular momentum, they could deductively
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reason further what would be the consequences of such a giant impact.
In short, a lot of volatile elements would vaporize upon shock-unloading
and a disk of debris would be caught in the gravitational field of the earth.
After a while, the heavier elements (including iron) would sink into the
still very fluid young earth, while the lighter elements that remain in an
elliptical trajectory around the earth would, over a certain amount of time,
form the moon by accretion. Thus, deductively deriving further conse-
quences of this hypothesis, they concluded that “the Moon should thus be
deficient in metallic iron and volatile elements...” (p. 121) and, hence, that
this hypothesis could at first sight account for all the available data, much
of which had previously been problematic.
Before I start to model this case study, it is important to note that we
are interested in the process of abduction or the heuristic process of form-
ing explanatory hypotheses, not in confirmation theory or (justificational)
inference to the best explanation.23 What is to be modeled, then, is the
reasoning process of scientists looking for a new explanatory hypothesis
for the origin of the moon.24 This is a different reasoning process than
confirmation processes, in which one tries to decide whether there is suf-
ficient evidence to support a certain conclusion. This explains the more
qualitative nature of arguments in abductive reasoning as opposed to the
more quantitative nature of these arguments in justification. I will further
use the following notations:
m “the moon”
Ex “x exists in its actual state”
Ax “x is part of a two-body system with unusually high angular momentum”
Fx “x has an iron (Fe) core”
V x “x has a surface containing volatile elements”
Ix “x is part of a two-body system that is the result of a collision between two
proto-bodies”
23In discerning abduction and IBE I follow the reasoning initiated by Hintikka (1998)
and elaborated by Schurz (2008a,b) that the distinction is to be found in their function and
context. Abduction is a strategical or heuristic process, while IBE is a justificational process
(see also Sections 1.2 and 1.4 on my interpretation of the notion ‘abduction’).
24New hypotheses can be found by means of both creative and selective abductive pro-
cesses. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the logic MLAss does not model creative
abductions, which would imply that the conditional used by Cameron and Ward would have
been created. Instead, the new hypothesis found by Cameron and Ward is obtained by select-
ing an existing conditional in their background knowledge (“Collisions have an impact on the
angular momentum in systems of physical bodies”) and using it to abduce a new hypothesis
for the origin of the moon.
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We can thus model the relevant background knowledge of Cameron and
Ward as follows. The domain of objects over which the variables can range
is the set of all natural satellites of our solar system.
1 Em -;PREM ∅
2 ¬Fm -;PREM ∅
3 ¬Vm -;PREM ∅
4 Am -;PREM ∅
5 (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Ax) -;PREM ∅
From these premises, they could derive their new hypothesis.
6 ♦Im 4,5;RC {!Im .Am}
Note that if they would have tried to come up with one of the three older
hypotheses by considering one of the three implications (∀x)(Hix ⊃ Ex)
(with 1 6 i 6 3) as an extra premise25 and abducing the correspond-
ing hypothesis ♦Him, these hypotheses would have been defeated given
the premises on lines 2 − 4 and our further background knowledge about
these hypotheses {(∀x)(H1x ⊃ Fx),(∀x)(H2x ⊃ (V x∧¬Ax)),(∀x)(H3x ⊃
(Fx ∧¬Ax))}. But, as we can see in the following extension of the proof,
the new hypothesis ♦Im actually predicts all the known (and previously
problematic) data about the moon.
7 (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Ex) -;PREM ∅
8 (∀x)(Ix ⊃ ¬Fx) -;PREM ∅
9 (∀x)(Ix ⊃ ¬V x) -;PREM ∅
10 ♦Em 6,7;RU {!Im .Am}
11 ♦¬Fm 6,8;RU {!Im .Am}
12 ♦¬Vm 6,9;RU {!Im .Am}
Since the new hypothesis is at first sight corroborated by the known
data, Cameron and Ward (and other scientists in the field) could now go on
and try to justify or prove that this new hypothesis is the actual explanation
for the origin of the moon. This also nicely illustrates that it is not possible
to sharply distinguish between the context of discovery and the context
of justification.26 Already in the initial phase of hypothesis formation, a
25Although these three hypotheses are not able to explain the origin of the moon, some of
them are leading hypotheses for other natural satellites in our solar system. See, for instance,
Canup and Ward (2002).
26As discussed and argued in Aliseda (2006) and elsewhere.
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justificational aspect is present (which I have labeled here “corroboration
with the known data”).27
That this model of their thought process can be assumed to be more or
less accurate follows from Cameron and Ward’s own reflection upon their
thought process, as stated in their conclusions.
We wish to emphasize that this picture follows as a logical con-
sequence of the process needed to provide the angular momen-
tum of the Earth-Moon system. (p. 121)
This conclusion is correct, but omits their abductive move: only if we
take the increased angular momentum to be the result of a collision, all the
other characteristics follow as deductive consequences.28 Their essential
consideration was that collisions are a well-known cause of changes in the
parameters of dynamic systems.
Together with the independently proposed article by Hartmann and
Davis (1975),29 Cameron and Ward’s paper has led to a new successful
hypothesis about the origin of the moon, which has since come to be called
the “giant impact hypothesis” (Hartmann, 1986). Increased interest in this
problem led to the 1984 conference on the origin of the moon in Kona.
At the conference it became clear that a “major shift of confidence had oc-
curred among lunar scientists” towards the giant impact hypothesis (Wood,
1986, p. 47). At present, this hypothesis is still the most widely favored
among lunar scientists (Belbruno and Gott, 2005, p. 1), although one is still
looking for more conclusive evidence by modeling this impact by means of
computer simulations.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented the logic MLAss that enables us to model
the singular fact abductive reasoning processes of scientists. Scientists are
in general interested in the actual explanation of the puzzling phenomena
27For a thorough discussion on justification in scientific discovery, see Nickles (1980).
28As Cameron and Ward are physicists and not trained logicians, I assume that they use the
notion of logical consequence in its common layman sense, i.e. as consequences that follow
directly and deductively from previous reasoning.
29This paper mostly explains that such collisions in the initial stadia of our solar system
were not as uncommon as was thought.
104 CHAPTER 4. SINGULAR FACT ABDUCTION IN SCIENCE
they investigate. This means that in the case of multiple explanatory hy-
potheses, scientists will further investigate the different hypotheses one by
one. The logic MLAss provides this possibility by allowing one to derive –
in a defeasible way – the different hypotheses. The logic MLAss is a decent
formal logic in every possible way. Since it is formulated in the standard
format of adaptive logics, this logic has a proof theory and a semantics that
is sound and complete with respect to it.
While this logic is apt to model actual abductive processes in science
– as the case study points out – several extensions can still enrich it. An
interesting addition would be that the logic could also handle explananda
that contradict the existing background knowledge (anomalies). Another
extension that comes to mind is the ability to handle a structured or layered
background knowledge. Finally, there is still a lot of work to be done on the
heuristics behind abductive reasoning. Can a pattern be discerned in how
scientists find relevant conditionals to perform their abductive reasoning
steps?
5Singular Fact Abduction in AI
It [the Analytical Engine] might act upon other
things besides numbers, were objects found whose
mutual fundamental relations could be expressed by
those of the abstract science of operations, and
which should be also susceptible of adaptations to
the action of the operating notation and mechanism
of the engine.
— Ada Byron, Lady Lovelace, 1842
“Funny that penguin being there, isn’t it? What’s
it doing there?”
“Standing.”
— Monty Python’s Flying Circus, 1970
This chapter is based on the article “An Adaptive Logic-based Approach to Abduc-
tion in AI” (Gauderis, 2011), published in the proceedings of the 9th International
Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Action and Change (NRAC 2011), associated
with the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011).
I am indebted to Peter Verde´e, Bert Leuridan and four anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
In this paper, a set-based formulation of the syntax of adaptive logics in standard
format (using the simple strategy) is presented. The translation of the logic MLAss into
this framework will allow us to address the abduction problem as it is conceived in the
field of artificial intelligence. The major difference with the problem in philosophical
logic is that in AI one is not so much concerned with syntactical proof theory, but
rather with how the method handles subsequent stages of theory extension in fast-
growing knowledge bases. Therefore, the stress is on how (final) consequence sets
of different extensions relate, a problem that is conceived hard with respect to non-
monotonic reasoning (e.g. see the review article Paul, 2000). Given the rather low
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complexity of the simple strategy, the results of addressing this problem by means of
the logic MLAss are promising.
The scope and content of the original article are to a large extent retained. Yet
several paragraphs are adapted or rewritten for general consistency with the remainder
of this dissertation and the adaptive logics framework in general. Also, the spelling is
changed to American English.
5.1 A Set-based Formulation of Adaptive Logics Syntax
The adaptive logics program is established to offer insight in the direct ap-
plication of defeasible reasoning steps.1 This is done by focusing on which
formulas would falsify a defeasible reasoning step. In this chapter, I start by
reformulating the syntax of this framework in terms of sets. This will allow
me to address the problem of abduction as it is perceived and defined in the
field of artificial intelligence by means of the existing adaptive logic MLAss,
which I presented in Chapter 4. The main difference between abduction
as it is perceived in philosophical logic and in artificial intelligence is that
in AI the stress in not so much on proof theory given a single premise set,
but rather on how derived consequence sets can be reused for extensions
of the theory.
The presented reformulation of adaptive logics syntax, which reinter-
prets various elements of its proof theory, is tailored to a specific subclass
of adaptive logics, i.e. those in standard format using the simple strategy,
but can easily be extended to include other adaptive logics in standard
format using other strategies.
Consider a logical theory T defined in a language L.2 In my reformula-
tion of adaptive logics syntax, a formula is a pair (A, ∆) with A standing for
an ordinary well-formed formula in L and ∆, the condition of the formula,
standing for a set of ordinary well-formed formulas in L that are assumed
to be false. To express this assumption, elements of the condition ∆ can be
called abnormalities. For each adaptive logic in standard format AL, these
abnormalities are characterized by a logical form. Also, each such adap-
tive logic AL has a so-called lower limit logic LLL, a monotonic logic the
consequences of which are always considered to be valid in the adaptive
logic. For abductive purposes, this logic is generally Classical Logic CL or
1For a philosophical defense of the use of adaptive logics, see Batens (2004).
2In logic-based approaches to problems in artificial intelligence, such a theory represents
the background knowledge of an agent.
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a suitable modal extension of CL.
The set of plausibly derivable formulas P from a logical theory T accord-
ing to an adaptive logic AL is defined by the following three rules:
1. Premise Rule: if A ∈ T , then (A, ∅) ∈ P
2. Unconditional Inference Rule:
if A1, . . . , An `LLL B
and {(A1, ∆1), . . . , (An, ∆n)} ⊆ P for some ∆1, . . . , ∆n,
then (B, ∆1 ∪ . . .∪∆n) ∈ P
3. Conditional Inference Rule:
if A1, . . . , An `LLL B∨Dab(Θ)
and {(A1, ∆1), . . . , (An, ∆n)} ⊆ P for some ∆1, . . . , ∆n,
then (B, ∆1∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ) ∈ P
where Dab(Θ) stands for disjunction of abnormalities, i.e. the classical dis-
junction of all elements in the finite set of abnormalities Θ.
The third rule, which adds new conditions, makes clear how defeasibly
derived formulas can be modeled. The idea is that if we can deductively
derive the disjunction of a defeasible result B and the formulas the truth
of which would make us to withdraw B, we can defeasibly derive B on the
assumption that none of these formulas is true.
Apart from the set of plausible formulas P we need a mechanism that
selects which defeasible results should be withdrawn. This is done by defin-
ing a marking strategy. In the adaptive logics literature, several strategies
have been developed, but for our purposes it is sufficient to consider only
the simple strategy.3 Following this strategy, the set of the derivable formu-
las or consequences D ⊆ P from T according to AL consists of :
1. Deductive Results: if (A, ∅) ∈ P , then (A, ∅) ∈ D
2. Unfalsified Defeasible Results:
if (A, Θ) ∈ P (with Θ , ∅)
and if for every ω ∈Θ : (ω, ∅) < P ,
then (A, Θ) ∈ D
3This simple strategy, although computationally simple, should be used with care, be-
cause it has no mechanism to block, for instance, formulas with one abnormality in their
condition for which that abnormality can be derived as part of a disjunction but not individ-
ually. Therefore, when using the simple strategy, it should be prevented in the language or
allowed structure of T that disjunctions of abnormalities can be derived (without at least one
of the disjuncts being individually derivable).
108 CHAPTER 5. SINGULAR FACT ABDUCTION IN AI
So, apart from the deductive results – which are always derivable – an
adaptive logic considers all defeasible results as derivable so long as none
of the elements of their condition are deductively derivable.
From the definitions of the sets P and D, we can understand how adap-
tive logics model the non-monotonic character of defeasible reasoning. If
our theory T is extended to a new theory T ′ (T ⊂ T ′), we can construct the
corresponding sets P ′ and D′. On the one hand, the set of plausibly deriv-
able formulas will be monotonic (P ⊂ P ′), since there is no mechanism
to withdraw elements from this set and it can only grow larger. On the
other hand, we know that the set of derivable formulas is non-monotonic
(D 1 D′). It is possible that a condition of a defeasible result in D is sud-
denly – in light of the new information in T ′ – deductively derivable. So,
this result will not be part of D′. Obviously, no deductive result will ever
be revoked.
These properties make this kind of logics very apt to model fast growing
knowledge bases.4 If we need a previously defeasibly derived result at a
certain point, we cannot be sure whether it is still valid, because there
might have been several knowledge base updates in the meantime. But,
since the set of plausible formulas is monotonic, we know that this formula
will still be in P . So, instead of recalculating the whole non-monotonic set
D after each knowledge base extension (which is the traditional approach),
it is sufficient to update the monotonic set P . If we then want to use a
defeasible result at a certain stage of knowledge base expansion, we just
have to check its condition. It is easily seen that a lot of repetitive re-
computation is avoided by this approach, certainly in situations in which
we need only a small percentage of the defeasible results at any given stage
of knowledge base expansion.
Finally, it has been proven that if the adaptive logic is in standard format
(i.e. the abnormalities have a fixed logical form and the lower limit logic
LLL is sound, complete, reflexive, transitive, monotonic and compact),
then the adaptive logic will have many interesting meta-theoretic proper-
ties such as soundness, completeness, proof invariance and the fixed-point
property.5
4In this way, this kind of logic can offer a solution to what Paul (2000) noted as one of
the main problems both of set cover-based and of some logic-based approaches to abduction.
5For an overview of the generic proofs of these properties, see Batens (2007).
5.2. OTHER CONDITIONAL APPROACHES IN AI 109
5.2 Other Conditional Approaches in AI
So far as I can see, two other approaches to non-monotonic reasoning in AI
have used the idea of directly adding conditions or restrictions to formulas.
On the one hand, there is a line of research, called “Cumulative Default
Reasoning”, going back to a paper of Brewka (1991) with the same title.
On the other hand, in the area of argumentation theory, some work on
defeasible logic programs (see e.g. Garc´ıa and Simari, 2004) is also based
on formulas together with consistency conditions that need to be satisfied
to make these formulas acceptable.
The main difference with these research programs is that the abnormal-
ities in adaptive logics are characterized by a fixed logical form. This means
that, for instance, the logical form of the logic for abduction in this chapter
is the fixed form of abnormalities for any theory or premise set to which we
want to apply abductive reasoning. In other words, as soon as any logical
theory is given, all abnormalities for that theory and, hence, all plausible
and finally derivable abductive results are already determined. In the two
other approaches, the conditions of defeasible steps must be specified in
the premise set, which gives a complicating element of choice.
5.3 The Problem of Multiple Explanatory Hypotheses
Abduction in AI is the search for explanations for particular observations
given a logical theory. Whether a sentence φ is considered as an expla-
nation for an observation ω given a theory T depends on some formal
conditions, of which, in general, the following three are considered cru-
cial: (1) φ together with T implies ω; (2) φ is logically consistent with T ;
and (3) φ is the most ‘parsimonious’ explanation for w.
The main problem for abduction is that the different defeasible results
– the abduced hypotheses – can be mutually exclusive. For instance, if
Tweety is a non-flying bird, he may be a penguin or an ostrich. But the
formulas (penguin(Tweety), Θ1) and (ostrich(Tweety), Θ2) are incompati-
ble.6
An elegant solution to this problem is found by translating this problem
into a modal framework. When we introduce a possibility operator ♦ to
indicate hypotheses and the corresponding necessity operator ( =df ¬♦¬)
6At this point, we abstract away from the exact conditions; the details of these will be
explained in Section 5.4.
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to represent background knowledge, we evade this problem. The Tweety-
example translates, for instance, as follows (for variables ranging over the
domain of all birds):
Background Knowledge:
(∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅)





So, with this addition the set D is again consistent. However, in order to
have easily accessible reference sets, it is not really necessary to maintain
the modal operators explicitly, because we can quite easily make a transla-
tion to a hierarchical set-approach by borrowing some ideas of the Kripke
semantics for modal logics. It is important, however, to remember that,
although we borrow some ideas of Kripke semantics, we are constructing
a syntactical representation for abductive extensions of theories and not a
semantics for the underlying logic. The notion world (set) will denote a
(syntactical) set of formulas, not a semantic concept.
We define the actual world w as the set of all formulas of the knowledge
base and all of its deductive consequences. The elements of the set w are
the only formulas that have a -operator in our modal logic. Subsequently,
for every abduced hypothesis we define a new world set that contains it.
This world is hierarchically directly beneath the world from which the for-
mula is abduced. This new set contains, further, the formulas of all the
world sets hierarchically above, and will be closed under deduction. To
make this hierarchy clear, we will use the names w1, w2, . . . for the worlds
containing hypotheses directly abduced from the knowledge base, w1.1,
w1.2, . . . , w2.1, . . . for hypotheses abduced from a first-level world, etc. As
can be verified, the actual world w is a subset of every other defined world
set. In general, for every wi : wi ⊂ wi.j for every wi.j defined hierarchically
under wi . Therefore, it suffices to keep track in the representation of a
formula of the highest world set that contains it.7
7This approach allows for a particular ordinary formula to appear in two world sets that
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Using these ideas, our Tweety example can be respresented as follows:
(∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅) w
(∀x(ostrich(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅) w
(¬f lies(Tweety), ∅) w
(penguin(Tweety), Θ1) w1
(ostrich(Tweety), Θ2) w2
Since the hierarchical system of sets wi contains all the information of
the set P (the plausibly derivable results) of a modal logic for abduction,
the definition of the setD can be applied to this system of sets too. It is clear
that only the deductive consequences of the premises – the only formulas
with an empty condition – will be in set w. Further, since all formulas in
a world set that are not comprised in the world set hierarchically directly
above have the same condition, i.e. the union of the abnormality of the
hypothesis for which the world is created and the condition of the world
set hierarchically directly above, the definition of D does not only select at
the level of individual formulas, but also at the level of the world sets.8
In other words, the definition of D selects a hierarchical subsystem of
the initial hierarchical system of world sets. The different sets in this sub-
system are equivalent with what Flach and Kakas (2000a) called abductive
extensions of some theory (the deductive closure of which is equivalent with
the actual world set w). In this way, the logic can handle mutually contra-
dictory hypotheses, without the risk that any set of formulas will turn out
to be inconsistent. Different explanations lead to different abductive ex-
tensions: one in which Tweety is an ostrich and one in which Tweety is a
penguin.
are not hierarchically connected, e.g. w1 and w2.1. This happens when the formula can be
derived via two different defeasible ways resulting in different conditions. We will see below
that all formulas of a world set that are not comprised in the world set just above it have
the same condition. Therefore, as the condition is an inherent part of a formula, they are,
strictly speaking, two different formulas. As long as one of them is selected according to the
definition of the set D, the ordinary formula can be considered defeasibly derivable.
8It is true that each world set also contains all formulas of the world sets hierarchically
above. But since these formulas are contained in those worlds above, no information is lost if
we allow that D can select at the level of the world sets.
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5.4 A Set-based Formulation of the Logic MLAss
So far, in this chapter we have shown (in Section 5.1) how we can rep-
resent the syntax of adaptive logics in terms of the sets P and D, and (in
Section 5.3) how we can cope with contradictory hypotheses by using a
hierarchical system of world sets, which is equivalent to the various abduc-
tive extensions. In this section we will now use this set representation to
reformulate the syntax of the logic MLAss, which has been developed in
Gauderis (2013a) (see Chapter 4) and is designed to handle contradictory
hypotheses in abduction. The reformulation in terms of sets is performed
with the aim of integrating the adaptive approach with other approaches
to abduction in AI. The problem of abduction in AI is typically defined in
terms of an abductive system (Paul, 2000):
Definition 5.1 (Abductive System). An abductive system T is a triple (H,O,d)
consisting of the following three sets
• a set of clauses H of the form
∀α((A1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α)) ⊃ B(α))
with A1(α), . . . ,An(α),B(α) literals and α ranging over d.
• a set of observations O of the form C(γ)
with C a literal and γ ∈ d a constant .
• a domain d of constants.
All formulas are closed formulas defined over first-order predicate logic.
Furthermore, the notation does not imply that predicates should be of
rank 1. Predicates can have any rank; the only preliminaries are that in the
clauses all Ai and B share a common variable, and that the observations
have at least one variable that is replaced by a constant. Obviously, for
predicates of higher rank, extra quantifiers for the other variables need to
be added to make sure that all formulas are closed.
Definition 5.2. The background knowledge or actual world w of an abduc-
tive system T = (H,O,d) is the set
w = {(p, ∅) | H∪O ` p}
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Since it was the goal of an adaptive logic-approach to implement di-
rectly defeasible reasoning steps, we will consider instances of the Peircean
schema for abduction (Peirce, 1958, CP 5.189):
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
When we translate his schema to the elements of T = (H,O,d), we get
the following schema:
∀α((A1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α)) ⊃ B(α))
B(γ)
A1(γ)∧ . . .∧An(γ)
To implement this schema – better-known as the logical fallacy Affirm-
ing the Consequent – in an adaptive logic, we need to specify the logical
form of the conditions that would falsify the application of this rule. As we
can see from the way in which the conditional inference rule is introduced
in the first section, the disjunction of the hypothesis and all defeating con-
ditions needs to be derivable from the theory. To specify these conditions,
we will first look at the different desiderata for our abductions.9
Obviously, it is straightforward that if the negation of the hypothe-
sis can be derived from our background knowledge, the abduction is fal-
sified. If we know that Tweety lives in the wild in the African savan-
nah, we know that he cannot be a penguin. So, in light of this infor-
mation, the penguin hypothesis can no longer be considered derivable:
(penguin(Tweety),Θ1) < D. But the hypothesis still remains in the mono-
tonic set of ‘initially’ plausible results: (penguin(Tweety),Θ1) ∈ P .
So, if we define A(α) to denote the full conjunction,
A(α) =df A1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α)
the first defeating condition that could revoke the abductive step is
∀α(A(α) ⊃ B(α))∧B(γ)∧¬A(γ).
9As this chapter is based on a stand-alone article, the following paragraphs unavoidably
have some overlap with Chapter 4, yet adjusted to the specific aims of the original paper.
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To avoid self-explanations we will further add the condition that A(α)
and B(α) share no predicates.
The reason why this condition also states the two premises of the abduc-
tive schema is because, in an adaptive logic, we can apply the conditional
rule each time the disjunction of a formula and a condition is derivable.
So, if we didn’t state the two premises in the abnormality, we could derive
anything as a hypothesis since ` C(γ)∨¬C(γ) for any C(γ). But with the
current form, only hypotheses for which the two premises are true can be
derived. This abnormality would already be sufficient to create an adaptive
logic.
Still, we want to add some other defeating conditions. This could be
done by replacing the abnormality by a disjunction of the already found
condition and the other required defeating conditions. Then, each time one
of the defeating conditions is derivable, the whole disjunction is derivable
(by addition), and so the formula is defeated.
Often, it is stated that the abduced hypothesis must be as parsimonious
as possible. One of the main reasons for this is that one has to avoid ran-
dom explanations. For instance, have a look at the following example:
H = {∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x))}
O = {¬f lies(Tweety)}
d = {x | x is a bird}
The following formulas are derivable from this system:
(∀x((penguin(x)∧ is green(x)) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅) w
(penguin(Tweety)∧ is green(Tweety), Θ1) w1
(is green(Tweety), Θ1) w1
The fact that Tweety is green is not an explanation for the fact that
Tweety doesn’t fly, nor is it something that follows from our background
knowledge. Since we want to avoid that our abductions yield these kinds of
random hypotheses, we will add a mechanism to ensure that our hypothesis
is the most parsimonious one.
A final condition that we have to add is that our observation is not a
tautology. Since we use a material implication, anything could be derived
as an explanation for a tautology, because ` C(γ) ⊃ > for any C(γ).
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Now we can define the defeasible reasoning steps. Therefore we will
need a new notation, the purpose of which is to lift out one element from
the conjunction A1(α) ∧ . . . ∧ An(α). This will be used to check for more
parsimonious explanations.
Notation 5.3 (A−1i (α)).
if n > 1 : A−1i (α) =df A1(α)∧ . . .∧Ai−1(α)∧Ai+1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α)
if n = 1 : A−11 (α) =df >
Definition 5.4. The set of abnormalities Ω of the adaptive logic MLAss for
an abductive system T is given by




∀α(A−1i (α) ⊃ B(α)) | γ ∈ d,
α ranging over d,Ai and B literals,B < {Ai }}
One can verify that the generic conditional rule for adaptive logics (see
Section 5.1) for which the abnormalities are characterized by the form
above (Θ ⊆Ω) is equivalent to the following inference rule, written in the
style of the Peircean schema. To keep the computational complexity of test-
ing the condition as low as possible, we can apply a simplifying procedure
on Θ that consists in replacing disjunctions by their individual disjuncts
and removing conjuncts that are premises. This procedure guarantees that
as soon as one of the members of the simplified condition, which will be
called Ξ, is unconditionally derivable, a member of the original condition
Θ is also unconditionally derivable (by simple applications of addition and
conjunction).
Definition 5.5. Defeasible Inference rule for Abduction
(∀α(A1(α)∧ . . .∧An(α) ⊃ B(α)), ∅) w
(B(γ), Ξi) wi
(A1(γ)∧ . . .∧An(γ), Ξi.j ) wi.j
with wi.j a new world set hierarchically directly beneath wi and
Ξi.j = Ξi ∪ {¬A1(γ), . . . , ¬An(γ), ∀αB(α), ∀α(A−11 (α) ⊃ B(α)), . . . ,
∀α(A−1n (α) ⊃ B(α))}
So, it is possible to abduce further on hypothetical observations (and, in
that way, generate further abductive extensions), but the implications need
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to be present in the background knowledge w. It is quite obvious, that
if the abduced hypothesis is already abduced before (from, for instance,
another implication), the resulting world set will contain (partly) the same
formulas, but with other conditions.
5.5 An Elaborate Example: a Bird called Tweety
Motivation and comparison with other approaches In this section we
will consider an intricate example of the dynamics of this framework. Our
main goal will be to illustrate the key advantage of this approach, i.e. that
it is no longer needed to recalculate all non-monotonic results at any stage
of a growing knowledge base, but only to update the monotonic set of plau-
sible formulas and to check the non-monotonic derivability of the specific
formulas needed at that stage.
This is the main difference with other approaches to abduction such as
the ones explicated, for instance, in Paul (2000), Flach and Kakas (2000a)
or Kakas and Denecker (2002). Since these approaches focus on a fixed
and not an expanding knowledge base, they require in cases of expansion
a full re-computation to keep the set of derived non-monotonic results up to
date. It remains open, however, whether the presented adaptive approach
also yields better results for fixed knowledge bases.
Initial system T Our example will be an abductive learning situation
concerning the observation of a non-flying bird, called Tweety. Initially,
our abductive system T = (H,O,d) contains in addition to this observation
only very limited background knowledge.
H = {∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)),∀x(ostrich(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x))}
O = {¬f lies(Tweety)}
d = {x | x is a bird}
Thus, our background knowledge contains the following formulas:
(∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅) w (5.1)
(∀x(ostrich(x) ⊃ ¬f lies(x)), ∅) w (5.2)
(¬f lies(Tweety), ∅) w (5.3)
The following abductive hypotheses are also part of P :
(penguin(Tweety), Ξ1) w1 (5.4)
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(ostrich(Tweety), Ξ2) w2 (5.5)
with the sets Ξ1 and Ξ2 defined as
Ξ1 = {¬penguin(Tweety),∀x ¬f lies(x)}
Ξ2 = {¬ostrich(Tweety),∀x ¬f lies(x)}
Since both implications have only one conjunct in the antecedent, their
parsimony conditions – as defined in the general logical form – trivially
coincide with the second condition. Since none of the conditions is de-
ductively derivable in w, both (5.4) and (5.5) are elements of the set of
derivable formulas D.
First Extension T ′ At this stage, we discover that Tweety can swim,
something we know ostriches can’t do.
H′ =H∪ {∀x(ostrich(x) ⊃ ¬swims(x))},
O′ = O∪ {swims(Tweety)}
d = {x | x is a bird}
From this, the following formulas can be derived:
(∀x(swims(x) ⊃ ¬ostrich(x)), ∅) w (5.6)
(¬ostrich(Tweety), ∅) w (5.7)
As the background information is extended, we know that all previously
derived hypotheses are still in the set of plausible hypotheses (P ⊆ P ′). If
we now want to check whether these hypotheses are in the new set of
derivable hypotheses D′, we need to check whether or not their conditions
are derivable from this extended information. But – this has already been
cited several times as the key advantage of this system – we don’t need to
check all hypotheses. Since we do not have any further information on the
penguin case and we also do not need that idea at the moment, we can
choose to just leave the hypothesis (5.4) for what it is (and save, hence,
a computation). At this stage we only want to check whether this new
information is a problem for the ostrich hypothesis; and indeed, it is easily
seen that (5.5)<D′.
Second Extension T ′′ At this stage, we will further investigate the pen-
guin hypothesis and retrieve additional background information about pen-
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guins.
H′′ =H′ ∪ {∀x(penguin(x) ⊃ eats f ish(x)),
∀x((on south pole(x)∧ in wild(x)) ⊃ penguin(x))}
O′′ = O′
d = {x | x is a bird}
The following formulas can now further be retrieved:
(eats f ish(Tweety), Ξ1) w1 (5.8)
(on south pole(Tweety), Ξ1.1) w1.1 (5.9)
(in wild(Tweety), Ξ1.1) w1.1 (5.10)
with the set Ξ1.1 defined as
Ξ1.1 = Ξ1 ∪ {¬on south pole(Tweety),¬in wild(Tweety),
∀x penguin(x),∀x(on south pole(x) ⊃ penguin(x)),
∀x(in wild(x) ⊃ penguin(x))}
This stage is added to illustrate the other aspects of adaptive reasoning.
First, as (5.8) illustrates, there is no problem in reasoning further with pre-
viously deductively derived hypotheses. Only, to reason further, we must
first check the condition of these hypotheses. This poses no problem here,
as we can easily verify that (5.4)∈ D′′. The deductively derived formula has
the same conditions as the hypothesis on which it is built (and is contained
in the same world). So, these results stand so long as the hypotheses on the
assumption of which they are derived hold. This characteristic of adaptive
logics is very interesting, because it allows one to derive predictions that
can be tested in further investigation. In this example, we can test whether
Tweety eats fish. In case this experiment fails and ¬eats f ish(Tweety) is
added to the observations in the next extension of the theory, the hypothe-
sis (and all results derived on its assumption) will be falsified.
Second, the set of conditions Ξ1.1 for the formulas (5.9) and (5.10)
contains now also conditions that check for parsimony. Let us illustrate
their functioning with a final extension.
Third Extension T ′′′ At this stage, we learn that even in captivity the
only birds that can survive at the South Pole are penguins. In addition to
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that, we get to know that Tweety is held in captivity.
H′′′ =H′′ ∪ {∀x(on south pole(x) ⊃ penguin(x))},
O′′′ = O′′ ∪ {¬in wild(Tweety)}
d = {x | x is a bird}
If we now check the parsimony conditions of Ξ1.1, we see that an el-
ement of this condition can be derived from our background knowledge.
Hence, none of the formulas assigned to world w1.1 are any longer deriv-
able on this condition. Yet one might wonder whether this parsimony con-
dition should not let us keep (5.9) and only withdraw (5.10). That this is
not a good way forward is proven by the fact that in that case (5.9) would
still be falsified, because Ξ1.1 also contains ¬in wild(Tweety), our new ob-
servation. In fact, we do not need the world w1.1 to maintain the South Pole
hypothesis of (5.9), as it can now be derived from H′′′ in another world,
which has no conditions on whether or not Tweety lives in the wild.
(on south pole(Tweety), Ξ1.2) w1.2 (5.11)
with the set Ξ1.2 defined as
Ξ1.2 = Ξ1 ∪ {¬on south pole(Tweety),∀x penguin(x)}
So, at the end, we find that the set D′′′ of derivable formulas consists of
all formulas derivable in the world w1.2 (which is an abductive extension
of the worlds w and w1). The formulas of w2 and w1.1 are not an element
of the final set of derivable results D′′′.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have presented a new logic-based approach to the problem
of abduction in AI, which is based on the adaptive logics program. The
main advantages of this approach are :
1. Each abduced formula is presented together with the specific condi-
tions that would defeat it. In that way, it is not necessary to check
the whole system for consistency after each extension of the back-
ground knowledge. Only the formulas needed at a certain stage need
to be checked. Furthermore, it allows for the conditions to contain
additional requirements, such as parsimony.
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2. In comparison with other approaches that add conditions to formu-
las, the conditions are here fixed by a logical form and hence only
determined by the (classical) premise set. In this way, there is no
element of choice in stating conditions (as, for instance, in default
logics).
3. By integrating a hierarchical system of sets, it provides an intuitive
representation of multiple hypotheses without causing conflicts be-
tween contradictory hypotheses.
4. It allows for further deductive and abductive reasoning on previously
retrieved abduced hypotheses.
5. The approach is based on a proper, sound and complete fixed point
logic (MLAss).
Limitations and Future Research It has been argued that these advan-
tages make this approach apt for systems in which not all non-monotonically
derivable results are needed at every stage of expansion of a knowledge
base. Still, it needs to be examined whether an integration with existing
systems (for a fixed knowledge base) does not yield better results. Further-
more, since the key feature of this approach is that it saves computations
in expanding knowledge bases, it needs to be investigated whether there
is any possibility of integration with assumption-based Truth Maintenance
Systems (building on the ideas of Reiter and de Kleer, 1987).
6Abduction of Generalizations
Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that
different ideas are connected together; I do not find
that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or
class all the principles of association; a subject,
however, that seems worthy of curiosity.
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, 1748
This chapter is based on the paper “Abduction of Generalizations”, co-authored by
Frederik Van De Putte and published in Theoria (Gauderis and Van De Putte, 2012).
We are indebted to Laszlo Kosolosky, Dagmar Provijn, Bert Leuridan, Peter Verde´e,
Joke Meheus and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
In this paper, a logic for the abduction of a generalization is presented, a pattern
which has, so far, not been modeled in terms of a formal logic. Furthermore, the notion
of explanatory framework is introduced, which is a valuable asset for any logic that
aspires to model abductive patterns.
The content of the original article is largely retained. In order to avoid repetition
in the formal presentation of adaptive logics, elements presented already in previous
chapters have been removed from Section 6.4. Further, small stylistic corrections have
been made for general consistency with the remainder of this dissertation.
Recently, Mathieu Beirlaen has found a problem for some adaptive logics for ab-
duction, which affects the logic in this paper. The problem and some suggestions to
solve this problem are presented in a new section (6.5).
6.1 Introduction
Abduction is generally defined as “the process of forming an explanatory hy-
pothesis” (Peirce, 1998, p. 216). In this chapter we will focus on a specific
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“pattern of abduction” (to use a phrase introduced by Schurz (2008a)).
Consider the following example (Schurz, 2008a, p. 212):
(P1) Pineapples taste sweet.
(P1) Everything that contains sugar, tastes sweet.
(C) Pineapples contain sugar.
Schurz called this type of inference “law abduction”. The name “rule
abduction” has also been used for a similar pattern (Thagard, 1988). But,
as ‘law’ and ‘rule’ are heavily debated concepts in the philosophy of science
and in philosophy in general, we will use the more neutral term abduction
of a generalization (henceforth AG) for this specific pattern. More examples
and a general characterization of AG will be presented in Section 6.2. It
will be argued that this pattern is ubiquitous in both everyday and scientific
reasoning, and is commonly recognized as a useful – though also fallible –
means of extending one’s knowledge.
Notwithstanding the importance of AG, little effort has been made so
far to study the characteristics of this inference pattern or to explicate it
by means of a formal logic. As will be explained in Section 6.2.2, most
scholars in AI and formal logic have focused on singular fact abduction,
whereas philosophers of science have taken a more general, but informal
point of view on abduction. It is our aim to treat AG as a distinct subject
matter to see how one may understand and formalize it.
Outline A first analysis of AG is provided in Section 6.2. We describe this
pattern informally, showing that it is a widespread inference pattern; sec-
ondly, we explain why it has been neglected in formal logic and philosophy
of science; finally, we argue for the specific importance of AG in scientific
contexts.
In Section 6.3, we turn our focus to the problems that emerge when
representing AG formally. We argue that a distinction in the object lan-
guage is needed between what we call mere generalizations and the ex-
planatory framework for any logic that models AG; and, moreover, that this
distinction is useful in any logic for abduction. In general, as AG is a non-
monotonic inference form, we also discuss how the dynamic features can
be represented.
Finally, in Section 6.4, the logic LAr∀ is presented. This is a logic for
the abduction of generalizations (symbolized by the ∀ subscript), formu-
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lated in the standard format of adaptive logics, using the reliability strat-
egy (symbolized by the r superscript). After arguing why this framework is
well-suited for the current application, we will illustrate the proof theory of
LAr∀, which allows us to model the dynamic interaction of AG and classical
inferences.
Preliminaries Let L be the standard language of classical first-order pred-
icate logic, obtained from a set of constants C = {a,b,c, . . .}, a set of vari-
ables V = {x,y,z, . . .}, a set of predicates P = {P ,Q,R, . . .}, the connectives
¬,∨,∧,⊃,≡ and quantifiers ∀,∃. W is the set of formulas in L. Depending
on the context, A,B,C are used either as metavariables for members ofW ,
or for (conglomerates of) predicates, e.g. (P ∧Q)∨¬R. The metavariables
α,β, . . . refer to constants and variables.
6.2 Abduction of a Generalization
6.2.1 The phenomenon
We define abduction of a generalization (AG) as every inference that fits the
following pattern:
It has been observed that all A are B.1
Also, being C is regarded as an explanation for being B.
Therefore, the hypothesis that all A are C is raised.
Hence, by AG we generate hypotheses that explain why all observed
objects of a certain class have a specific property. In Section 6.3, we will
explain how this definition can be operationalized in a first-order modal
language. But first, let us point out some general characteristics of AG.
First of all, consider the classical definition of abduction by Peirce (1958,
5.189):
1Strictly speaking, this is shorthand for “All observed A are B, and therefore it is believed
that all A are B.” In essence, this pattern contains an instance of the pattern Inductive General-
ization. This is important, because, although we will model this premise as a generalization,
it cannot be forgotten that abduction always starts from observed cases.
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The surprising fact, X, is observed;
But if Y were true, X would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that Y is true.2
Note that AG does not entirely fit this definition. In AG we do not seek an
explanation for a certain observation, but for a generalization based on a
series of such observations. However, if one is willing to accept this natural
extension of the concept, we can make AG fit the above schema nicely. Both
the surprising fact X and the hypothesis Y are generalizations, respectively
“all A are B”, and “all A are C”. The second line of Peirce’s schema follows
deductively if “being C” implies “being B”.3
This leads to another important consideration about the Peircean or clas-
sical notion of abduction: it is defined in a deterministic way, i.e. the truth
of Y implies the truth of X. Although we do not suggest that this notion of
abduction cannot be meaningfully extended to other accounts in which the
motivation to adopt the abductive hypothesis is, for instance, probabilistic
(P (X |Y ) is high) or comparative (P (X |Y ) > P (X |¬Y )), we restrict ourselves
in this chapter to the classical case, as does most of the literature on ab-
duction. As it is also assumed that Y explains X,4 this restriction will have
consequences for the formalization of AG in Section 6.3.1.
Second, AG is distinct from what is called singular fact abduction, in
which both the surprising fact and the hypothesis are singular facts (see
Chapter 4). In a first-order language, both the explanandum and explana-
tory hypothesis of a singular fact abduction are modeled as objects having
a certain property (such as P a). In contrast, in AG they will be modeled
by generalizations (such as ∀x(P x ⊃ Qx)). Existing models for abduction
usually limit themselves to singular fact abduction, as we will see in the
next section.
Third, AG is not a novel reasoning pattern. It has been known at least
since Aristotle, who treats something similar in his Posterior Analytica when
he considers the “middle term” of a definition. This pattern is, in his view,
the essence of a good definition: it should not only say what the definien-
2To avoid confusion with our definition of AG, the schematic letters A and C originally
used by Peirce are replaced by X and Y .
3This may be easier to grasp when spelled out in first-order predicate logic: we have that
∀x(Cx ⊃ Bx) `CL ∀x(Ax ⊃ Cx) ⊃ ∀x(Ax ⊃ Bx).
4Applying the above schema as such is justified only in case of abduction, i.e. the for-
mation of explanatory hypotheses. If Y does not explain X, flagrant examples of the logical
fallacy affirming the consequent that have little value qua hypothesis will be obtained.
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dum (A) is, it should also be an explanation (C) for its observed properties
(B). As an example, he explains why horned animals (A) lack upper in-
cisors (B) by defining horned animals as a subclass of animals that have
inflected hard material from their mouth to their heads (C). According to
Aristotle, this is a good definition of a class because it explains the prop-
erties of that class.5 However, the reasoning pattern we are considering
is much broader than what Aristotle had in mind. A, B and C can be any
properties, and neither should A be a definiendum, nor C a definiens. Fur-
thermore, as explained in Eco (1983), Aristotle’s desire to have a strict tax-
onomy of definitions confronts him with the fact that different properties
need different explanations. As we do not presuppose a taxonomical or hi-
erarchical structure connecting the three predicates, we naturally consider
different explananda for different properties.
Fourth, AG is frequently applied in human reasoning, often in combina-
tion with or following an instance of singular fact abduction. For instance,
people do not only wonder why their heads hurt (they drank too much last
night) or why there is a thunderstorm (it was very hot during the day).
Not much of a reflective mind is needed to start also asking questions such
as why it is that every time one drinks a bit too much, one suffers from
headaches, or why thunderstorms often follow hot days. In other words,
people wonder not only why certain facts are the case, but also why certain
regularities occur in their environment.
6.2.2 The Lack of Formal Characterizations of AG
The lack of models for AG will be explained by pointing out how the ap-
plication of the concept of abduction in a variety of fields has caused a
growing divergence in definitions and interpretations. This will also clarify
the relation between our current project and the literature on abduction.
Broadly speaking, two main currents in research on abduction can be
discerned. On the one hand, research in AI and formal logic mostly fo-
cuses on a syllogistic interpretation of Peirce’s work, in which abduction
5See Aristotle’s Posterior Analytica (n.d.), section II.10 for his distinction between two
types of definitions and sections II.12-14 for his view on the role of the middle term in a
definition. A good treatment of the analogy between Aristotelian definitions and Peircean
abduction can be found in Eco (1983). In our opinion, Schurz (2008a) refers to the wrong
concept when he links AG (in his words: law abduction) to Aristotle. The concept “hitting
upon the middle term” is only employed in the definition of quick wit (Aristotle, n.d., I.34), in
which it is illustrated with an example of a singular fact abduction. In our view, a predecessor
of AG can be found only in Aristotle’s treatment of the role of the middle term in definitions.
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is introduced as part of a triad that is clarified with the following famous
beans-example of Peirce (1958, CP 2.623):
All the beans from this bag are white. (Rule)
These beans are from this bag. (Case)
These beans are white. (Result)
All reasoning deriving a result from a case and a rule is called deductive,
all reasoning deriving a rule from a case and a result inductive, and all
reasoning deriving a case from a rule and a result abductive. Of these three,
only deductive reasoning is analytic and infallible; abduction and induction
are called by Peirce synthetic or ampliative (Peirce, 1958, CP 2.623).
Having this schema in mind, researchers in AI or formal logic generally
focus on instances of singular fact abduction, which are variations on the
following pattern:
B(α),∀β(A(β)→ B(β))/A(α)
This pattern is usually combined with the condition that the hypothesis
should be explanatory. Aliseda (2006) adds a further condition suggested
by Peirce, i.e. that the observed fact should be surprising (in the sense that
Bα cannot be derived from the background theory alone).
One noteable exception to the exclusive focus on singular fact abduc-
tion is Thagard (1988). He obtains a pattern similar to AG, which he calls
“rule abduction”, by adding to his logic program PI the ability to generalize
the results of singular fact abductions. Although his model does not ab-
duce from generalizations, it has the same goal as an AG, i.e. to derive an
explanation for why all elements of a given class share a certain property.
On the other hand, research in philosophy of science usually starts from
a methodological interpretation of Peirce. In his later writings Peirce distin-
guishes abduction, induction and deduction as different steps in a method-
ology of science (Peirce, 1998, pp. 212-218). Abduction is the process of
forming an explanatory hypothesis, from which deduction can draw pre-
dictions, which then can be tested by induction.6 Research in this tradition
(see e.g. Magnani 2009) considers abduction as a very broad concept in-
cluding analogical reasoning, visual abduction, common cause reasoning,
6It is generally acknowledged (see e.g. Flach and Kakas 2000a, pp. 5-8) that both interpre-
tations can be found in Peirce’s work, although they are not fully compatible. They represent
an evolution in his thinking, as he hinted himself when he remarked that he “was too much
taken up in considering syllogistic forms” (Peirce, 1958, 2.102). See also Sections 1.2 and 1.4.
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etc. Here, Peirce’s definition of abduction (see Section 6.2.1) is seen as an
expression in the metalanguage, in which the term ‘fact’ can refer to any
proposition. Some (see e.g. Harman 1965; Lipton 2004; Douven 2011)
have tried to capture this concept of abduction under the single schema of
inference to the best explanation (IBE).7 However, such attempts to reduce
the broadness of the considered concept prevent the discovery of interest-
ing features of more specific patterns of abduction. Even more, it is not
exactly clear whether IBE and abduction refer to the same thing in the
process of discovery. Schurz explains this as follows (2008a, p. 205):
The majority of the recent literature on abduction has aimed at
one most general schema of abduction (for example IBE) which
matches every particular case. I do not think that good heuristic
rules for generating explanatory hypotheses can be found along
this route, because these rules are dependent of the specific
type of abduction scenario.
In this article, Schurz subsequently presents a taxonomy of distinct patterns
of abduction. Having this in mind, we think it is best to remain pluralistic
on the logical form of abduction. We should maintain the rich concept of
abduction as it is understood in the philosophy of science, but, in order to
provide the formal rigor which is characteristic of the logic and AI commu-
nity, we should focus separately on each of the different specific forms of
abduction.
6.2.3 The Ubiquity of AG in Scientific Practice
At the end of Section 6.2.1, we mentioned several examples in which ab-
duction of a generalization is triggered by a question concerning the result
of a singular fact abduction. This question arises from the need for a deeper
understanding of the observed relations. Even in these simple examples,
the hypotheses resulting from the second abduction often have a more sci-
entific outlook. One is not satisfied with the information that somebody has
put this particular banana in the fridge as an explanation for the fact that
it has a dark brown color. One wants to understand why bananas change
color when they are put in cold places.
7These scholars consider Peirce’s remark that abduction should be as economical as pos-
sible (Peirce, 1958, 7.220) to be an essential and crucial condition.
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We can recognize this curious spirit in the endeavors of many scien-
tists. For instance, Descartes was not satisfied with the folk explanation of
the rainbow, i.e. that a rainbow appears because the sun breaks through
shortly after a rain shower. He wanted to understand why rainbows appear
whenever the sun shines while it rains. We will argue that AG is at least
as important in scientific practice as singular fact abduction by considering
two general characteristics of this practice.8
First, in scientific practice one attempts to formulate theories, which
have both a universal and falsifiable nature.9 One does not merely want
an explanation why, for instance, this particular person suffers from this
disease. One wants to understand why and how this disease is transmitted
in general. Formulating theories about particularities is seldom considered
good scientific practice, and such theories are then also often labeled as ad
hoc. Theories are thus mainly formulated for a whole class of objects and,
by consequence, formulated in terms of generalizations. These generaliza-
tions allow us to derive singular fact predictions by means of which theories
can be tested. Therefore, in the formation process of such theories, reason-
ing methods resulting in generalizations, such as inductive generalization
or abduction of a generalization, are essential.
Second, augmented unification (as characterized, for instance, by Kit-
cher, 1993) is generally seen as an indicator of scientific progress.10 Each
application of AG is in essence a unification step, because it explains an
observational generalization, e.g. “All A are B”, by characterizing its an-
tecedent (A) as a subclass of a more general class (C) for which the ob-
served properties (B) hold. Therefore, AG is a key method in enhancing
unification in scientific practice. The most interesting examples in the his-
tory of science can be found when a new theory is proposed as a solution
for some anomalies of an existing theory. In that case, the proponents of
the new theory also need to show that most of the already known and
well-tested observational laws, which are explained by the old theory, can
be explained by the new theory. For instance, Newton could explain Huy-
gens’ pendulum law using his general laws of motion by pointing out how
8This claim is about the scientific practice and not about scientific explanation. In scientific
explanation, a scientific theory is employed to explain a certain fact (either a singular fact
or a generalization). Scientific practice is the activity of forming such scientific theories and
expanding current scientific knowledge.
9Universality should not be taken as an absolute notion, but as an achievable level of
generality relative to the methods and scope of the specific field.
10Both the instrumentalist and realist views concerning the nature of scientific progress
seem to agree on this point (Niiniluoto, 2011).
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the different parameters of the pendulum law could be translated into his
general mathematical framework. In the same way, Bohr could explain by
means of his atomic model why the wavelengths of the visible emission
spectrum of hydrogen can be calculated by the Balmer formula.11
6.3 Introducing the Formal Framework
6.3.1 The Explanatory Framework
The pattern presented in the definition of AG (on p. 123) could be formally
explicated as follows:12
(P1) ∀α(A(α) ⊃ B(α))
(P2) ∀α(C(α) ⊃ B(α))
(H) ∀α(A(α) ⊃ C(α))
However, we must be careful here: the definition stipulates that C-
hood explains B-hood, not just that everything that has the property C
also has the property B. In other words, where (P1) and (H) can be of
any kind, the set of possible candidates for (P2) is restricted.13 We call
this set the explanatory framework. It consists of all generalizations of the
form ∀α(F(α) ⊃ G(α)) where being F provides an explanation for being
G. Whether or not a generalization belongs to the explanatory framework,
may depend on the phenomenon we are trying to explain. In other words,
it is contextually defined. All we assume is that it is clear for each gen-
eralization, given the abductive problem at hand, whether it is a member
of the explanatory framework or not. In the latter case we call it a mere
generalization.
With this new terminology, we are now able to characterize all the lines
of the above schema: (P1) is the explanandum, i.e. the mere generalization
that is to be explained; (P2) is a generalization that is part of the explana-
tory framework for the current abductive context; (H) is the explanatory
hypothesis. An explanation or explanans for (P1) consists of an explanatory
11A philosophical introduction to the circumstances of these two major milestones in sci-
ence can be found in Smith (2008) and Faye (2008).
12This first representation makes use of the fact that we restrict ourselves to the determin-
istic case.
13In our opinion, Schurz (2008a) puts too little emphasis on this point in his discussion of
AG, or “law abduction” as he calls it. In his schema, (P2) is called a “background law”, but as
far as we see, no explicit definition or circumscription is provided.
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hypothesis together with one or more elements of the explanatory frame-
work that connect the hypothesis to the explanandum.
Now what does it actually mean that F-hood explains G-hood? Need-
less to say, the philosophical literature abounds in theories of explanation.
However, as we have here restricted ourselves to classical abduction (see
Section 6.2.1), certain preconditions apply. First, if F-hood explains G-
hood, then F-hood should also imply G-hood. Second, as abduction is an
inference, only argumentative accounts of explanation are relevant. Hence,
the choices to explicate the notion ‘explanation’ in the definition of the
explanatory framework of a (classical) abductive problem are limited to ac-
counts of explanation that have the structure of a deductive argument such
as a DN-argument (e.g. Hempel 1965), a causal argument (e.g. Hausman
1998) or an augmented unification argument (e.g. Kitcher 1993).14
In any of these accounts, (P2) has a specific status: it must be lawlike,
refer to an underlying causal mechanism, or be a more general argumen-
tation scheme. We use the more abstract term explanatory framework to
express this status of (P2). This specific status turns AG into a fundamen-
tally asymmetric inference. It is not possible to derive ∀α(C(α) ⊃ A(α)) from
the same premises, since A-hood does not explain B-hood. Hence, if a logic
explicates AG, it should be able to represent this asymmetry between (P1)
and (P2) in its object language.
Before we explain how this can be done, let us briefly give an extra
reason to motivate the distinction between the explanatory framework and
mere generalizations as a valuable asset for any logic that models abductive
processes in general. Mere generalizations are often used in abductions
that involve knowledge about methods or procedures. For an example in
singular fact abduction, consider the following premises:
P1 The Geiger counter produces audible clicks near the object a, but turns
back to silence if an aluminum plate is brought between a and the
Geiger counter.
P2 If the Geiger counter produces audible clicks near an object, but turns
back to silence if an aluminum plate is brought between the object and
the Geiger counter, the object emits β radiation.
P3 If an object contains 146 C, the object emits β-radiation.
14It is not implied that there are no other valuable accounts of explanation. We only claim
that (classical) abductive hypotheses (the only ones that are of our concern here) are part of
a deductive argument that forms an explanation for the explanandum.
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Without the distinction between the explanatory framework and mere
generalizations, a logic for singular fact abduction treats P2 and P3 as hav-
ing the same formal structure (a mere generalization). But a physicist
interested in explaining the emitted β radiation from a is interested only
in the hypothesis suggested by P3, as the behavior of the Geiger counter
provides no explanation. On the other hand, the mere generalization P2
is needed to derive the fact that a emits β-radiation in the first place (as
the only thing the physicist can observe is P1). Hence, P2 cannot be omitted
from this abductive reasoning context. Only a logic that is able to represent
explanatory frameworks can handle this case properly.
6.3.2 A Modal Approach
In Section 6.4, we will present the logic LAr∀. This system is a non-mono-
tonic extension of the well-known modal logic T, and allows us to model
instances of AG in the modal language L. We will first define L and T
formally, after which we will offer some comments concerning our choice
of these two.
Let L denote the extension of L with the modal necessity operator
. The set of formulas W is the smallest set for which the following
holds:
For all A ∈W : A,A ∈W
For all A,B ∈W : ¬A,A∨B,A∧B,A ⊃ B,A ≡ B ∈W
Note that by this definition, we exclude the occurrence of boxes within
the scope of quantifiers, of iterations of boxes and, more generally, of
nested boxes.15 For instance, ∀x(P x ⊃Qx) and P a∨∃x(¬Rx) are mem-
bers ofW, whereas ∀xP x and ∀xP x are not.
An axiomatization for the predicate version of T over the language
W is obtained by taking the axioms of classical first-order predicate logic
(henceforth CL) and adding the following axioms (closed under modus
ponens):
K (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃B)
15It might be possible to do without these restrictions on the language, given a number of
additional axioms such as the 4-axiom (A ≡ A), the Barcan formula and/or the inverse
Barcan formula. This would however severely complicate the logical apparatus, whereas the
extended language would contain several expressions that have no sensible interpretation in
terms of explanatory frameworks.
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RN where A ∈W : if ` A then `A
T A ⊃ A
A semantics of T that is sound and complete with this axiomatization
can be found in Batens et al. (2003, pp. 46-47), which is a typical Kripke
semantics in terms of a set of worlds and an accessibility relation over them.
The language L allows us to represent the premises involved in abduc-
tive reasoning processes with the expressive power of classical first-order
logic, but gives us the extra operator , which allows us to indicate at
the object level that a certain generalization is in the explanatory frame-
work. Let F ◦ denote the set of purely functional formulas, i.e. formulas
that contain no individual constants, quantifiers, or sentential letters. For
example, P x∧ (Qxy∨Rx) is a purely functional formula, whereas P a∨Qxy
and P x ∧ ∃yQxy are not. For A ∈ F ◦, let ∀A be the universal quantifica-
tion over every variable that is free in A. The logic LAr∀ treats any formula
of the form ∀(A ⊃ B) with A,B ∈ F ◦ as an element of the explanatory
framework.
The choice for T in order to model the explanatory framework has two
important consequences. First of all, in view of the rule RN and the ax-
iom K, classical logic consequences of the explanatory framework may
themselves be used to generate explanatory hypotheses. For instance, if
∀x(P x ⊃ Qx) and ∀x(Qx ⊃ Rx) are premises of a particular abductive
problem, not only these formulas but also ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) will be part of
the explanatory framework. Second, in view of axiom T, a generalization
that is part of the explanatory framework is, as such, assumed to be true.
This is the formal expression of our restriction to the classical account of
abduction, where “A explains B” implies “A implies B”.
As we will explain below, the logic LAr∀ is a non-monotonic extension of
T, which is itself a monotonic extension of CL. Hence, LAr∀ provides only
sensible consequences under the assumption that the explanatory frame-
work and the set of known facts relevant to the abductive problem are
mutually consistent; otherwise, it results in plain triviality.
Our logic for AG is in a sense minimal: iterations of boxes are excluded,
and explanation is expressed by rather simple formal tools. It is a topic
for further research whether our model can be meaningfully extended to
include specific, more fine-grained accounts of explanation (e.g. adding
asymmetric axioms to specify causal arguments in the sense of Hausman
1998).
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6.3.3 The Dynamics of AG
Apart from the distinction between the explanatory framework and mere
generalizations, several other difficulties arise when we try to model ab-
duction in general, and AG in particular.16 First of all, abduction is a
non-monotonic method of reasoning: new information may contradict the
hypotheses we have raised. Moreover, it may not always be clear at a cer-
tain point whether the currently available information contradicts some of
these hypotheses. This requires further inferences, which might not yet
have been drawn. As a result, we can discern a double dynamics in ab-
ductive reasoning: previously drawn inferences can be retracted in view of
additional premises, but also in view of further inferences from the same
body of evidence. Therefore, the proof theory of a formal logic for AG
should be able to frame this double dynamics, yet the logic still needs to
define a sensible and stable output for any given premise set.
Second, every realistic model of ampliative reasoning (such as abduc-
tion) should allow us to combine deductive (classical) inferences with am-
pliative (supraclassical) steps. That is, it should allow the user to draw new
inferences on the basis of previously inferred hypotheses, and it should al-
low the classical consequences of the evidence to falsify such hypotheses
(and whatever we derived from them).
This relates to a third important desideratum, i.e. that the hypotheses
yielded by a formal logic for abduction should be mutually consistent with
the evidence and the explanatory framework. Ampliative reasoning should
not only allow us to go beyond the mere deductive consequences of our
knowledge, but should also remain within the boundaries of consistency.
The fourth problem is specific to the context of abduction: explanatory
hypotheses should be as logically parsimonious as possible. For instance, if
Y suffices to explain X, then we should not raise the explanatory hypothesis
Y ∧Z. More generally, we should aim to derive only the logically weakest
hypotheses that suffice to explain the explananda.17
Finally, any logic for abduction should be able to handle cases of mul-
tiple explanatory hypotheses (see Section 4.1) in a consistent and uniform
16As this chapter is based on a stand-alone article, the following paragraphs may contain
some overlap with previous chapters.
17As indicated by one of the referees, logical parsimony should be distinguished from ex-
pressive parsimony. For instance, if Y ∨ Z explains X, than the explanatory hypothesis Y is
expressively more parsimonious because it contains fewer different terms, but logically less
parsimonious than the explanatory hypothesis Y ∨Z because Y logically entails Y ∨Z.
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way.
We chose to use the framework of adaptive logics to formulate the logic
LAr∀ for AG. Adaptive logics are powerful formal systems that explicate var-
ious forms of defeasible reasoning such as reasoning on the basis of incon-
sistent premises (Batens, 1999), inductive generalization (Batens, 2011),
reasoning on the basis of conflicting norms (Van De Putte and Straßer,
2013), etc. Several adaptive logics have also already been developed for
singular fact abduction (Meheus, 2011; Gauderis, 2013a) and all of them
were shown to meet the above desiderata.
One of the most important developments within the adaptive logics pro-
gram is the definition of a canonical format, the so-called standard format
for adaptive logics. This format encompasses a generic dynamic proof the-
ory and a selection semantics. A rich and attractive metatheory has been
shown to hold generically for all adaptive logics in standard format (see
Batens 2007, n.d.): they are sound and complete, have the reassurance
property, their consequence relation is idempotent, cautiously monotonic,
etc. Most adaptive logics have been successfully expressed within this for-
mat, so it provides a good basis for a unifying study of defeasible reasoning
forms in general, and of patterns of abduction in particular.
The main motivation to choose this non-monotonic framework is its
dynamic proof theory, which enables us to construct proofs that are very
similar to actual human reasoning processes, as will become clear from the
examples in Section 4. There we will also argue that each of the other
desiderata from the current section are met by LAr∀.
6.4 Presentation of The Logic LAr∀
6.4.1 The Definition of LAr∀
As explained in Section 4.2, an adaptive logic in standard format is charac-
terized by a triple 〈LLL,Ω,x〉 consisting of a lower limit logic LLL, a set of
abnormalities Ω, and a strategy x.
The adaptive logic LAr∀ employs T as its lower limit logic. The set of
abnormalities of LAr∀ requires a bit more explanation. Consider once more
the inference schema of AG introduced in Section 6.3 (p. 129), this time
capturing the distinction between mere generalizations and the explana-
tory framework:
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(P1) ∀(A ⊃ B)
(P2) ∀(C ⊃ B)
(H) ∀(A ⊃ C)
The LAr∀-abnormalities are all formulas which imply that the premises
in the above schema are true, whereas its conclusion is false, for a particu-
lar A, B and C. To keep the formulas comprehensible, let us first introduce
two abbreviating notations. First, let
A9C B =df ∀(A ⊃ B)∧∀(C ⊃ B)∧¬∀(A ⊃ C)
A9C B can be read as: “although all A are B and C-hood explains B-hood,
it is not the case that all A are C”. Second, where A,B ∈ F ◦, let A‖B denote
the fact that A and B share no predicates.
Using these two abbreviations, we can now define the set of abnormal-
ities of LAr∀:
Ω = {A9C B | A,B,C ∈ F ◦,A‖B and B‖C}
The restrictions A‖B and B‖C are added to avoid that certain trivial self-
explanatory hypotheses block the derivation of other hypotheses.18
The strategy of LAr∀ is reliability, which will be explained in Section 6.4.2.
As for all adaptive logics in standard format, the LAr∀-semantics is ob-
tained from the same triple 〈T,Ω,reliability〉 – we refer to Batens (2007,
n.d.) for a generic definition of the adaptive logics-semantics. In Sec-
tion 6.4.3, we will present some particular features of LAr∀ that show how
it meets the desiderata from Section 3.3.
6.4.2 The Proof Theory of LAr∀
The LAr∀-proof theory is a mere instantiation of the generic proof theory
for adaptive logics in standard format (see Section 4.2). In short, lines in
adaptive proofs have, compared to standard logical proofs, an extra ele-
ment, the condition, and can be marked at a certain stage. This happens if
the formula of that line is considered to be no longer derivable at that stage
of the proof. Adaptive proofs proceed to the next stage by applying one of
the three generic rules PREM (for the introduction of premises), RU (for
18We refer to Van De Putte (2012, pp. 206-207) for examples that motivate these restric-
tions.
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deductive steps) or RC (for defeasible steps), which results in the addition
of a new line to the previous stage.
To get an idea of how this proof theory works for LAr∀, consider the
formalization of the pineapple-example from the introduction (p. 121):
Γ1 = {∀x(P x ⊃Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃Qx),∃xP x}
The last premise is added to avoid certain unwelcome results (see Sec-
tion 6.4.3). In view of the interpretation of the premises, this is a harmless
addition: if we want to explain the fact that all pineapples taste sweet, then
it seems evident that we also know that pineapples exist.
We start an LAr∀-proof from Γ1 by writing down two of the premises:
1 ∀x(P x ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
As ∀x(P x ⊃ Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃ Qx) `T ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) ∨ (P 9R Q), we may
apply the rule RU to derive ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx)∨ (P 9R Q) and, from the latter,
that all P are R by RC:19
3 ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx)∨ (P 9R Q) 1,2;RU ∅
4 ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) 3;RC {P 9R Q}
To illustrate the dynamic flavor of this logic, we have to add more
premises to Γ1. Suppose that we learn about a genetically modified pineap-
ple a, which contains no sugar, but nevertheless tastes sweet because it
contains a synthetic type of sweetener. This can be modeled by adding to
Γ1 the premise P a∧¬Ra, which contradicts the hypothesis ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx). Let
us call the extended premise set Γ2. Since the proofs are dynamic, we need,
as explained in Section 4.4, not to start the proof all over again; we can





4 ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) 3;RC {P 9R Q} X7
5 P a∧¬Ra PREM ∅
6 ¬∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) 5;RU ∅
7 P 9R Q 1,2,6;RU ∅
19Line 3 is added for the sake of clarity. In view of the definition of the rule RC, it is also
possible to derive the formula on line 4 directly from those on lines 1 and 2, which we will do
further on.
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At line 7, we have reached the insight that P 9R Q follows from our
premises by T. Hence, we need to indicate that there is something wrong
with the condition of line 4, which is done, as explained before, by marking
it with a X7-sign.
However, there is a difference with the logic MLAss from chapter 4. For
that logic, the language scheme and set of abnormalities were constructed
in such a way that if a disjunction of abnormalities could be (uncondition-
ally) derived, also one of these disjuncts could be derived independently
(see the formal condition on p. 88).
This is not the case for the present logic. There exist premise sets of
which disjunctions of abnormalities can be derived unconditionally. For
instance consider ω1,ω2 ∈ Ω for which, for a certain premise set Γ , Γ `T
ω1 ∨ω2, but not Γ 0T ω1 nor Γ 0T ω2. Were we to use the simple strategy,
we would not have to revoke a formula that is derived on condition ω1.
This is clearly naive: it may be thatω1 is not unconditionally derivable from
the premise set, but as it is derived as part of a disjunction, it is unreliable.
The reliability strategy expresses this idea by marking all conditions that
appear as an individual disjunct in a minimal disjunction of abnormalities.
Definition 6.1 (MinimalDab-formula at stage s). ADab-formulaDab(∆)20
is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s if and only if Dab(∆) is derived on the
empty condition at stage s, and there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ for which Dab(∆′) is derived
on the empty condition at stage s.
Definition 6.2 (Set of unreliable formulas Us(Γ ) at stage s). The set of
unreliable formulas Us(Γ ) at stage s is the union of all ∆ for which Dab(∆) is
a minimal Dab-formula at stage s.
Definition 6.3 (Marking for the reliability strategy). Line i with condition
Θ is marked at stage s of a proof if and only if Θ ∩Us(Γ ) , ∅.
It is important to remark that, despite the dynamic character of the
proofs, adaptive logics are proper proof-invariant logics. Given a Γ and A,
the logic defines whether A is a consequence of Γ or not. This does not
depend on the way we start a proof or proceed through one. To avoid
confusion with formulas that are derivable at a certain stage of a proof
(but can be defeated at a later stage), formulas in the consequence set are
20Recall, Dab(Θ) is the (classical) disjunction of the abnormalities in a finite subset Θ of
the set of abnormalities Ω.
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called finally derivable. The final derivability relation of an adaptive logic
is defined as follows:21
Definition 6.4. A formula A is derived from Γ at stage s of a proof if and
only if A is the formula of a line that is unmarked at stage s.
Definition 6.5. A formula A is finally derived from Γ at stage s of a proof
if and only if A is derived at line i, line i is not marked at stage s and every
extension of the proof in which i is marked may be further extended in such a
way that line i is unmarked.
Definition 6.6 (Final Derivability). Γ `LAr∀ A (A ∈ CnLAr∀(Γ )) if and only if
A is finally derived in an LAr∀-proof from Γ .
To illustrate the above definitions, consider again our proof from Γ2.
Since the Dab-formula at line 7 is a single abnormality, it will be a minimal
Dab-formula in every extension of the proof. Hence, line 4 will remain
marked in every such extension. More generally, ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) is not finally
derivable from Γ2, i.e. there is no proof in which we can finally derive
∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) from this premise set.
6.4.3 Some Salient Features of the Logic LAr∀
We end this section with a brief survey of the ways in which LAr∀ solves
some typical problems for any formal model of abduction. First of all, as
any adaptive logic in standard format, LAr∀ has the Reassurance property
(Batens, 2007, Corollary 1):
Theorem 6.7. If Γ is not T-trivial, then neither is CnLAr∀(Γ ). (Reassurance)
This means that if our explanatory framework and our factual knowl-
edge are mutually consistent, then LAr∀ will always yield a consistent set of
explanatory hypotheses. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that
CL is included in T and of the axiom T.
Second, as explained in Section 3.3, a logic for abduction should yield
only the most parsimonious hypotheses. Consider the following proof from
Γ1:
21As explained in Batens (2007), adaptive logics in general lack a positive test. We refer
to Meheus (2011) for an extensive discussion of this fact.
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1 ∀x(P x ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
3 ∀x((Rx∧ Sx) ⊃Qx) 2;RU ∅
4 ∀x(P x ⊃ (Rx∧ Sx)) 1,3;RC {P 9R∧S Q} X9
5 ∀x(P x ⊃ Sx) 4;RU {P 9R∧S Q} X9
6 ∃xP x PREM ∅
7 ∃x(P x∧¬Sx)∨∃x(P x∧ Sx) 6;RU ∅
8 ¬∀x(P x ⊃ (Rx∧ Sx))∨¬∀x(P x ⊃ (Rx∧¬Sx)) 7; RU ∅
9 (P 9R∧S Q)∨ (P 9R∧¬S Q) 1,2,8;RU ∅
As the material implication has the property A ⊃ B ` (A∧C) ⊃ B (strength-
ening the antecedent), the hypothesis on line 5, which states that anything
that is P also has the random property S, could be derived. However, using
the premise ∃xP x, we can derive the Dab-formula on line 9 which defeats
lines 4 and 5.
Third, the dynamic proof theory and the form of the abnormalities also
ensure that no hypotheses can be finally derived from tautologies, and
that no contradictions can be finally derived as a hypothesis. The fol-
lowing proof from Γ1 illustrates how the logic enables us to defeat both
self-contradictory hypotheses and hypotheses derived from tautologies.
1 ∀x(P x ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x((Sx∧¬Sx) ⊃Qx) -;RU ∅
3 ∀x(P x ⊃ (Sx∧¬Sx)) 1,2;RC {P 9S∧¬S Q} X6
4 ∃xP x PREM ∅
5 ∃x(P x∧¬(Sx∧¬Sx)) 4;RU ∅
6 P 9S∧¬S Q 1,2,5;RU ∅
7 ∀x(P x ⊃ (Sx∨¬Sx)) -;RU ∅
8 ∀x(T x ⊃ (Sx∨¬Sx))) -;RU ∅
9 ∀x(P x ⊃ T x) 7,8;RC {P 9T (S ∨¬S)} X12
10 ∀x(¬T x ⊃ (Sx∨¬Sx)) -;RU ∅
11 ¬∀x(P x ⊃ T x)∨¬∀x(P x ⊃ ¬T x) 4;RU ∅
12 (P 9T (S ∨¬S))∨ (P 9¬T (S ∨¬S)) 7,8,10,11;RU ∅
The final feature that will be illustrated is how this logic handles multi-
ple explanatory hypotheses. Suppose that we become aware of a property
S, which explains Q-hood just as well as the property R does. Hence we
have to add the premise ∀x(Sx ⊃Qx) to Γ1, which results in the following
set:
Γ3 = {∀x(P x ⊃Qx),∀x(Rx ⊃Qx),∀x(Sx ⊃Qx),∃xP x}
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At first sight, both the hypotheses ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) and ∀x(P x ⊃ Sx) can
be derived from Γ3. But, as shown in the proof below, these two formulas
are not finally derivable. The composed hypothesis ∀x(P x ⊃ (Rx ∨ Sx)),
however, is finally derivable from Γ3.
1 ∀x(P x ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
2 ∀x(Rx ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
3 ∀x(Sx ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
4 ∀x(P x ⊃ Rx) 1,2;RC {P 9R Q} X9
5 ∀x(P x ⊃ Sx) 1,3;RC {P 9S Q} X10
6 ∃xP x PREM ∅
7 ¬∀x(P x ⊃ Rx)∨¬∀x(P x ⊃ (Sx∧¬Rx)) 6;RU ∅
8 ∀x((Sx∧¬Rx) ⊃Qx) 3;RU ∅
9 (P 9R Q)∨ (P 9S∧¬R Q) 1,2,7,8;RU ∅
10 (P 9S Q)∨ (P 9R∧¬S Q) 1,2,3,6;RU ∅
11 ∀x((Rx∨ Sx) ⊃Qx) 2,3;RU ∅
12 ∀x(P x ⊃ (Rx∨ Sx)) 1,11;RC {P 9R∨S Q}
In view of this last feature, LAr∀ models a kind of practical abduction:
whenever multiple explanatory hypotheses are available, LAr∀ allows only
for the (undefeated) derivation of a disjunctive combination of these hy-
potheses. This is opposed to theoretical abduction, in which each of the
individual hypotheses can be separately derived. For a more thorough dis-
cussion of this distinction, see Gauderis (2013a) (Chapter 4).
6.5 A New Problem for the Logic LAr∀
Recently, while working on the problem of planning in the field of artificial
intelligence,22 Mathieu Beirlaen found that the logic LAr∀ from this chap-
ter and all other so-far constructed adaptive logics that model a form of
practical abduction (such as the aforementioned LArs from Meheus 2011)
are actually too weak. It appears that if a class (or an object, in the case
of singular fact abduction) has two properties that can be independently
explained, no explanatory hypotheses at all can be derived for the class
(or object). To illustrate this problem for LAr∀, consider the premise set
Γ4 = {∀x(P x ⊃ (Qx∧Rx)),∀x(Sx ⊃Qx),∀x(T x ⊃ Rx),∃xP x}.
1 ∀x(P x ⊃ (Qx∧Rx)) PREM ∅
22From a logical perspective this problem is very similar to abduction: a goal that has to
be reached resembles an explanandum, while different steps that can be taken to reach the
goal are similar to the different explanatory hypotheses that explain the explanandum.
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2 ∀x(Sx ⊃Qx) PREM ∅
3 ∀x(T x ⊃ Rx) PREM ∅
4 ∀x(P x ⊃ Sx) 1,2;RC {P 9S Q} X7
5 ∀x(P x ⊃ T x) 1,3;RC {P 9T R} X8
6 ∃xP x PREM ∅
7 (P 9S Q)∨ (P 9T∧¬S R) 1,2,3,6;RU ∅
8 (P 9T R)∨ (P 9S∧¬T Q) 1,2,3,6;RU ∅
This is a severe problem. For instance, suppose that we observe that
bananas are curved and taste sweet, and we know in general that a sweet
taste can be explained by the presence of sugar and that a curved shape
can be explained by attraction towards sunlight during growth. Still, in
this case, using the logic LAr∀, we can neither hypothesize that bananas
contain sugar, nor that they grow towards sunlight.
This problem appears not to be resolvable by a simple adjustment to
the logic. Mathieu Beirlaen (private communication) is currently working
on a (not-yet published) solution in terms of deontic operators, which is in
essence applicable to the presented logic. The idea is to enrich the language
and indicate at the level of the premises whether different explanations are
“allowed” together or not.
This solution might be apt for the context of planning in AI. Yet I am
not convinced that this solution is the right way to remedy the logic LAr∀,
which is designed for the context of scientific reasoning. In fact, I consider
this problem rather as an argument against the use of logics for practical
abduction in the context of scientific reasoning. One should not worry too
much about how different hypotheses for different observed characteristics
relate formally to each other (whether they should mutually block each
other, be in a disjunction, or be in a conjunction), because at this stage
of the discovery process this is not very relevant. Different hypotheses are
better pursued independently of the other possible hypotheses.23 There-
fore, I think it is better to focus (in the context of scientific reasoning) on
logics that model theoretical abduction.
23It is true that in some cases, there might be good reasons to connect two hypotheses
and pursue them together. Yet, such reasons cannot be formal: they are topic- and content-
dependent, which put them outside the scope of this logic. Of course, this does not preclude
a priori that this process of relating hypotheses cannot be studied formally. It just means that
such a reasoning process needs another formal framework that can represent reasons to relate
hypotheses.
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A logic for the theoretical abduction of generalizations can be rather
straightforwardly built from the logic LAr∀ in a manner analogous with
how the logic MLAss from Chapter 4 (which models theoretical singular
fact abduction) is built from the logic LArs (for practical singular fact ab-
duction). This result, call it MLAs∀, would be a bimodal logic in which one
modal operator indicates whether the formula is a hypothesis or part of the
background knowledge and the other whether the formula is explanatory.
Yet it remains to be studied how exactly these operators relate to each other
and how premise sets should be formally represented.
6.6 Conclusion
As argued in this chapter, abduction of generalizations (AG) is ubiquitous
in everyday and scientific reasoning. We provided a first general analysis
of this pattern, and argued that the notion of an explanatory framework
should be embodied in any formal model for AG. This idea was imple-
mented in LAr∀, which is a well-behaved formal logic that aims to model
AG.
An open question remains whether one may obtain a sensible interpre-
tation of the Kripke semantics for this application of (extensions of) T. In
this way, assumptions about the notion of the explanatory framework may
be translated into formal properties of the accessibility relation and vice
versa. We focused here mostly on the proof theoretic aspects of our formal
model and consider this a topic for future research.
Several enrichments of our formal model can be studied, in order to
deal with e.g. probabilistic information, causal arguments, and abductive
anomalies.24 Also, it seems worthwhile to develop ways in which singular
fact abduction and AG can be integrated in the framework of adaptive log-
ics to model examples such as those mentioned at the end of Section 6.2.1.
Finally, case studies of some of the examples mentioned in Section 2 may
shed new light on the relation between AG, unification and other patterns
of abduction.







In this part, I will focus on the perspective of individual agents. Studying
hypothesis formation from this perspective will give us some insights into
the reasons, preferences and circumstances that lead individual agents to
form certain hypotheses in answer to particular triggers. In order to un-
derstand how these characteristics play their role in hypothesis formation,
I will consider an actual (historical) case from science in which the various
actors advanced not only quite different hypotheses in answer to a single
research question, but also employed different patterns of hypothesis for-
mation.
My main goal is to get some initial understanding of why agents pro-
ceed according to one rather than another pattern of hypothesis formation
for a given problem by contrasting the reasoning of the various physicists
that tried to address one of the big experimental puzzles of early 20th cen-
tury nuclear physics, the anomalous β spectrum.
The core assumptions at the heart of this part of the dissertation are
(1) that given a particular problem, various patterns of hypothesis forma-
tion can be applicable; (2) that the choice as to which pattern and which
hypothesis looks initially most promising (i.e. before the hypothesis is ac-
tually pursued and experimental evidence is collected) is based on the per-
sonal preferences of the individual agent; and (3) that such preferences
and their motivation for a particular case can be brought forward by means
of historical research. Let us turn to the motivation for adopting each of
these assumptions.
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Patterns of hypothesis formation For the existence of patterns of hy-
pothesis formation, I refer to the motivation of Part II, in which I have
argued for this claim. That for some research questions, various of these
patterns are applicable is illustrated by the case study of the β spectrum,
which is presented in this part. For those who are confused about this
claim – the various patterns of hypothesis formation have formally differ-
ent premises, so how can they be applicable to the same case? – it is
important to remember that the classification of hypothesis formation pat-
terns is a classification of descriptions of hypothesis formation instances. A
single problem can be interpreted and described in various ways.
Choices depend on preferences That the choice as to which pattern
should be employed depends on the agent might at first sound trivial:
choices, rational or not, depend (assumed that they are freely made) on the
preferences of the agent, and these preferences are in turn shaped by per-
sonal characteristics such as experiences, beliefs, values, etc. The question
is which of these personal aspects most motivates an agent’s preferences.
To determine this, for the case of hypothesis formation in science, will be
our goal in this part.
Yet, given the nature of our subject, there are at least two good reasons
to doubt this assumption: (1) Why should there be a choice or prefer-
ence? If multiple patterns of hypothesis formation are applicable to a cer-
tain problem, why not apply multiple patterns and decide between them
only after further evidence is gathered in the process of hypothesis selec-
tion? (2) Why should the perspective of the individual agent matter? Is
it not the aim of science to reduce personal preferences as much as possi-
ble? Why can we not study hypothesis formation by looking exclusively at
the field in which the agent is working, with its paradigms, theories and
research problems – the macro-structure – and the various methods and
patterns available to agent – the micro-structure?1
The first question is a pertinent one. To further motivate its importance,
consider how humans typically program artificially intelligent agents for re-
search tasks. First, they instruct the agent to generate as many hypotheses
as possible, assigning each of them an equal a priori likelihood. Next, the
agent is instructed to start collecting evidence and update the likelihoods
of the various hypotheses accordingly (generally via Bayesian methods). If
this is our rational view of how research should proceed, why do we find
1See the three broad perspectives distinguished in Section 1.5.
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over and over again scientists who single out certain hypothetical positions
for which so far no evidence has been gathered? Apparently, history shows
us that often some form of initial selection already occurs during the pro-
cess of hypothesis formation.
The short answer to this question is that it is a matter of resources.
While several accounts of rationality tend to neglect this issue, scientists in
the actual world are limited beings with limited time, limited funding and
limited cognitive energy. At the same time, the pursuit of one particular
hypothesis can be a painstaking process requiring many years of research
effort of a whole team. Therefore, even if virtually no evidence is available,
researchers are obliged to make choices, and to motivate these they can
only turn to things such as their experience or theoretical considerations.
Yet this answer, although in line with how we observe actual science de-
velop, is not fully satisfying. Being unable to pay equal attention to a large
number of hypotheses is one thing; sticking to only one hypothesis is an-
other. As we will observe in the case study, scientists may tend just to stick
to their idea, often more than would be rationally justified. Apparently,
human agents are not very good at entertaining multiple hypotheses (see
also Part I), or, probably related, people find it hard to motivate themselves
or their collaborators to conscientiously pursue particular suggestions or to
convince funding agencies if no clear hypothesis and research direction is
chosen.2 Increasing awareness of this tendency to psychologically elimi-
nate certain hypotheses prematurely can only be of benefit to science.
This brings us to the second question: if limited resources require early
selection during hypothesis formation, why should this choice be motivated
by elements of the personal perspective of the agent? If at the micro-level
various patterns or methods lead to different hypotheses, why would the
collective experience and considerations of the field not unequivocally in-
dicate the most plausible hypothesis or hypotheses given the current state
of knowledge?
In fact, we often find a broad consensus concerning the best way for-
ward and the most plausible hypothesis to pursue. Only in this way can
multi-billion dollar budgets be freed for the experimental pursuit of recent
hypotheses such as the Higgs boson or dark matter. But such consensus on
the question of which hypothesis to pursue (and which to fund) is achieved
2See also Glass and Hall’s (2008) criticism of funding agencies that require research ob-
jectives to be stated as factual hypotheses. Some of their ideas will be further discussed in
Section 9.3.3.
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only after some initial progress, both theoretically and experimentally, has
been made. At that point, the problem has often lost its status of being a
deep theoretical problem. Deep problems, such as the case of the β spec-
trum, are problems that trigger many different hypotheses, divide the field,
and lead to, in Lakatos’s terminology, competing research traditions.
Therefore, if we want to shed light on the process of hypothesis forma-
tion, we have to focus on the period before the field has found a consensus
concerning the best way forward. In the case of the β spectrum, this means
the period between 1927, when the experimental anomaly was found, and
1934, when theoretically a consensus was reached that the existence of
Pauli’s neutrino was the most plausible option. At this point, the problem
shifted to the (mostly) experimental quest to discover this new particle,
which happened eventually in 1956 (see Franklin, 2001). Hence, in order
to study hypothesis formation, we cannot fail to study how the preferences
of individual agents are shaped and how they influence their hypothesis
formation processes, all before a group decision is made.
Historical research can reveal these preferences This is an important
issue, which I deal with in more detail in the methodological introduction
of the chapter on the β spectrum (see Section 7.1). The position I argue
for bites the bullet on this issue: I do not assume that historical research
can reveal a complete factual account of how the protagonists’ preferences
were shaped by their experiences, theoretical considerations and values.
One can through historical research, however, give a “how possibly” ac-
count of how their preferences were shaped and led to the hypotheses they
suggested, an account that gives the best explanation of their writings and
the historical conditions.
To a certain extent, any form of historical research, especially if it at-
tempts to interpret the motives of historical agents, has to acknowledge the
use of Inferences to the Best Explanation. So, as long as the full historical
context is taken into account, and as long as more speculative passages are
clearly marked, this should not constitute a problem for historical research.
For the purposes of this dissertation, it may be asked whether aban-
doning this assumption does not put in question my goal of understanding
the process of hypothesis formation. I do not think that this has to be the
case. If certain patterns are found in reasonable and empirally adequate re-
constructions, these patterns can be further examined by considering other
historical cases or confronting them with present research. Yet, as I have
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been able to cover extensively only one case study, these options remain
for future research, and I can only claim to have looked for some initial
insights on the issue.
strengths and weaknesses of the method
Strengths The main advantage of studying historical cases is that it is a
method that allows one to look at scientific processes from a perspective
that is very closely connected to the actual processes and which reduces a
priori assumptions to a minimum. Only directly observing scientists (and
the possibility to get direct feedback from them) might deliver results that
are even more tightly connected to the actual processes. Yet this latter
method has the drawback that the process of hypothesis formation is nei-
ther planned, nor easily observable, nor easily recognizable by the agents
themselves. Also, it misses the clear view that comes with hindsight: not
every formed hypothesis is equally interesting. To determine its interest, it
has to be connected both with the past (is it a novel approach to the prob-
lem?) and with the future (has it proved to be a fruitful approach?). The
combination of hindsight and of a close connection to the actual processes
is unique to the historical methods.
Related to the previous point, if the research is done sufficiently elabo-
rately, the method of case studies will allow one to grasp most of the full
complexity and richness of actual processes. It will allow one to pay atten-
tion to all nuances and details, including facets that cannot be covered in
any more formal treatment.3
Weaknesses The method of historical case studies faces, however, an ob-
vious limitation: how to generalize them? How can conclusions about a
general process be drawn from a single case or instance?
I do not think there is a straightforward answer to this question: draw-
ing general conclusions from case studies is always somewhat tricky. Yet a
3An interesting example of this, coming from the case of the β spectrum, is the fact that
Pauli suggested the particle that later would become known as the neutrino barely one week
after his first wife left him. At first sight, common sense instructs us to leave such anecdotes
from his private sphere outside any serious analysis of his hypothesis formation process. Yet
Pauli was also human, so irrational behavior was most likely not fully unfamiliar to him. So,
could it not be that his personal turmoil incited him to make bolder leaps of imagination and
to keep less reservations than he usually did? The historian Pais (1986), who personally knew
Pauli, thought it mattered.
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few things can be considered. The case study of the β spectrum has been
chosen specifically because it meets certain desiderata: it had to be a well-
documented single problem that triggered at least three different patterns
of hypothesis formation within a single community, or at least among con-
temporaries who had more or less the same methods at their disposal. So
I could hope to bring forth some general or structural characteristics, by
studying diverging instances within a single context. There are not that
many passages in modern physics that meet these desiderata: it had to
be a hard and deep problem for the field (otherwise people with a similar
background would employ the same patterns of hypothesis formation), it
had to be more than just two competing stances (although even this case
eventually polarized to a debate between the supporters of Bohr and Pauli)
and it had to occur in a relatively short timespan (as the methods of mod-
ern physics evolve too fast to claim that stances separated in time by over
twenty years have access to the same methods).
Apart from this main drawback, two further issues that I already dis-
cussed may also be regarded as weaknesses of the method: the specula-
tive flavor of certain historical reconstructions and the difficulty in drawing
clear and precise normative conclusions.
overview of my contributions
In Chapter 7, the case study of the anomalous β spectrum is studied in great
detail. No less than six very divergent hypotheses were put forward in a
timespan of three years to account for this single experimental anomaly,
which was first established in 1927. By identifying the main factors that fu-
eled the hypothesis formation processes of the various actors in this case, it
can be stated (for this case) that the protagonists’ preferences were mostly
shaped by their previous experience and by how they structurally related
the different elements of the theory and field of physics. It is also shown
that all of the protagonists reused and adapted older methods and ideas.
7The Curious β spectrum
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to
go from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to
get to,” said the Cat.
— Lewis Caroll, Alice’s Adventures
in Wonderland, 1865
This chapter is based on the paper “To envision a new particle or change an existing
law? Hypothesis Formation and Anomaly Resolution for the Curious Case of the β De-
cay Spectrum”, forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics
(Gauderis, 2013b). I am indebted to Bert Leuridan and two anonymous referees for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I further want to thank the participants of
the various workshops and conferences where I presented (part of) these ideas for their
many useful suggestions and questions.
In this paper, the historical case of the anomalous β spectrum is examined, a puzzle
that occasioned the most diverse hypotheses amongst physicists at the time. It is shown
that initial preferences for a particular hypothesis are most often implicitly informed by
scientists’ individual perspectives on the structural relations between various elements
of the theory. Also, it is argued that the adaptation of older ideas for new purposes is
a far more common practice than is sometimes thought.
The content of the original article is retained, except for the second section, in
which an introduction to the literature on hypothesis formation was presented. I have
moved this section to the general introduction of the dissertation (Section 1.2). For
general consistency with the remainder of this dissertation, small stylistic corrections
have been made.
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7.1 Introduction
In physics, as in other scientific disciplines, an anomalous experimental
result can occasion the formation of formally quite different hypotheses.
Confronted with such a result, a scientist has no strict guidelines to help
her determine whether she should explain the result by withdrawing or
adapting a constraint of the current theory (e.g. a law), or else by pre-
supposing the existence of a hitherto unobserved entity that makes the
anomaly fit within that theory (e.g. a particle). But she has more options
than this: she can also suggest a new structural model, blame the anomaly
on an overlooked feature of the experimental setting, or stretch and modify
the theoretical classes that label the observables, among other possibilities.
If a scientist knows in advance which kind of hypothesis would best
explain the anomaly, she can employ more efficient heuristics. For instance,
when Max Planck was studying the experimental anomalies of Rayleigh-
James’s and Wien’s laws for the spectrum of black bodies, he sought a
new formula that fitted the data. Similarly, when Ernst Rutherford was
confronted with the backwards scattering of α particles, he knew he had to
construct a new structural model for the atom.
As the case study examined in this chapter illustrates, however, the sit-
uation is not always so clear: when an experimental anomaly proves per-
severant, even the greatest minds in the field can differ strongly in opinion
about which kind of hypothesis would lead to a satisfying explanation. Sug-
gested hypotheses can vary so widely primarily because the determination
as to which formal kind of hypothesis is needed is in itself an abductive and,
hence, defeasible inference. Although often inferred implicitly, this choice
is hugely important, as it determines what direction the initial search will
take.
A lack of heuristics for this initial choice of hypothesis type presents it-
self as a problem especially when formal representations are utilized, such
as in logic or AI. Because such representations determine in advance what
types of hypotheses can be inferred, the choice of the type of hypothesis is
(often implicitly) made when the premises are translated into the formal
language: there are different ways to describe a (realistic) anomaly in nat-
ural language, any of which can lead to a different formal representation.
My aim in this chapter is not to suggest a normative heuristics for this
choice, for given the lack of research in this area we lack sufficient knowl-
edge about how scientists in the field decide on this matter (see Section
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1.2 for an overview of the philosophical literature on discovery and hy-
pothesis formation). Instead, my more modest goal is to examine how this
choice was made in one notable instance, by examining a concrete case
study with various diverging hypotheses. It will be shown that this choice
is almost always implicitly made in a manner determined by the scientist’s
previous experiences and specific way of perceiving the problem, and that,
moreover, scientists in general are sometimes, due to the strong ontologi-
cal commitments their particular perspective often entails, very unwilling
to accept other kinds of hypotheses.
Between 1927 and 1934, a manifest and persistent anomaly mystified
the physics community: while α and γ decay behaved in a manner per-
fectly accordant with the new quantum mechanics, the energy of electrons
emitted in β decay displayed a broad continuous spectrum. This puzzle
intrigued the most established and famous physicists of the time, including
Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Rutherford, Chadwick, Ellis, and G.P. Thomson,
and incited a lively debate among them. Curiously, all suggested hypothe-
ses were of very different formal types: Ellis and Wooster were willing to
give up the universality of the quantum postulate, Rutherford and Chad-
wick thought of varying internal energies, Bohr suggested a restriction of
the energy conservation principle, Heisenberg tinkered with a second quan-
tization of space at the scale of the nucleus, and Pauli proposed the exis-
tence of a new elementary particle – all these hypotheses being, as we will
see, quite radical and highly controversial.
By focusing in detail on how these scientists arrived at their hypotheses,
this chapter challenges the somewhat mythical proportions this episode
has received in more popular histories of science, which, with its focus
on genius and success, typically trace great discoveries back to a single
man who enlightens his community by a kind of epiphany. But new ideas
do not come out of nowhere; they are related to older suggestions. This
debate also cannot be narrowed, as is often done, to Pauli’s and Bohr’s
stances alone: many more ideas were around at the time, and all of them
influenced each other.
I start, in Section 7.2, by introducing the case of the β spectrum histor-
ically, after which I analyze in detail the reasoning processes of six promi-
nent physicists (or pairs of physicists) who tried to address this puzzle in
Sections 7.3 through 7.8. Finally, in Section 7.9, I summarize these results
and connect them back to the questions raised in this introduction.
Before we continue, some reservations about the methodology and scope
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of this chapter are in order.
First, I will not discuss this case in a purely historical or descriptive fash-
ion, as this has been done sufficiently and extensively in other places such
as Jensen (2000); Pais (1986); Bromberg (1971); Brown (1978); Hughes
(1993); Navarro (2010); Cassini (2012); Guerra et al. (2012). Instead,
I will try to reconstruct how the various protagonists could have reached
the hypotheses they suggested and show how the choices they made along
the way are related to their personal perspectives – a project I have been
able to perform only because of the excellent scholarship on this period
by historians of science. Their extensive coverage ensures that if the nearly
impossible task of a full reassessment of the archival record (given the tem-
poral and spatial scope of this episode) had been executed, it would only
have had a minor impact on this project.
Second, in principle, there are at least three ways to study human rea-
soning processes such as hypothesis formation: from an internal perspec-
tive by analyzing direct feedback from the agents (e.g. psychological ex-
periments), from an external perspective by linking the agents’ recorded
ideas to the historical and scientific context (e.g. historical case studies),
or via simulation by trying to reproduce the agent’s ideas (e.g. computa-
tional or logical approaches). As I do not assume that scientists make a
conscious “metachoice” concerning which pattern of hypothesis formation
is most appropriate for a particular problem, I believe that the examina-
tion of historical cases is the best method to gain some initial insight into
how and why different patterns might have been employed in response to
a single problem, as we can, by virtue of hindsight, situate these sugges-
tions in their context. Having said this, of course, one should immediately
note the drawback that we have no means to gather direct feedback from
the agents themselves; we have only our interpretations of their scattered
remarks, which are always based on assumptions and might be erroneous.
This same problem occurs even when agents are alive and approachable,
as agents tend to rationalize and reconstruct their thoughts afterwards.1
Therefore, I do not claim to offer a factual representation of the agents’
thought processes. I aim rather to offer a coherent interpretation of how
1As Franklin (1993, n. 110) reported in his study of the rise and fall of the fifth force
hypothesis, protagonists might fail to give an accurate view of their own ideas and positions,
even though the interviews were conducted only a few years later. Sometimes, these re-
constructions become apparent if they are confronted with external historical evidence, as
for instance in Brown (1978), who showed that Pauli’s recollections concerning whether he
considered the neutrino to be a nuclear constituent were incorrect (see Section 7.8).
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the protagonists’ recorded ideas could have originated by making reason-
able assumptions and specifying the historical surroundings. As Darden
(1991, p. 4) has already acknowledged, this kind of research necessar-
ily has a speculative flavor, as it can merely reconstruct “how” the agents
“possibly” arrived to their hypotheses. Still, it offers us, as it is generally as-
sumed in the literature on discovery (see Section 1.2), insights into the pro-
cess of hypothesis formation that cannot be obtained by exploring logical
principles or by psychological experiments alone. There is certainly value
in trying to provide the best possible explanation of how actual agents in
actual historically important debates arrived at their ideas, and such will
be my aim in these pages.
7.2 The β puzzle in 1927
This introductory historical section provides the necessary background for
the analyses in the following sections, but contains no novel results in itself,
aside from making a case for the self-evidence of the p-e model. It first
summarizes the relevant experiments that led to the β anomaly as it was
perceived in 1927 (based on Franklin, 2001; Jensen, 2000; Pais, 1986;
Malley, 2011), and completes this background picture with an overview
of nuclear theory around 1927 and the various problems it faced (based
on Stuewer, 1983; Brown, 2004; Pais, 1986; Hughes, 1993, 1998, 2003;
Jensen, 2000; Fernandez and Ripka, 2013).
7.2.1 Experimental History of the β spectrum
The story of the β puzzle goes back to 1896, when Henri Becquerel discov-
ered the phenomenon of radioactivity: some particular substances radiate
spontaneously and independently of any interaction with the environment.
The discovery of this curious form of radiation was made by mere luck;
it revealed itself for the first time in the imprints left by uranium on some
photographic plates that Becquerel had stored in a dark cupboard, deprived
of all incoming sunlight.
From that moment onward, experimental discoveries unfolded at a
steady pace. In 1899, Ernst Rutherford showed that the radiation emit-
ted by uranium consisted of at least two different kinds of radiation, which
he labeled α and β radiation. Even though α radiation was identified by
Rutherford as helium ions only in 1907, it was already established in 1904
by William Bragg that it had a mono-energetic spectrum, i.e. that α parti-
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cles of a particular radioactive element are always emitted with the same
characteristic amount of energy. For β radiation, it was already suggested
shortly after Rutherford’s discovery that it consisted of electrons (the ele-
mentary particles then recently discovered in cathode rays by J.J. Thom-
son). By 1902, this thesis was confirmed by experimental evidence pro-
vided by Becquerel and Walter Kaufman. Their experiments even hinted at
a possible continuity of the β spectrum, though this idea was not accepted
by the community at the time. According to Franklin (2001, p. 30), this
was a justified call given that their experimental setup was too inaccurate
to draw such a conclusion. The main reason why this idea was not taken
seriously at the time, however, was the general expectation that β decay
would prove analogous to α decay, and so produce a mono-energetic spec-
trum.
In 1909, William Wilson argued that β rays could not be a homoge-
nous stream of mono-energetic electrons, given that, in matter, β particles
had an exponential absorption curve, while homogenous electron streams
(such as cathode rays) had a linear curve. Hence, the electrons found in β
rays must have a range of energies, a variety that could not be explained
by analogy to α decay.
Shortly after this, improved energy spectra for β radiation showed the
occurrence of multiple lines, which suggested that there existed a discrete
set of possible emission energies. As such, one suspected that β sources
consisted of multiple unstable elements, still all decaying with a character-
istic energy and, therefore, resulting in a single line in the spectrum. But,
as line spectra grew more detailed as the quality of spectral photography
improved, more and more lines appeared, and it came to be understood
that it was “impossible to assume a separate substance for each beta line”
(Otto Hahn, as cited in Franklin, 2001, p. 43). Apparently, β radiation was
truly heterogeneous.
In 1914, while theoretical explanations for these line spectra were still
lacking, James Chadwick and Hans Geiger tried to count the distribution
of electrons in these lines with an improved particle counter. To their great
surprise, they found hardly any line. For the first time, they established
the continuous spectrum of β radiation on a solid experimental basis. The
earlier observed complex line spectra proved to be just a secondary effect
of the process of spectral photography.
Experimentalists were left perplexed. The idea that β decay was emit-
ted with a continuous spectrum seemed impossible. Many, most promi-
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nently Lise Meitner, Otto Hahn, and Chadwick himself, put forward a long
list of hypotheses to explain this surprising result, such as secondary radia-
tion of the electrons, the production of recoil electrons, influence by γ rays,
etc. What all these hypotheses had in common was that all supported the
initially mono-energetic emission of β particles, and ascribed the continu-
ity to subsequent secondary processes, somewhere between the radioactive
source and the measurement of the spectrum.
This speculation came to an end in 1927, when Charles D. Ellis and
W. A. Wooster from the Cavendish laboratory in Cambridge (which had
been led by Rutherford since 1919) constructed a direct test to determine
whether energy was lost between the β ray source and the location of mea-
surement. By determining the average heat increase per β particle emis-
sion, they found that the energy needed for this increase was the average
and not the maximum of the β spectrum. This means that no energy was
lost after the emission, and that, hence, the β particles left the source with
a continuous spectrum.
This experiment did not immediately settle the question, however. Al-
though starting to question her own secondary origin hypotheses, Lise
Meitner came to doubt whether Ellis and Wooster had controlled for all
these possible secondary effects in their experiments, as a result of which
certain continental physicists, by contrast with their colleagues in England,
did not have much confidence in the Cavendish results. Until 1929, Pauli,
for example, thought that non-detected γ rays were the cause (Jensen,
2000, pp. 137-143, Rueger, 1992, p. 315). Only after Meitner and Orth-
mann replicated, improved and confirmed the Ellis and Wooster experi-
ments in the late spring of 1929 did a general consensus arise concerning
the continuity of the β spectrum. In a famous letter to Ellis (in July 1929),
Meitner admitted that:
It seems to me now that there can be absolutely no doubt that
you were completely correct in assuming that beta radiations
are primarily inhomogeneous. But I do not understand this
result at all. (Meitner, as cited in Franklin, 2001, p. 59).
Before examining the various proposals to explain this counterintuitive
result, I will complete the background picture by sketching the contours of
nuclear theory in 1927. More particularly, we must consider the nuclear
model which prevailed at the time and its difficulties.
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7.2.2 Nuclear theory in 1927
In 1927, the prevailing model for the constitution of atomic nuclei was the
so-called p-e model. In this model, the nucleus of an atom with mass num-
ber A and charge number Z consists of A protons (p) and A−Z electrons (e),
kept together by the electromagnetic force. For example, according to the
p-e model, the α particle, identified as the nucleus of 42He, consists of four
protons and two electrons. By comparison, in our current understanding,
this particle consists of two protons and two neutrons, held together by the
residual strong force.
While this p-e model became hugely problematic around 1927, it was
the core assumption of virtually all nuclear models proposed since the fa-
mous Rutherford-Geiger-Marsden experiments led to the discovery of the
nucleus in 1911.2 The tenacity with which the problematic p-e model was
adhered to is related to the inevitability of its adoption. Before we consider
the details of the various problems related to this model, something must
be said as to why its adoption appeared so self-evident to so many at the
time (Pais, 1986, p. 231) and why this model was so deeply entrenched
in the minds of physicists of that era (Stuewer, 1983, p. 32); or, as Brown
(2004, p. 309) has put it, why electrons in the nucleus were taken for
granted until the discovery of the neutron in 1932. This reconstruction
will help us understand the mindset of the physicists discussed in the next
sections.
A constitution model is expected to specify in a reductionist fashion
the various elements of the target phenomenon and the relations among
them. In the case of a model for the nucleus, a specification of the vari-
ous elementary particles and forces must explain the observed properties:
that these particles stick together inside the nucleus, that they allow for ra-
dioactive radiation,3 and that each element has a specific mass and charge
2For an overview of this exotic assembly of often quite speculative models, see Stuewer,
1983, pp. 22ff.; Hughes, 1998, n. 17; Pais, 1986, pp. 230ff.. Despite their wide variety, these
models all had in common that they presupposed the existence of electrons in the nucleus, and
except for a few exceptions (e.g. Van Den Broek’s 1913 model took α particles and electrons
as the fundamental constituents), most of these models conjectured, already well before the
experimental liberation of H nuclei (protons) from heavier nuclei (Rutherford, 1919), the
existence of some kind of particle with positive elementary charge in the nucleus. These
fundamental constituents were generally combined, however, into larger stable substructures
such as α or 42He particles and other speculative entities (e.g. Rutherford’s
3
2X particle (1920,
pp. 392ff.), see Section 8.3). Although Rutherford complained of the excess in speculative
models, he seems to have taken some part in it too (Hughes, 1998, p. 346).
3Around 1911, the peripheral electrons orbiting the nucleus were sufficient to explain
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number.4 At the time, few elementary particles were known. Since J.J.
Thomson’s discovery, the negatively charged electron was best-known, and
its charge was considered to be the elementary unit of electrical charge.
Regarding positively charged particles, until Rutherford’s discovery of the
nucleus there was no need to presuppose the existence of “corpuscules”,
because in Thomson’s old “plum pudding” model the positively charged
matter was spread uniformly within the atom. It was the insight that most
of the atom is void, except for a dense material nucleus that concentrates
the positive charge, that led naturally to the idea that nuclei are a kind of
positively charged (composite) particles. In particular, two types of nuclei
were well-known: the nucleus of the lightest element, hydrogen, and of
the second lightest, helium, which had been identified as the constituent
of α radiation. Finally only two forces were known at the time, electro-
magnetism and gravity, though the effects of the latter are negligible on an
atomic scale.
As both α and β particles were observed in radioactivity, it was natu-
ral to assume that both were present in the nucleus. Yet as the internal
mass of all elements was always an integer multiple – the atomic weight
number – of the mass of the H nucleus, and not always of the He nucleus
(which is four times heavier), it made more sense to take the H nucleus
(which Rutherford called the “positive electron”) as the fundamental nu-
clear constituent, a hypothesis first conjectured by Rutherford (1914) and
later confirmed by his discovery of artificial disintegration and liberation
of H nuclei from nitrogen nuclei (Rutherford, 1919). As electrons do not
add up to the atomic weight number (their mass is only about 1/1000th
the mass of a proton), assuming the presence of that number of H particles
was the only way to account for the weight of a nucleus. Yet as the nuclear
charge is in general about half the nuclear weight, the presence of electrons
in the nucleus seemed the only logical explanation to compensate for this
positive charge. After all, did one not observe their emission in radioactive
β decay? Moreover, the electromagnetic attraction between negative and
“positive” electrons explained the stability of nuclei.
most thermal, optical, elastic, magnetic, and chemical properties of atoms; the only exception
to this idea appeared to be the phenomenon of radioactivity: “Radioactive phenomena form a
world apart, without any connection with the preceding phenomena. It seems therefore that
radioactive phenomena originate from a deeper region of the atom.” (Marie Curie, as cited in
Pais, 1986, p. 223)
4These numbers were summarized in the table of Mendeleev, originally in a table in which
the elements were ranked according to increasing atomic weight. In 1913, Van Den Broeck
conjectured that the rank in the table actually matches the nuclear charge Z.
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Seen in retrospect, this model is the simplest possible given one impor-
tant ontological commitment. One had to consider elementary particles
as truly fundamental, i.e. indestructible and permanent, much in the way
that the ancient Greeks had regarded atoms as the smallest building blocks
of the universe: they are never created and never destroyed, nor can they
transform into each other. This ontological assumption seemed natural at
the time (see Brillouin’s testimony, quoted in Navarro, 2004, p. 451). The
idea that the electrons found in β decay were created in the process itself
seems not to have crossed these physicists’ minds. While already in 1924
Eddington had spoken of particle creation (in the context of cosmic ray re-
search), and Dirac, in 1928, became the first to adopt it in mathematical
quantum mechanics (Bromberg, 1976), only in 1933 did it come to be un-
derstood that elementary particles could be created from and transformed
into radiation, that they were unstable and decayed into other particles,
and that they were not only the building blocks of matter but also the ve-
hicles for nuclear interaction (Navarro, 2004, pp. 451-455).
In other words, the p-e model appeared self-evident: it was a simple,
elegant and visual model that explained all the observed data (as the father
of this model, Rutherford, preferred them to be (Hughes, 1998, p. 343));
no further existential assumptions were needed about unobserved parti-
cles; and the ontological commitment on which it was based was fully in
line with the conception of elementary particles prevalent at the time. Any
other model would have had to introduce radically new categories of parti-
cles and forces or drastically change existing concepts, which would require
extensive theoretical elaboration or, at least, some experimental evidence
that challenged the elegant and straightforward p-e model.
This apparent self-evidence of the p-e model explains scientists’ rela-
tively long adherence to this model, even as new discoveries gradually
changed the theoretical framework, such as the first glimpses of the strong
nuclear force in 1921 or the concept of wave-particle duality. Only by 1932,
when the neutron was discovered, did physicists start to understand that
the p-e model, by that time hugely problematic, was obsolete. Yet still,
although Heisenberg was able to complete a new nuclear model consti-
tuted of neutrons and protons within just four months (Bromberg, 1971),
it took several years for the neutron to be truly accepted as an elementary
particle and not merely as a close proton-electron combination (Stuewer,
1983, pp. 46-56; Navarro, 2004, pp. 442-443; Fernandez and Ripka, 2013,
pp. 263-270).
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7.2.3 Problems for nuclear theory around 1927
Around 1927, the p-e model started to face various difficulties. Apart from
the discovery of the continuous β spectrum, at least three other important
problems were pointed out. These differed slightly from the β puzzle, as
they were specific to the p-e model, whereas, in the case of the β puzzle, it
was not clear where the problem was situated.
Two problems were pointed out by Ralph Kronig, an American physi-
cist who suggested the electron spin before George Uhlenbeck and Samuel
Goldstein (Stuewer, 1983, pp. 34-35). In 1926, he showed that, unless
the spin of the various nuclear electrons exactly cancelled each other out,
the magnetic moment of the nucleus would be much larger than the ob-
served effects in spectral photography. Nuclear electrons should produce
splitting levels of the same size as peripheral electrons (the so-called fine
structure), whereas experimentally the magnetic moment of the nucleus
produces effects at a smaller scale (the so-called hyperfine structure).
While some, like Owen Richardson, tried to explain this anomaly by
assuming that nuclear electrons radiate part of their spin, Kronig, in 1928,
found another, even more vexing anomaly. Observing the spectra of nitro-
gen nuclei, he discovered that these nuclei obeyed Bose-Einstein statistics,
an indication that they have an integer spin. But both electrons and pro-
tons were known to have a spin of 1⁄2. Therefore, nitrogen nuclei, which
according to the p-e model consist of 14 protons and 7 electrons, should
have in total a half-integer spin and, therefore, obey Fermi-Dirac statistics
– a contradiction. Kronig concluded that “in the nucleus protons and elec-
trons do not maintain their identity in the same way as in the case when
they are outside the nucleus” (cited in Stuewer, 1983, p. 35).
The final problem that troubled the nuclear electron hypothesis was the
so-called Klein paradox. This paradox, formulated by one of Niels Bohr’s
close collaborators at the end of 1928, was intended to attack the Dirac
equation and its negative energy solutions. According to the Dirac equa-
tion, electrons confined to a region the size of the nucleus would have
such a high probability of escaping (with negative energy) through the nu-
clear potential barrier that they could not be confined to the nucleus at
all (Stuewer, 1983, p. 39). It is significant that this paradox was at the
time mostly considered as a paradox for the Dirac equation, while accord-
ing to our present understanding it is a problem for the p-e model, more
particularly, for the presence of electrons in the nucleus.
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7.2.4 Theoretical Attempts to Account for the β Puzzle
In the next sections, we will consider six hypotheses meant to account for
the continuous emission spectrum of β decay, as experimentally demon-
strated by Ellis and Wooster in 1927 and verified by Meitner in 1929. Each
suggestion was in its own right an original idea that could provide the
explanatory link to the β anomaly; all sketch in a more or less program-
matic way how the initial idea might lead to a full explanation, as well
as how the intended explanation should be understood in relation to the
theoretical framework the researchers had in mind. Although three of the
six hypotheses seem very similar, i.e. all three suggest to restrict the energy
conservation principle, I still consider them as distinct hypotheses because
they are formed differently and so connect their basic idea differently to
the theoretical framework.
7.3 Ellis and Wooster: Non-Universality of the Quantum
Postulate
At the end of their seminal paper, in which they experimentally demon-
strated the continuous β spectrum, Ellis and Wooster offered “a simple
hypothesis by which these facts can be reconciled” (1927, pp. 122-123).
But, while their experimental results are today part of the canon of nu-
clear physics, these last pages have gained little, if any, traction in the
physics community, mainly because – even if the Cavendish laboratory in
Cambridge was not noted in the 1920s for its openness to developments
in mathematical physics (Hughes, 1998) – it shows an almost surprising
misunderstanding of the basic quantum postulate: it is taken to be a con-
sequence of undisturbed classical particle motions. Although their idea did
not leave any mark on the further course of events, it has some interest for
our specific purposes.
Ellis and Wooster’s hypothesis is based on Rutherford’s satellite model
of the nucleus. This was Rutherford’s version of the p-e model, which,
by 1927, he had developed from an early explanation of his discovery
of artificial disintegration (1919, pp. 589-590) into a highly sophisticated
and structured visual model that enabled him to explain both the artificial
disintegration of light elements and the radioactivity of heavy elements
(Stuewer, 1986).
In the final version of this semi-classical model (Rutherford, 1926, pp.
370-371), which is the version referred to by Ellis and Wooster (1927,
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p. 122), the nucleus is said to be composed of three distinct regions. Sur-
rounding a positively charged inner nucleus, one could first distinguish, at
a distance, a number of electrons, and then, at a further distance, a number
of neutral satellites circulating the system. These neutral satellites were α
particles (He nuclei) that had gained two electrons in a close bond, kept in
stable orbits by polarization or magnetic forces.
Based on this model, Ellis and Wooster put forward the following hy-
pothesis:
There is no reason why the outer satellite region should not be
quantised, and so give the possibility of ejection of alpha parti-
cles of definite energy, but yet the electronic region unquantised
in the sense that the electrons have energies varying continu-
ously over a wide range. (Ellis and Wooster, 1927, p. 122)
The pattern according to which this hypothesis is formed is very straight-
forward. On the one hand, it is observed that there is a qualitative differ-
ence between the discrete α spectrum and the continuous β spectrum; on
the other hand, the employed nuclear model is cited to establish that the
particles emitted in α and β decay first reside in different regions of the
nucleus. Hence, via a simple instance of abductive reasoning, it becomes
reasonable to suggest that the same qualitative difference applies to these
two regions. As Ellis and Wooster (1927, p. 123) took the essence of quan-
tum theory to be the quantized orbits model (nowadays generally referred
to as the Bohr-Sommerfeld atomic model or the old quantum theory), they
regarded the discrete emission spectrum of α decay as an indication that
the neutral satellites (containing the α particles) orbit the inner nucleus in
quantized orbits (analogous to the electrons in the old Bohr-Sommerfeld
model). Based on these assumptions, Ellis and Wooster were able, in a
quite straightforward way, to conceive the inner orbit containing the β par-
ticles as not quantized or continuous.
It was not that Ellis and Wooster were unaware that the quantum postu-
late, i.e. that there is a quantum of action, was to be universally applied on
the atomic and subatomic levels. They simply did not regard this universal-
ity as a necessity, but rather as a contingent fact, though one which had to
that point been consistently confirmed by experiment. This can be seen in
the following passage, where Ellis and Wooster anticipate some suspicious
frowns as they continue their discussion:
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It is interesting to enquire whether this picture of the free elec-
trons in the nucleus existing in unquantised states is contrary to
modern views. At first sight it would certainly appear to be so,
but this is not necessarily the case. (Ellis and Wooster, 1927,
pp. 122-123)
They explained this by stating that, for a particle to occupy a quantized
orbit, it must be able to “describe many complete orbits without distur-
bance” (an analogy with the classical quantization of, for example, stand-
ing waves might have played a part here). While this condition might be
fulfilled for the outer shell of neutral satellites, one can “scarcely expect
undisturbed electronic orbits” so close to the positively charged nucleus.
In short, Ellis and Wooster did not consider the quantum postulate as a
genuine postulate; for them, it was an emergent phenomenon that arises
from particles describing stable orbits, which could be described by clas-
sical mechanics and electromagnetism (although they gave no account of
how this exactly happens). Given this perspective, though they did not
question the applicability of this postulate to existing atomic theory or to
the outer nuclear layer, they did not feel the need to retain its apparent uni-
versality, which allowed them a straightforward solution for the β spectrum
within the contours of Rutherford’s nuclear satellite model.
As might be suspected, this idea had a very brief history. By 1927, quan-
tum mechanics and the dominant Copenhagen interpretation had been de-
veloped and started to spread quickly (Kojevnikov, 2011; Heilbron, 1985).
Gamov (1928) applied these new ideas to the nucleus and α decay, and
succeeded in providing a quantitative explanation of the Geiger-Nutall re-
lation between the decay constant and the energy of the emitted parti-
cle, something Rutherford’s semi-classical qualitative satellite model was
totally unable to do (Stuewer, 1985, see Section 7.6). Yet as Gamov’s
calculations confirmed Rutherford and Chadwick’s experimental results in
the Cambridge-Vienna controversy, Rutherford realized he had to accept
Gamov’s model over his own, even if this took him some time (Hughes,
1998; Stuewer, 1985, pp. 349-352). Also, Ellis appears to have shifted
only slowly, as, in 1929, he was still defending this early view in a letter to
Meitner (Jensen, 2000, p. 134).
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7.4 Rutherford and Chadwick: Identical Nuclei with
Varying Internal Energies
After Ellis and Wooster’s paper, experimentalists generally shied away from
advancing much speculation concerning what might explain the β spec-
trum. An exception can be found, however, in some remarks made by
Ernest Rutherford and James Chadwick (1929) in an article on artificial
disintegration, published in early 1929, in which they suggested that it
might be possible that not every nucleus of a given element has the same
internal energy.
Rutherford and Chadwick’s article was certainly not an attempt to solve
the β puzzle. Their goal was simply to report some unexpected results
from their artificial disintegration experiments. They had discovered that,
after inducing the artificial emission of protons from aluminum nuclei by
shooting them with α particles, the energy of these emitted protons varied
widely and continuously,5 a surprising result that could not be ascribed to
inaccuracies in the measurements. After verifying that this result was not
caused by hitherto unobserved particles,6 they declared that:
The process of disintegration of an aluminium nucleus by an
α particle of given energy is not exactly the same for each in-
dividual nucleus. [...] The variation in energy change must
be due to variations in the internal energy either of the initial
aluminium nucleus or of the final nucleus. (Rutherford and
Chadwick, 1929, p. 190)
After expressing the need for further evidence and experiments, they re-
peated this hypothesis in their conclusion, adding that:
This suggestion, [...], is supported by evidence from the natural
disintegration of the radioactive elements. The disintegration
5Variation in the range of emitted protons had been observed earlier in artificial proton
emission from nitrogen nuclei. But in their 1929 article, Rutherford and Chadwick argued
that this earlier variation can be ascribed to the variation in momentum of the incident α
particles. The variation they found now for aluminum nuclei, however, is considerably larger
than the variation found earlier for nitrogen nuclei.
6Before coming to their conclusion Rutherford and Chadwick verified that no other par-
ticles such as “neutrons” were present. As Rutherford and Chadwick were trying to unravel
the nucleus, they were prepared to find some hypothesized composite substructures, such
as “neutrons”, which Rutherford (1920, pp. 396-397) had conjectured to be close proton-
electron combinations (see Section 7.8).
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electrons from β ray bodies are emitted with energies varying
over a relatively wide range and in some cases at least, e.g. ra-
dium E, the energy balance is not restored by the emission of an
appropriate amount of γ radiation. (Rutherford and Chadwick,
1929, p. 192)
In other words, by ascribing their results to the same cause as the simi-
lar continuous β spectrum, they suggested that the β puzzle might be ex-
plained by assuming that the internal mass or energy of an element can
vary.
This idea is very radical: it infringes the principle of identity for chemi-
cal elements, which states that two atoms of the same element and isotope
have identical properties. In their conceptual framework, however, the
idea can be formed in a very straightforward way. Given the most basic
assumptions about the process of disintegration – it is a nuclear process re-
sulting in the emission of an observable particle – the observed continuity
of emission energies can only have originated in a limited range of places:
(1) either it was already present at the start of the process; (2) or it was
created at the moment of disintegration; (3) or it entered somewhere be-
tween the disintegration and the place of measurement. Before I explain
in more detail why Rutherford and Chadwick preferred the first option, let
us take a closer look at how this disjunction is formed.
At first sight, the disjunction seems to be the result of an elementary
abductive reasoning step, which can be modeled by existing logics for ab-
duction.7 But the disjunction does not mention just a couple of possibili-
ties: anyone considering this disjunction (see e.g. also G.P. Thomson (1929,
p. 405) or Pauli (Brown, 1978, pp. 22-24)) was convinced that it covered
all (initial) possibilities. It was, in other words, an exhaustive disjunction.
This relates to how these physicists’ knowledge of disintegration processes
is structured: not as a set of propositions (the building blocks for logics),
but as a coherent spatiotemporal model of the process, which synthesizes
their knowledge.8 The basic assumptions mentioned above constitute the
outline of such a model, which can be represented visually by drawing
7See, for instance, the logics for abduction developed in the adaptive logics framework
(see Part II).
8In this chapter, I understand models as they are commonly understood in the philosophi-
cal literature on the use of models in science, as “a representation of a system with interactive
parts and with representations of those interactions” (Nersessian, 2008, p. 12). These imagi-
nary functional or structural analogues of the target phenomena allow for determining future
states by mentally simulating the model by means of the interactive parts. In the case of
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the experimental setup or by a more abstract sketch. In this type of pro-
cess model, one can derive a purportedly exhaustive disjunction of possible
origins for a property observed at the end of the process by covering the
possibility of each spatiotemporal region in the model.
This is a pattern of abduction which draws on our intuitions about
causal processes. In Salmon’s terminology (1984), a characteristic ob-
served at the end of a causal process must either have been uniformly
present throughout the process, or else introduced into the process as a
mark by means of a single local interaction at a certain space-time point,
and the characteristic must have remained present at all subsequent stages
until the space-time point of the observation. Exactly because the disinte-
gration process is considered to be a causal one, these physicists assumed
the exhaustiveness of the disjunction.
Of the three possible options, the third, i.e. that the continuous variety
in energies appears in the model after the particle has left the nucleus, had
been investigated by the experimentalists over the fifteen preceding years
(see Section 7.2.1), a quest that ended with the Ellis and Wooster’s caloric
experiment and the consensus among Ellis, Wooster, Meitner and Geiger
that the electron leaves the nucleus with a continuous spectrum.
This left two options open: either the variety in energy is present from
the start, or it is introduced into the process at the exact space-time point of
the disintegration. The first option is interchangeable with the thesis that
nuclei of the same element can vary in internal energy. The second option
is (in this model) equivalent to the assumption that energy is not conserved
in a single disintegration (otherwise nuclei with fixed internal energies be-
fore and after cannot emit electrons with varying energies).9 Hence, these
physicists were caught between Scylla and Charybdis and had to give up
either the principle of identity for chemical elements or the principle of en-
ergy conservation – both of them cornerstones of a physicist’s worldview.
This dilemma also explains the arduous focus of Meitner and others in ear-
lier years to find a hypothesis that would fit the third option, and their
perplexity when the caloric experiments of Ellis and Wooster excluded this
the model for disintegration, the visual picture represents the system, the various variables
(which can be adjusted) represent the interactive parts, and the mathematical formulae (that
specify the relations among the variables) represent the interactions. See also Part IV of this
dissertation in which I examine the nature of scientific models in greater detail.
9Of course, this equivalence pertains only to this particular model of disintegration, which
assumes that the nucleus emits a single particle. At the time, this was, however, the model
that most physicists had in mind.
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possibility.
This leaves us with the question of why Rutherford and Chadwick pre-
ferred to give up the principle of atomic identity, a route taken by no other
protagonist in this history. In my opinion, the answer should be sought
in the fact that Rutherford and Chadwick were in the first place experi-
mentalists.10 Experimentalists tend to have, as Franklin (1999, p. 97) has
put it, an instrumental loyalty. While their ideal might be to look for “the
best physics experiment in their field that can be done”, and consequently
build the appropriate apparatus, in reality they tend to look for the best ex-
periment that can be done with their existing equipment (or with a minor
modification). In that way, they recycle their expertise time after time, and
become more and more experienced in employing the existing apparatus
and its underlying models.
In the case of these Cavendish researchers, nuclear reactions were typ-
ically elicited by smashing small particles (mostly α particles) into nuclei,
and then an effort was made to determine the properties of the remnants
by observing them in electromagnetic fields – experiments and calculations
that crucially depend on the conservation theorems. By performing this
type of experiment over and over again, the theoretical models on which
they were based became ever more deeply ingrained in their minds. As
Franklin (1999, p. 149) has claimed that there are probably no anti-realists
in the laboratory,11 it is perhaps unavoidable that experimentalists form a
deep belief in the veracity of their underlying models, i.e. that these mod-
els, which they manipulate mentally each time they perform physical ex-
periments, have a true functional or structural analogy to reality. The only
time Rutherford and Chadwick mention the conservation theorem in their
paper of 1929 is when they explain the model of artificial disintegration
on which their calculations and experiments are based. Also in their book
on radioactivity (Rutherford, Chadwick and Ellis, 1930), though published
at a time when they must already have heard of Bohr’s proposals to limit
energy conservation (Jensen, 2000, p. 160), they hardly mention the con-
servation theorem, except when they use it to explain their models. Clearly,
10See Hughes (1993, 1998) for a thorough discussion of the relation between the experi-
mentalists at the Cavendish laboratory and theoretical physics.
11Franklin’s claim is a strong version of entity realism, as it is proposed by Hacking (1983),
which takes the manipulability of an entity as the criterion for belief in its existence. Franklin
claims that experiments can also give us reasons to believe in the truth of some laws between
these entities. I only use the descriptive part of his claim here, i.e. that experimentalists tend
to form such beliefs.
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due to their experimental bias, they did not question the validity of the con-
servation theorem, for it was an implicit and inherent part of the underlying
models for the experiments they performed every day.
On the other hand, the internal or rest mass of an element can be mea-
sured. From an experimental point of view, it is perfectly conceivable that
what was thought to be equal might turn out to allow for small variations.
In fact, it was at the Cavendish laboratory that precisely a decade earlier As-
ton had discovered, with his newly devised mass-spectrograph, the isotopes
suggested by Soddy: chemically identical elements with varying masses
(Hughes, 2009; Fernandez and Ripka, 2013, pp. 166-171, Soddy, 1921,
p. 369). Due to this long history of research on isotopes at the Cavendish,
it must have appeared quite reasonable to Rutherford and Chadwick to
expect that further variations at the level of individual nuclei might be
measured. As a result, they supported the thesis of non-identity until 1932
despite the lack of any experimental proof, such as a varying lifetime for
radioactive elements (Jensen, 2000, p. 161).12
7.5 G.P. Thomson: Non-Conservation of Energy as a
consequence of Quantum Mechanics
As mentioned in Section 7.2.1, theoretical physicists, certainly on the con-
tinent, did not immediately appreciate the seriousness of the problem (Jen-
sen, 2000, pp. 137-143). According to Pais (1986, p. 309), only one ref-
erence to the Ellis and Wooster paper can be found in all the literature of
1928: a short note from George Paget Thomson in Nature. In this first ar-
ticle (1928) and a more substantial article published a year later (1929),
Thomson explained the β spectrum in terms of the non-conservation of
energy for the emitted electrons.
The single most interesting feature of this account, which will turn out
to be incoherent, is that Thomson described the non-conservation of energy
12They did try, however, to minimize this radicalism by situating the variation in the bind-
ing energy between the disintegration electrons and the nucleus, thus leaving the stable part
of the nucleus identical (Rutherford, Chadwick and Ellis, 1930, p. 410). Opposition to their
proposals was, given the lack of experimental evidence, very fierce; consider the following
quote from Bohr’s Faraday Lecture: “Although the corresponding variations in mass would be
far too small to be detected by the present experimental methods, such definite energy dif-
ferences between the individual atoms would be very difficult to reconcile with other atomic
properties.” (Bohr, 1932, p. 382)
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in β decay not as an anomaly but as a result that was “to be expected on
the new wave mechanics” (1928, p. 615).
Shortly before the fifth Solvay conference in 1927, a consensus had
emerged concerning the mathematical equivalence of the formalisms of
Born-Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger,13 offering the field a new and versatile
set of formal tools that could be applied to many open problems in theoret-
ical physics and that would lead, in subsequent years, to a substantial list
of successful explanations. Thomson regarded the experimental β anomaly
as just one of the many puzzles to be solved by means of this new formal-
ism.14 Given the broad consensus and quick succession of solved puzzles,
this expectation is understandable. It might even explain, to a certain ex-
tent, Pais’s observation that the severity of the β puzzle was not directly
appreciated: in these first years of quantum mechanics, the number of
puzzles that could be addressed was still large indeed and the frontiers of
formalism’s application were still vague. As such, it was not immediately
clear which puzzles would turn out to be a challenge for the new theory.
In the case of the β spectrum, this took at least a year.
Thomson’s account is clearly in contradiction with the orthodox or Copen-
hagen interpretation of the quantum formalism,15 as he did not accept two
13See for instance the discussion between Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger after the latter’s
talk at the 1927 Solvay conference (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini, 2009, pp. 471-472); for a
detailed history of the reconciliation of the two formalisms, see Longair (2013, ch. 15); for
some recent discussion about the actual equivalence of the original formalisms, see Muller
(1997); Perovic (2008). Of course, the agreement on the formalisms’ equivalence was only a
footnote to the real discussion at the Solvay conference, which concerned the interpretation
of the quantum formalism (for an introduction, see Heilbron, 1985; Bacciagaluppi and Valen-
tini, 2009; Mehra, 1975). Therefore, and due to the heterogeneity of the group of physicists
involved, it would maybe be premature to label this episode as the installment of a new Kuh-
nian (1962) paradigm (see also Beller, 1999, ch. 14 and Bokulich, 2006 for an interesting
analysis of Kuhn’s notion of a “paradigm” as reminiscent of Heisenberg’s notion of a “closed
theory”, a concept Heisenberg used to mount his rather dogmatic defense of the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics). Apart from this discussion (see e.g. Massimi (2005)
for a reading of this period that is more sympathetic towards Kuhn’s ideas), I do think that
Kuhn’s description of “normal science” fits the period from 1927 onward, as it should not be
forgotten that, while senior professors continued their interpretational debates, most contri-
butions to the field were made by a large group of younger researchers that employed the
new mathematical formalism to address a wide variety of problems in the field (Kojevnikov,
2011, pp. 346-348).
14G.P. Thomson, following C.G. Darwin, was attracted by Schro¨dinger’s wave formalism
mostly because it allowed, as both Thomson and Darwin believed, for more “mechanical” ex-
planations (Navarro, 2010). In the present case, this preference for mechanical explanations
would lead to his faulty assumptions.
15Recent scholarship has shown that the Copenhagen interpretation is a far less coherent
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of its central theses: the completeness of the wave function and the com-
plementarity principle (which, as originally formulated by Bohr (1928),16
states that the principles of conservation of energy and momentum are
complementary to the space-time description of elementary particles). Thom-
son claimed that “the conception of a particle in motion is almost mean-
ingless unless it can be supposed to have a definite velocity at a definite
time” (1929, p. 413), meaning that he disbelieves that the wave function –
inherently probabilistic in nature – provides a complete description of the
electron. In fact, he adhered to the pilot-wave interpretation of quantum
mechanics: wave functions exist physically as accompanying or guiding
pilot-waves of particles, while the particles themselves have a definite but
“hidden” trajectory. The standard formulation of this interpretation, also
known as the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, manages to be empirically
equivalent with the Copenhagen interpretation by restricting the epistemic
access to this definite trajectory to what is known in a statistical way via
the wave formalism – hence the hidden character of this trajectory. But
Thomson was misled by this idea of definiteness, and tried to gain knowl-
edge about the electrons’ trajectories by other means: by stating that “the
equality of the particles emitted and atoms transformed is exact and not
statistical” (1929, p. 406), he took the principle of identity (in which he
firmly believed, unlike Rutherford and Chadwick) to require that the prop-
erties of the hidden trajectories must be exactly the same for all emitted
electrons. This is in clear contradiction with the (empirically adequate) or-
thodox interpretation, which takes this principle only to require that identi-
cal systems can be described by the same wave function; measurements of
identical systems are still uncertain and distributed according to the prob-
abilities specified by the wave function. Thomson, however, fallaciously
inferred that “the initial velocity is the same in all cases.” (1929, p. 415)
– being apparently unaware that the attribution of a definite speed would
prevent any knowledge about the position of these particles.17 At the same
(Beller, 1996) and unified (Howard, 2004) view than has traditionally been thought, as Bohr’s
and Heisenberg’s views on complementarity diverged quite seriously. This does not need to
concern us here, as Thomson rejected any notion of complementarity.
16As Camilleri (2007) shows, Bohr originally conceived of this concept as the complemen-
tarity between the description of the stationary unmeasured state (for which conservation of
energy and momentum applied) and the description of this state in terms of position mea-
surements (a space-time description). It was only in the wake of his dispute with Einstein
that he extended this view around 1935 to our current understanding of the complementarity
principle in terms of mutually exclusive experimental arrangements.
17Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations state that the uncertainty in position is inversely pro-
portional to the uncertainty in momentum. Physically realistic quantum models allow, there-
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time, he employed the Gaussian model for a free particle (a well-known
exemplar of the quantum formalism that describes position probabilities
in terms of moving Gaussian curves, also called wave packets) to describe
the evolution of the electrons’ wave function in time.18 As the variance of
moving Gaussians grows over time, this model predicts that the uncertainty
for position measurements will rise proportionally. At this point, Thomson
had no other option than to accept that the electrons (which are, on his
pilot-wave view, spread according to this Gaussian distribution inside the
wave packet) can speed up or down from their initial velocity to move to
the front or back of the wave train. Hence, the energy of a single emitted
electron is not conserved in free space.19
Despite his confused assumptions, it is for our purposes still interest-
ing to investigate the pattern of discovery by which Thomson arrived at
these ideas. The initial step in his reasoning is rather easy to retract: he
found that by taking a Gaussian with appropriate parameters, one could
get a “fair fit to Ellis and Wooster’s result” (1928, p. 616). The visual
resemblance between the somewhat skewed experimental curve of the β
spectrum (Figure 7.1) and the mathematical shape of a Gaussian, which
figures prominently in the quantum model for a free particle,20 led him to
assume that the emitted electrons in β decay behaved as free particles with
the same wave function. Once he had formed this initial hypothesis via vi-
sual identification, he could then apply this model to the data and calculate
the properties of this wave function: it should be in a large superposition of
momenta, and have a rather small initial wave length that increased with
time. Combined with his faulty assumption of the exact and equal initial
velocity, this led him to his thesis of “straggling” electrons. The calculated
fore, for uncertainty in both momentum and position, treating a system as in a superposition
of both momenta and positions.
18Thomson appears to make a peculiar categorical distinction between velocity, a property
of particles which has a definite nature, and momentum, a property related to the wave for-
malism which can be superposed. As such, he takes the emitted electrons to have initially a
definite velocity, while at the same time allowing them to be in a superposition of momenta
(as prescribed by the Gaussian model of a free particle).
19The assumption that the electrons had at first a definite and equal velocity is the real
problem in Thomson’s reasoning. Pais’s remark that “his conclusions resulted from inappro-
priate manipulations with phase velocities and group velocities” (1986, p. 312) refers only to
the consequences of this initial confusion. Bromberg traces Thomson’s mistake to the fact that
he employs a pilot-wave model (1971, p. 311), but this assumption would not be problematic
if he adhered to, for instance, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation.
20Thomson refers to a presentation of this model by C. G. Darwin in 1927, but the Gaussian
model for a free particle is still a textbook exemplar of quantum mechanics.
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Figure 7.1: The experimental β spectrum visually resembles a Gaussian dis-
tribution. (reproduced from Ellis and Wooster (1927, p. 111), permission
granted by Royal Society Publishing)
small initial wave length – he compared it to the sound pulse produced by
a firing gun – allowed him to explain why non-conservation was observed
only for β decay and not for other forms of decay, as the wave length he
calculated for β decay was much smaller than other observed wave lengths
in those days.
Thomson’s account is a clear example of how the counterintuitive as-
pects of quantum mechanics misled even renowned physicists in the early
years.21 Willing to embrace the new formalism and maybe blinded by its
attractive fruitfulness, Thomson thought it also contained the key to the β
puzzle. In order to solve this puzzle, he actually used a very straightfor-
ward pattern of discovery: the visual recognition of a well-known math-
ematical model in the experimental data. Despite the coherence of his
reasoning, he unfortunately relied heavily on an assumption based on clas-
sical intuitions, which made his contribution inconsistent.22 However, the
21G.P. Thomson received a shared Nobel prize for physics in 1937 precisely for his work
on the wave character of the electron.
22According to Navarro (2008, 2010), part of the trouble for his transition to quantum
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idea that energy is not conserved in β decay would prove persistent.
7.6 Bohr: Non-Conservation of Energy as part of a
Theory for Elementary Particle Constitution
The essence of Niels Bohr’s stance on the matter is generally reduced to
his embrace of the idea of energy non-conservation (e.g. Franklin, 2001,
p. 68; Pais, 1986, p. 309). Yet scholarly work by Bromberg (1971, p. 309)
and Jensen (2000, ch. 6) shows that we cannot evaluate Bohr’s sugges-
tion independently of the much broader scope he had in mind. By 1929,
Bohr (and Heisenberg) became convinced that nuclear and atomic systems
differ profoundly, and that a new theory must be constructed to address
the various problems at the nuclear scale – a theory without energy con-
servation. By the time Bohr felt assured enough to first publish his ideas,
however (Bohr, 1932), the β puzzle and the other nuclear problems had
already polarized the field between his supporters and opponents. As the
criticisms of the latter were aimed particularly at his views about energy
non-conservation, Bohr seemed to stress this thesis in a more autonomous
way beginning around 1932.
To understand why Bohr was on the lookout for a new physical the-
ory, we have to trace his views to his first attempts to solve the β puzzle.
These can be found in an unpublished, programmatic note written in June
1929,23 which is particularly interesting for our purposes because, taken
together with some short remarks in his correspondence, it displays the
formation of his ideas. He starts this note with a reference to Thomson,
whom he credits for connecting the idea of a limitation of the energy prin-
ciple and the β puzzle. But, in his well-known gentle way,24 he informs
mechanics can be related to the old continuous and aetherial worldview of his father, J. J.
Thomson, and his classical Cambridge training, influences he struggled considerably to get
free of. It took him until 1930 to come to “understand that the new physics was totally alien
to the old notion of explanation by way of mechanical models.” (Navarro, 2008, p. 250)
23This note is included in Vol. 9 of the Bohr Scientific papers (Bohr, 1929/1986). In the
introduction to this volume, Peierls (1986) states that the content of this note must be “in
substance” the same that he sent to Pauli on 1 July, accompanied by the words: “The other is
a little piece about the beta-ray spectra, which I have had in mind for a long time, and which
has been typed in the last few days, but I have not yet made up my mind to send it off, since
it yields so few positive results and has been written so sketchily.”
24Bohr’s contemporaries did not always understand his well-known hesitation to use con-
frontational language; consider the start of Pauli’s answer to this 1929 note: “It already starts
so depressingly with a reference to the nonsensical remarks by G.P. Thomson, and from this
the people in England will only draw the erroneous conclusion that you regard these remarks
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Figure 7.2: Electrons with energy M and captured between F and D have, ac-
cording to quantum mechanics, a non-zero probability of “tunneling through”
the nuclear potential barriers HGF and DCB without changing their energy
level. (reproduced from Gurney and Condon (1928, p. 439), permission
granted by Nature Publishing Group)
us that Thomson’s view is wrong and resulted from a misunderstanding of
the complementarity principle. Bohr considered this principle to be a cru-
cial insight of quantum theory, a view he saw confirmed by the successful
explanation of α decay by Gurney and Condon (1928) and, independently,
by George Gamov (1928) (Stuewer, 1985).25
The reason why Bohr deemed the α decay explanation so “striking”–
it was the first explication of a quantum tunneling phenomenon – is that
it used the quantum formalism and the complementarity principle to ex-
plain a curious aspect of radioactivity, i.e. that the disintegration time of a
nucleus is independent of its previous history, and subject only to a fixed
chance. On a classical account, this is inexplicable: either the energy nec-
essary to overcome the nuclear binding energy remains constant (in which
case there would be either instant disintegration or no disintegration at
all) or else it changes over time (in which case disintegration would be
dependent on the previous history of the nucleus). But quantum mechan-
ics allows for the description of another type of behavior. To obtain this,
Gurney, Condon and Gamov modeled the nucleus by a constant potential
well (Figure 7.2; the well is formed by the peaks G and C), in which an α
as important.” (as cited in Peierls, 1986, p. 5)
25Gamov stayed at the Bohr Institute in Copenhagen during the academic year 1928-1929,
where he unsuccessfully tried to apply the same style of reasoning to the β spectrum; this
failure is one of the factors that led Bohr to consider the β puzzle.
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particle, having energy M, is captured in an orbit between F and D, or, in
other words, its energy is lower than the potential energy peaks (i.e. the
energy required to overcome the nuclear binding energy). Classically, this
particle cannot escape without external energy, but in quantum mechan-
ics (the measurement of) the position of a particle is subject to a certain
uncertainty. This means that there is a non-zero probability that the par-
ticle, confined between F and D, is actually located past the potential en-
ergy barrier (e.g. on the right-hand side of B) while maintaining the same
energy level M. In other words, the particle has “tunneled through” the
potential peaks raised by the nuclear binding energy. As Bohr noted, this
is a “particularly instructive example” (1929/1986, p. 87) of the comple-
mentarity between the principle of energy conservation and the space-time
description in terms of position measurements. In fact, it would be exactly
this satisfying explanation that led Bohr to think that β decay could not be
explained by quantum mechanics, but that a new theory was needed.
This α decay explanation also led to a change in the predominant con-
ception of radioactivity. As we have seen in the earlier work of Thomson
(1929, p. 412) and Ellis and Wooster (1927, p. 123), radioactivity was of-
ten considered to be a violent explosion in which a particle is hurled away.
But Gurney and Condon say that it is better to change this in light of the
present explanation and speak rather of particles that are “slipping away”
(1928, p. 439), while Gamov speaks of “leaking” particles (1928, p. 805).
This new metaphor for radioactivity led to drastic changes in the predomi-
nant conception: while radioactivity had long been regarded as an abrupt
change in the history of the involved particles, including possible deforma-
tions or alterations, the new image of leaking drops suggests that it is a
purely mechanical process and so must be described as such.
These observations allow us to understand why Bohr put forward the
idea of a new theory. If we follow the new metaphor and take radioactivity
to be a purely mechanical process, β decay should be modeled analogously
to α decay, because the mechanical constraints are similar: a decay ratio
which is fixed, a single observed and identified particle, and a change in
nuclear constitution that conserves total atomic mass and charge. But as
Gamov (1928) showed, the quantum tunneling model, which provides a
successful explanation of α decay, also allows for a calculation of the rate
of radioactive decay as a function of the velocity of the emitted particles
(the so-called Geiger-Nutall relation). In other words, the decay rate and
the energy of the emitted particles are directly related. If this is so, the
continuous β spectrum would also force the rate of β decay to vary contin-
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uously amongst the different nuclei, which contradicts the observed fixed
decay rate. Hence, Bohr concluded that:
The existence of a well-defined rate of decay of β ray disintegra-
tions would exclude any simple explanation of the continuous
β ray spectra based on the ordinary ideas of wave mechanics.
(Bohr, 1929/1986, p. 87)
Bohr regarded the quantum mechanical framework as inapt to explain
the β decay observations. Another theory was needed, and in fact a concep-
tual niche presented itself quite directly: if β particles do not “leak” from
the nucleus, then they cannot be present inside the nucleus beforehand
(otherwise quantum mechanics and the quantum tunneling model would
apply); and if they are not present in the nucleus beforehand, this means
that the β particles are created in the process of decay itself – a type of be-
havior for which no theory had yet been formulated. But before Bohr could
substantiate this new theory for the constitution of elementary particles, he
realized that his conclusions – apparently logical consequences drawn from
quantum mechanics and the observational data – presented a severe chal-
lenge to the p-e model, for which the presence of electrons in the nucleus is
a basic assumption. First, then, he had to address this theoretical conflict.
It is well-known that Bohr approached this kind of theoretical conflict
by scrutinizing the concepts involved and specifying how they apply to the
experimental observations.26 It is this style of reasoning that Heisenberg
hints at when he describes that Bohr’s insight was not so much
[...] a result of a mathematical analysis of the basic assump-
tions, but rather of an intense occupation with the actual phe-
nomena, such that it was possible for him to sense the relation-
ship intuitively rather than derive them [sic] formally. (Heisen-
berg, 1967, p. 95)
More particularly, we can describe Bohr’s pattern of reasoning as fol-
lows: by analyzing the meaning, preconditions and implications of the con-
26There exists a vast literature on Bohr’s work and philosophy. For an introduction to
the role of (classical) concepts and language in his reasoning, see Howard (1994); Favrholdt
(1994); Bokulich and Bokulich (2005); on scrutinizing the conditions of the various concepts,
see Favrholdt (1994, pp. 83, 94-95); Folse (1994, pp. 134-137); Camilleri (2007, pp. 520-
524); on the importance of experimental observations, see Shomar (2008); Tanona (2004,
p. 685).
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cepts involved, he could identify which minimal conceptual assumptions
were needed to describe the experimental data. In this way, he could, by re-
stricting the meaning of these concepts, carve out the necessary conceptual
space to resolve the contradicting elements – if his attempt was successful.
Of course, this pattern was not a straightforward algorithm that Bohr could
easily execute: explicating the many, often merely intuitive aspects of and
assumptions related to the meaning of a concept was a painstaking process,
in which Bohr succeeded only through numerous discussions with his col-
laborators, friends and visitors to his center. The most important result he
reached in this process is his famous complementarity principle (Camilleri,
2007, pp. 520-524; Shomar, 2008, pp. 329-334): faced with the apparent
contradiction between energy conservation and uncertainty of position, he
realized that the idea of energy conservation makes sense only for isolated
states (which, as such, are not observed), while the meaning of the con-
cept of position inevitably involved measurement, i.e. the observation of
this position. Hence, we obtain complementary descriptions for the same
phenomenon by limiting the contradictory concepts in such a way that they
can co-exist. As Heisenberg notes:
This concept of complementarity fitted well the fundamental
philosophical attitude which he had always had, and in which
the limitations of our means of expressing ourselves entered as
a central philosophical problem. (Heisenberg, 1967, p. 106)
This preoccupation with the meaning of concepts is indeed a constant in
Bohr’s writing, such as when he described the task of physicists as:
[...] not to penetrate in the essence of things, the meaning of
which we don’t know anyway, but rather to develop concepts
which allow us to talk in a productive way about phenomena
in nature. (Bohr in a letter to H. Hansen, as cited in Pais, 2000,
p. 23)
Bohr employed this same pattern of reasoning in the present case. Scru-
tinizing the role of electrons in the p-e model, he realized that they are
needed only to ensure the correct atomic charge and the electromagnetic
attraction that keeps the nucleus together.27 For these roles, the only prop-
27From 1921 on, serious doubts arose concerning whether it was the electromagnetic force
that kept the nucleus together. Still by 1928, no valid alternative had been proposed (Pais,
1986, p. 240).
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erty of (nuclear) electrons that one has to assume is that they have a neg-
ative elementary charge – a non-mechanical aspect. On the other hand,
the many problems related to the presence of electrons in the nucleus (the
β spectrum, the spin of the N nucleus, the absent total magnetic moment,
the Klein paradox) all have to do with the mechanical properties of these
electrons: their momentum, energy and spin. These problems led Bohr to
conclude that :
The behavior of electrons bound within an atomic nucleus would
seem to fall entirely outside the field of consistent application of
the ordinary mechanical concepts, even in their quantum theo-
retical modification. (Bohr, 1929/1986, p. 88)
By separating the mechanical and electric properties of (nuclear) electrons,
Bohr was able to resolve this conflict. On the one hand, electrons do not
exist as individual particles inside the nucleus; only their total charge (a
multiple of the elementary charge) exists and is somehow distributed in-
side the nucleus to ensure the p-e model. On the other hand, it is only in the
process of β decay that an electron is created as a “dynamical individual-
ity” (Bohr, 1929/1986, p. 88), while a negative unit charge attaches itself
somehow to this newly formed particle. By restricting the assumptions
about electrons in both cases, Bohr carved out conceptual space between
the two existing theories for a yet to be constructed theory of “the constitu-
tion of elementary electric particles” (p. 87). For him, it was clear that this
new theory could only account for the various energetic puzzles surround-
ing the electron concept – Bohr was at the time also puzzled by the classical
problem of the infinite self-energy of electrons, and even connected the en-
ergy production in stars to this newly projected theory (see Section 9.4) –
if it was not subjected to the principle of energy conservation.
To this analysis, we can add a further observation. As Pais (1986,
p. 312, n. 20) and Jensen (2000, p. 149) have already remarked, this pro-
posal is not related to the earlier BKS theory (Bohr, Kramers and Slater,
1924), in which he had already proposed the idea of energy non-conser-
vation in order to remedy the old quantum theory.28 In fact, as Darrigol
28For a historical introduction to the BKS theory, see Darrigol (1992, ch. 9) and Longair
(2013, pp. 194-197). It is common in the literature to suggest a relation between Bohr’s ideas
of 1924 and those of 1929 (e.g. Franklin, 2001, p. 68). Lakatos (1970, pp. 168-173)) regards
the non-conservation of energy even as the central thesis of a research program that ran from
1924 (the Bohr-Kramers-Slater paper) until 1936 (the Shankland experiments).
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(1992, p. 214) has noted, Bohr had come upon the idea to limit the con-
servation of energy and momentum even earlier. But it has not been suffi-
ciently stressed in the literature that at each of these three times there was
a different reason to consider the non-conservation of energy. Previous to
the BKS paper, Bohr privately held the opinion that the idea of momentum
conservation would be impossible to reconcile at a micro level with discon-
tinuous quantum jumps (Darrigol, 1992, p. 214). In the BKS paper, which
presented a probabilistic theory for the first time, the energy conservation
theorem had to be sacrificed to ensure the statistical independence of the
atoms:
It may be emphasized that the degree of independence of the
transition processes assumed here would seem the only consis-
tent way of describing the interaction between radiation and
atoms by a theory involving probability considerations. This in-
dependence reduces not only conservation of energy to a statis-
tical law, but also conservation of momentum. (Bohr, Kramers
and Slater, 1924, pp. 792-793)
Energy conservation would imply that each time an atom emitted a quan-
tum of energy, another atom would absorb this quantum – a contradic-
tion with the assumption that these processes are statistically independent.
Bohr acknowledged that this theory was mistaken following the 1925 ex-
periments by Compton and Simon (Franklin, 2001, pp. 65-68). The reason
why he proposed energy non-conservation for the third time in our case
study in 1929 is clearly different, and this time, as Gamov noticed, “he
now goes even further and stresses that the energy need not be conserved
even in the mean” (as cited in Jensen, 2000, p. 149).
However, there is a parallel to be observed. Clearly, maintaining the
energy theorem was not high on Bohr’s list of priorities. He was willing to
sacrifice it if necessary, and, although his previous suggestions to abandon
it had been unsuccessful, he still thought that this revision could help him
solve the many puzzles of nuclear theory.
This brings us to our main questions: why was Bohr so willing to with-
draw the energy conservation theorem? And why did he not take seriously
Pauli’s suggestion to acknowledge a new particle (see Section 7.8) when
the debate about the β spectrum narrowed to these two suggestions around
1932? In specifying his method of reasoning, we saw that Bohr gave abso-
lute priority to the observational data, which he tried to account for using
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the physical concepts at his disposal. He had always been rigorous in this.
In the BKS paper he stated, concerning photons, that:
Although the great heuristic value of this hypothesis [...], the
theory of light-quanta can obviously not be considered as a sat-
isfactory solution of the problem of light propagation. (Bohr,
Kramers and Slater, 1924, p. 787)
At a moment when many physicists were starting to accept the physical
existence of Einstein’s photons (certainly from the 1922 Compton experi-
ments onwards), Bohr continued to disbelieve in their existence until the
mid-1920s (Stachel, 2009), due to, as he put it, a lack of experimental
observation. So it should be no surprise that Bohr was also reluctant to
assume the existence of another new particle, of which, by 1929, there was
not the slightest experimental trace.
This analysis concurs with Shomar’s (2008) characterization of Bohr as
a “phenomenological realist”, i.e. someone who has a realist position about
low-level phenomenological models, which are seen as a kind of theoreti-
cal descriptions of reality, but an instrumentalist position about high-level
theories, which are seen to have merely the status of conceptual tools. This
explains in the same way why Bohr was hesitant to accept the reality of new
particles (phenomenological models that link very closely to experimental
observations), but willing to sacrifice the energy conservation principle (a
high-level theoretical principle).
This leaves us with the question of why the energy conservation theo-
rem should have been the law that needed to be sacrificed, and not another
law or principle. In my opinion, the main reason was that Bohr projected
that the new theory he had in mind could address all energetic problems
at once, and that therefore it would be better at first not to include such a
strong theorem about which he already, earlier, had doubts.
This summarizes his views on the matter. Unlike Thomson, Bohr real-
ized that this problem was beyond the scope of the new quantum formal-
ism. This did not, however, lead him to doubt the new quantum mechan-
ics; rather he thought that the best one could do in describing phenomena
was to assemble a patchwork of various theories, joined by correspondence
principles and common concepts and stripped of contradictions by specify-
ing and restricting these concepts. Still, one should also keep in mind that
Bohr had hardly any “positive results” to support this new theory, and his
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hesitation to put these ideas in print demonstrates that he was aware of
the radical nature of his suggestion.
7.7 Heisenberg: Non-conservation of Energy as part of a
Second Quantization at the Scale of the Nucleus
We will touch only briefly on Werner Heisenberg’s ideas, mainly because
his stance on the matter was never published and he held it for only a few
months. Also, his idea, however short-lived, must be understood in relation
to his broader research project at the time: to cope with the many infinities
and paradoxes associated with the construction of a relativistic quantum
electrodynamics (QED), especially at distances on the order of the size of
the electron (Cassidy, 1981; Rueger, 1992).
Heisenberg’s suggestions concerning the β spectrum were brought to
light by Bromberg (1971) and recorded in two letters to Bohr, dated in
February and March 1930, available at the Niels Bohr Archive. In these
letters, as Bromberg tells us, Heisenberg proposed to construct a mathe-
matical lattice world with grid cells of nuclear dimensions. If the scale
of the system was large with respect to these cells, normal quantum me-
chanics would apply; but within these cells, phenomena obeyed new laws.
He obtained these by turning the Klein-Gordon differential equation into
a difference equation tailored to these new cell dimensions. This had as
a consequence that the energy of particles became periodically dependent
on the wave number. By further supposing that particles near the maxima
behaved as electrons and those near the minima as protons, Heisenberg
constructed a first picture of the nucleus without “real” nuclear electrons.
The price of this idea was high: within the cells, neither charge, energy
nor momentum was conserved, which made him ask Bohr whether he re-
garded “this radical attempt as completely crazy” (as cited in Bromberg,
1971, p. 325). Yet, as we have seen, Bohr was on much the same track
(except for charge non-conservation) and also on the lookout for a new
nuclear theory. Still, Heisenberg’s idea was short-lived: already in April
1930, after a meeting with Bohr, Pauli and Gamov in Copenhagen, he jetti-
soned it because he realized that the introduction of a fixed cell grid length
could not be relativistically invariant.
The key to understanding how Heisenberg arrived at such a radical
theory can be found in the following passage from a letter he sent to Bohr
in December 1929, in which he commented on Ellis’s findings that protons
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emitted in the artificial disintegration of nitrogen also showed a continuous
spectrum, a result which later turned out to be mistaken:
I find Ellis’ claim that also the H particles from the disintegra-
tion of N show a continuous spectrum dreadful; for how shall
one then understand the sharp α ray spectra? (Heisenberg, as
cited in Jensen, 2000, p. 148)
As he later acknowledged in a personal interview with Bromberg (1971,
p. 328), the many problems associated with nuclear electrons in particular
and with the nucleus in general made him wonder why the α spectrum was
the lucky exception. In other words, instead of β decay, he thought that α
decay might be an anomaly; in doing so, he presupposed at the same time
the existence of a nuclear theory, to which α decay was the anomaly and
which explained all the other nuclear problems. He especially hoped that it
could solve the infinite self-energy of a point electron, which proved such a
hurdle for QED (Cassidy, 1981, p. 8). By thus inverting the anomalies, he
reached in a much more straightforward way the same conclusion as Bohr,
i.e. that a new (nuclear) theory was needed. But unlike Bohr, who expected
this to be a theory of elementary particle constitution, Heisenberg foresaw
a more general theory of all nuclear phenomena (which would reveal α
decay to be the real exception).
Heisenberg observed that the main difference between quantum me-
chanics and the nuclear problems was one of scale. At the same time, he
realized that the scale of the nucleus was of the same dimension as both
the classical electron radius (which proved in QED to be the scale of the
electron, below which the theory diverged to infinity) and the Compton
wavelength of the proton (as the proton was the heaviest particle known
at the time, this was the smallest length in which the uncertainty relations
allowed a particle to be localized). These coincidences must have led him
to hardcode this dimension as the dimension of grid cells, for which he had
the freedom to alter laws within their boundaries.
This quantum-nuclear divide is clearly constructed in a way analogous
to the classical-quantum divide: processes of large scale with respect to the
pivotal distance can be described by the former theory, while phenomena
at the scale of this distance obeyed new laws.
At this point Heisenberg needed some formal tool to start exploring this
new level. He did this using the relativistic Klein-Gordon equation for spin-
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less particles29 and hardcoding his cell axiom directly into this equation by
changing the differential equation into a difference equation. It was this
formal “point of attack”, as he called it himself, that led him to deduce the
various results he proposed (Bromberg, 1971, p. 328).
Interestingly, Heisenberg’s strategy, which is part of what Cassidy (1979)
has called his “professional style”, had proven fruitful before: the results
of his first paper on matrix mechanics in 1925 were obtained via a simi-
lar procedure, i.e. using the correspondence relations and hardcoding the
model of virtual oscillators in these formulae (MacKinnon, 1977; Miller,
1984/1986, pp. 135-138). Yet this time, his results were less lasting, and
after realizing that his theory could not stand the test of relativity, he turned
his focus away from nuclear physics, because he lacked a new formal point
of attack (Bromberg, 1971, p. 329). This changed when the neutron was
discovered in 1932, after which he needed only four months to construct
the first proton-neutron model of the nucleus.
7.8 Pauli: a New Elementary Particle as a Nuclear
Constituent
Wolfgang Pauli’s suggested solution for the β puzzle is quite famous be-
cause the canonical history of modern physics has equated the new particle
he envisioned with our neutrino, making of Pauli’s idea a highly original
feat of epiphany that provided the key to the β puzzle – a story spiced up
by the anecdotal details from his original letter addressed to the “Liebe Ra-
dioaktive Damen und Herren” from Tu¨bingen (Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1316).
This outsiders’ perception has, however, been successfully challenged: the
particle Pauli first had in mind was in fact different from what is currently
understood as the neutrino (Brown, 1978; Pais, 1986). Furthermore, while
it is correct to credit him for hypothesizing an as-yet unobserved particle
to solve the β puzzle, the idea he had in mind was not necessarily so new
as is commonly thought. As I will show in this section, it could well have
been an adaptation or variant of Rutherford’s original neutron idea.
Pauli’s famous letter, dated December 4, 1930 (see Figure 7.3),30 in
29Heisenberg at the time, just like Bohr, had issues with Dirac’s infinite sea interpretation
of the relativistic Dirac equation for particles with spin, which might be why he turned to the
older Klein-Gordon equation for this theory.
30Pauli himself made this letter public in a lecture on the history of the neutrino (Pauli,
1957/1964, pp. 1316-1317). The idea must have come to his mind only shortly before this
letter: the first known written reference to it is in the form of a letter from Heisenberg to Pauli
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Figure 7.3: Transcript of the original letter in which Pauli suggested for the
first time the existence of a hitherto unobserved particle. (Retrieved October
21, 2013, from http://physics.stackexchange.com)
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which he presented his “desperate remedy”, was written to a group of ex-
perimentalists – the most important among them being Meitner and Geiger
– who were to hold a seminar in Tu¨bingen three days later, which Pauli was
unable to attend.31 In this letter, Pauli hypothesized an electrically neutral
particle, named the “neutron”, which he conceived as a permanent con-
stituent of the nucleus with spin of 1⁄2. Its velocity, he said, was somewhat
below the speed of light and its mass was relatively small, on the order
of the mass of an electron. This particle was to be kept in the nucleus by
electromagnetic forces, and so must have a magnetic moment.
In the introduction to this letter, Pauli expressed his hope that the dis-
covery of this particle would solve both the β puzzle and the anomalous
spin of the nitrogen nucleus. In other words, just like Bohr, he tried to
solve several nuclear puzzles at once. This might be the reason why his
proposal had characteristics in common with both our present neutron (a
neutral spin-1⁄2 constituent of stable nuclei) and our present neutrino (a
very light spin-1⁄2 particle that carries away the remnant energy in β de-
cay). It was not until the experimental discovery of the ‘heavy’ neutron by
Chadwick in 1932 (which explained the spin of the N nucleus) that Pauli
would finally consider his proposal – renamed the neutrino by Fermi – no
longer as a nuclear constituent but solely as the key to the β puzzle (Brown,
1978, pp. 24-28).
Pauli was at first particularly hesitant about his ideas and well aware
that the lack of experimental evidence could be held strongly against him.
In a letter to Klein one week after his original letter, he wrote that:
So, if the neutrons really existed, it would scarcely be under-
standable that they have not yet been observed. Therefore,
I also do not myself believe very much in the neutrons, have
published nothing about the matter, and have merely induced
three days earlier (Jensen, 2000, p. 153; Pais, 1986, p. 315).
31As the letter states, he was expected to attend a ball the night before – according to Pais
(1986, p. 315), the Italian student ball – at which his presence was “indispensable”. Pais spices
up this story further by revealing that Pauli wrote this letter only one week after his first wife,
to whom he had been married for less than a year, left him. Pauli seems further to have once
referred to the neutrino as that “foolish child of the crisis of my life”, which led Pais to stress
the importance of this anecdotal evidence as follows: “I tend to regard Pauli’s association
between his time of personal turmoil and the moment at which he stated his new postulate
as highly significant. Revolutionary steps were out of line with his general character.” (Pais,
1986, p. 314)
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some experimental physicists to search in particular for this sort
of penetrating particles (Pauli, as cited in Jensen, 2000, p. 154).
However, as he received a “positive and encouraging” answer to his
original letter from Geiger – Pauli puts great emphasis on this support in
his recollections (Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1317) – and given the severity of
the problems, he kept toying with his idea and started lecturing about it
on a trip across America the next summer. In October 1931, while attend-
ing the first nuclear physics conference in Rome, he must have sparked
Fermi to develop his own β decay theory (Brown, 1978, p. 27). However,
until the discovery of Chadwick’s neutron, Pauli’s proposal remained a mi-
nority position, the majority of physicists being convinced by Bohr’s ideas
(Jensen, 2000, p. 155). Only after the 1933 experimental results of El-
lis and Mott did Pauli finally allow the first printed publication of his –
since the discovery of the neutron evolved – idea (in the report of the 7th
Solvay Conference in 1933, reprinted in Brown, 1978, p. 28). Ellis and
Mott’s experiments favored Pauli’s suggestion because they found that the
β spectrum had a sharp upper limit, indicating that something (a particle)
carried away the difference in total energy rather than that the electron
energies were distributed randomly around an average emission energy
(which would be the case in case of non-conservation of energy).
Let us now try to understand how Pauli originally came to his idea.
Clearly, his motivation stems from a serious discontent with Bohr’s thoughts
concerning the non-conservation of energy. In his letter to Klein, quoted
earlier, he made a more elaborate argument against Bohr’s proposal in the
form of a thought experiment:
Imagine a closed box in which there is radioactive β decay;
the β rays would then somehow be absorbed in the wall and
would not be able to leave the box. [...] If the energy law thus
would not be valid for β decay, the total weight of the closed
box would consequently change. (This conclusion seems quite
compelling to me.) This is in utter opposition to my sense of
physics! For then it has to be assumed that even the gravita-
tional field – which is itself generated by the entire box (in-
cluding the radioactive content) – might change, whereas the
electrostatic field, which is measured from the outside, should
remain unchanged because of the conservation of charge. (Yet
both fields seem analogous to me; that, incidentally you will re-
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call from your five-dimensional past.) (Pauli, as cited in Jensen,
2000, p. 153)
The five-dimensional past to which Pauli refers is his own early career
in relativity. At the age of 21, Pauli had written a state of the art overview
of general relativity, which impressed even Einstein (Pais, 2000, p. 215).
Given this, although he does not mention it explicitly in this article, he must
have been aware of Noether’s theorems, which state the correspondence
between conservation laws and the (differentiable) symmetries of fields. In
fact, for this article about relativity Pauli made use of Klein’s notes, which
called attention to these theorems several times (Kosmann-Schwarzbach,
2010, p. 93). Seen from this perspective, Pauli found it unacceptable that
the analogical treatment of the various field symmetries was broken.
This perspective differed significantly from that of most quantum physi-
cists at the time. As Heisenberg recalls in an interview with Thomas Kuhn
in the 1960s:
Much later, of course, the physicists recognized that the conser-
vation laws and the group theoretical properties were the same.
And therefore, if you touch the energy conservation, then it
means that you touch the translation in time. [...] But at the
time, this connection was not so clear. Well, it was apparently
clear to Noether, but not for the average physicist. (Heisenberg,
as cited in Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2010, p. 85)
Pauli was clearly ahead of his time. As one of the few protagonists in quan-
tum physics, he adhered already to a modern ontology that considered
particles and fields (with their symmetries) as the unifying ontological en-
tities.32 For him, conservation laws were not just empirical laws, but struc-
tural relations grounded in his ontology. As such, they could not be refuted
by simple empirical observations.
This analysis concurs with De Regt’s (1999) analysis of the heuristic
methodologies of Pauli and Heisenberg. Based on their earlier work in
the mid-1920s (on the Zeeman effect and matrix mechanics, respectively),
De Regt interpreted the difference between their methods at the level of
their personal philosophies: Pauli was an ontological realist whose opera-
32The present-day day view that even these two basic ontological entities coincide should,
according to Weinberg (1999, p 241), be ascribed to Feynman.
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tionalist methodology placed consistency with other theories and simplify-
ing unification above empirical adequacy, while Heisenberg would be best
described as a kind of pragmatist (although not fully anti-realist), whose
principal aim was to forge mathematical theories that were empirically ade-
quate, even if to do so he had to employ ad hoc strategies (see, for example,
his suggestions concerning the lattice world in Section 7.7).
This ontological necessity of the conservation laws must have triggered
Pauli to think over the nuclear problems himself:
I tried to connect this problem of the nuclear spin and statistics
with the other problem of the continuous beta-spectrum by the
idea of a new neutral particle without abandoning the energy
theorem. (Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1316, my translation)
In essence, the energy conservation theorem is an equation in which the
sum of the measurements before must be balanced with the sum of those
taken after. The abnormal statistics for the N nucleus, too, are basically
an unbalanced spin equation with the sum for the theoretically predicted
particles on one side and the observed total spin on the other. Unbalanced
equations cannot be balanced in so many ways: if one has confidence in
the terms of the equation and their values, the only way to balance it is by
adding to the picture something with appropriate values. In Pauli’s case,
as charge was already conserved, this meant an electrically neutral, spin 1⁄2
nuclear particle (in addition to the already present protons and electrons)
that is, together with an electron, released in β decay with appropriate
momentum and energy.
However, the idea of a new neutral particle was not new: Rutherford
had already, in his Bakerian Lecture (1920), mentioned the possibility of
“an electron to combine much more closely with the H nucleus, forming
a kind of neutral doublet”. Such a neutral particle, which was just one of
the many speculative nuclear composite particles he suggested (Hughes,
2003, p. 362), would have “very novel properties”: “it should be able to
move freely through matter, and its presence would be difficult to detect”
(1920, p. 396). Rutherford, at the time unaware of the strong nuclear
force, thought that such particles were requisite to explain nuclear consti-
tution:
The existence of such atoms seems almost necessary to explain
the building up of the nuclei of heavy elements; for unless we
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suppose the production of charged particles of very high veloc-
ities it is difficult to see how any positively charged particle can
reach the nucleus of a heavy atom against its intense repulsive
field. (Rutherford, 1920, pp. 396-97)
It is my thesis that it is well possible that Pauli, realizing that the pres-
ence of a neutral particle could restore the conservation laws, thought of
Rutherford’s idea and understood that it could, with slightly modified prop-
erties, offer a solution to the problems he was working on. In the remainder
of this section, I will develop several arguments for this speculative thesis.
First, Rutherford’s “neutron” idea remained very much alive before Chad-
wick’s discovery and was part of the research program of the Cavendish
laboratory (Stuewer, 1983, p. 27; Fernandez and Ripka, 2013, p. 253; for
a list of early references to the neutron, see Stuewer, 1983, n. 150); this
notwithstanding that Chadwick’s (1932, p. 698) claim – namely that the
particle he discovered was precisely the particle discussed by Rutherford
in his Bakerian lecture – was also an attempt to gain some prestige for the
Cavendish laboratory in the field of theoretical nuclear physics and raise
some much-needed funds (Navarro, 2004, p. 443; Hughes, 2000, p. 46).
Consider for instance Rutherford and Chadwick’s article of 1929, dis-
cussed in Section 7.4. There, they proposed a hypothesis for the observed
continuous spectra (i.e. that identical nuclei have varying internal ener-
gies) only after
[...] the liberated protons were examined in order to test whether
any particles other than protons were present; for example,
whether the particles of very long range might possibly be ‘neu-
trons’. (Rutherford and Chadwick, 1929, p. 189)
This particular article is mentioned by Bohr to Fowler in a letter concern-
ing the β problem (Jensen, 2000, p. 147), and Heisenberg, too, mentioned
these experiments in a letter to Bohr (Jensen, 2000, p. 148). It is very
plausible that Pauli, who was in both Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s inner corre-
spondence circle (e.g. Bohr’s first attempt to solve the β spectrum was sent
to Pauli) and who regularly visited Copenhagen to discuss the problems
of the day, knew this article, written only one year earlier, or, at the very
least, was familiar with the quest of the Cavendish Laboratory to find a
neutral nuclear constituent or neutron. This puts the following quote from
his original letter in perspective:
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[...] i.e. the possibility that there could exist electrically neu-
tral particles in the nucleus, which I want to call neutrons, and
which have a spin of 1⁄2, obey the exclusion principle, and distin-
guish themselves from light quanta in the fact that they do not
move at the speed of light. (see Figure 7.3; Pauli, 1957/1964,
p. 1316, my translation, emphasis added)
Second, Pauli tells us the following about his views at the time he lec-
tured about them on his American trip in the summer of 1931:
I did not hold them anymore to be nuclear building blocks;
therefore, I no longer called them neutrons, and used no par-
ticular name for them. (Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1316, my transla-
tion, emphasis added)
Apparently, the reason why he called them neutrons was that he thought
they were nuclear constituents. But, even more importantly, Brown (1978,
pp. 24-27) has shown that this statement is wrong and in contradiction
with the recollections of the participants of the 1931 Rome conference and
the newspaper articles detailing Pauli’s American travels. Brown situated
the moment when Pauli changed his mind about whether his particle was a
nuclear constituent in 1932 or 1933, yet did not draw the obvious conclu-
sion: that Pauli thought that his ‘neutron’ was a nuclear constituent until
Chadwick discovered the (heavy) neutron in February 1932. This would
mean that, although he thought that Rutherford was mistaken in regarding
the neutron as a composite particle, he was convinced of its presence in the
nucleus.
Finally, even in his recollections, Pauli links his idea to Rutherford’s by
describing Rutherford’s suggestion in the historical paragraphs before the
earlier quotes. Furthermore, Pauli criticizes Rutherford for taking the neu-
tron to be a close combination of a proton and an electron, and informs
us that this was the reason why Rutherford had no experimental success
in finding neutrons in hydrogen discharges (Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1315).
While this is a correct analysis from a present-day point of view, it could
also reflect Pauli’s thinking in 1930: the main difference between his and
Rutherford’s ideas was that Pauli’s neutron was an elementary particle,
which allowed for a lower mass and explained the half-integer spin (which
all known elementary particles had at the time). It seems possible that
Pauli adopted this idea, i.e. that neutrons, if they existed, would have to be
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elementary particles, in light of the failure of Rutherford’s experiments up
to 1930.
In summary, although I do not deny its somewhat speculative nature,
there is evidence for the thesis that Pauli, consciously or not, thought that
Rutherford’s idea, given its neutral charge and high penetrability, could
be used as the fitting piece to solve the nuclear problems, on condition
that it was not considered to be a proton-electron combination but instead
a truly elementary particle (hence, having spin 1⁄2) of smaller mass. The
idea that there might be two different neutral particles, the neutron and
the neutrino, most likely occurred to him only after the discovery of the
(heavy) neutron by Chadwick in 1932. This thesis, however, demystifies
one of the many stories about epiphany that have entered the canonical
history of science, and supports the more credible view that many new
ideas originate from adapting old ideas for new purposes. After all, the only
difference between Rutherford’s and Pauli’s original idea was a difference
of mass and of its elementary nature (being a spin 1⁄2 particle); Pauli’s idea
had to undergo many more adaptations before it became our current idea
of the neutrino.
7.9 Summary and Conclusions
Let me start by summarizing the six attempts to form an explanatory hy-
pothesis for the anomalous β spectrum discussed above. This will enable
us to draw some general conclusions about these processes and so to link
this case study back to the questions raised in the introduction.
First, I discussed Ellis and Wooster’s suggestion in their seminal paper
about the β spectrum. Making use of Rutherford’s nuclear satellite model,
they stated that the difference between the discrete α spectrum and con-
tinuous β spectrum could be traced back to the nuclear layer in which the
particles originated. Therefore, they put forward the idea that, in addition
to the quantized orbit in which the α particles resided, there was an un-
quantized orbit of β particles and questioned, as a result, the universality
of the quantum postulate. For Ellis and Wooster, this was justified as they
regarded the quantum postulate not as a genuine postulate, but rather as
a phenomenon arising from particles that describe stable orbits.
Second, we considered Rutherford and Chadwick’s ideas. These ex-
perimentalists suggested that the continuous β spectrum was caused by
variations in the internal energy of otherwise identical β nuclei. This idea
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seriously infringed the identity principle, which states that equal particles
(or atoms) are indistinguishable. To reach this radical hypothesis, they
evaluated a spatiotemporal process model of β decay, and realized that the
continuous variations must either have entered in the decay itself or else
have been present from the start. As the former option implied (in the in-
terpretation of their model) that energy was not conserved – something in-
conceivable because of their “experimental bias” – they regarded the latter
option as the more plausible one. Most probably, an analogy with Aston’s
discovery of isotopes a decade earlier at the Cavendish laboratory played a
role in Rutherford and Chadwick’s reasoning.
Next, I discussed Thomson’s account, which is a clear example of how
the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics misled even renowned
physicists in early years. Fully embracing the new formalism and maybe
somewhat blinded by its attractive fruitfulness, he assumed that it also
contained the key to the β puzzle. To solve this puzzle, he actually fol-
lowed a very straightforward pattern of discovery: he visually recognized
a Gaussian curve in the experimental data, and calculated the appropri-
ate parameters for a maximal fit with the quantum mechanical model of a
free particle (which is formulated in terms of Gaussian curves). This iden-
tification and calculation led him to the conclusion that energy was not
conserved in the process (which is, in his account, a natural consequence
of quantum mechanics). Unfortunately, he relied heavily on certain classi-
cal assumptions that rendered his contribution contradictory. However, the
idea that energy is not conserved in β decay proved persistent.
The fourth physicist discussed was Niels Bohr. By considering the suc-
cessful quantum mechanical explanation of α decay (which results in a
mono-energetic spectrum) and recognizing the mechanical equivalence of
α and β decay, Bohr understood that if the β electrons were present in
the nucleus beforehand, then in their case quantum mechanics would also
predict the occurrence of a mono-energetic spectrum. Because this was
(experimentally) not the case, he concluded that the electrons must have
been created in the process of decay. As no physical theory yet existed
for such a process of elementary particle creation, he foresaw the devel-
opment of a new theory, which, if he did not impose energy conservation
on it, would allow him to solve multiple energetic problems in the nucleus
at the same time. Yet as the nuclear model prevalent around 1929, the
p-e model, required the presence of electrons in the nucleus, Bohr first had
to address this apparent contradiction, which he did by means of a typi-
cal Bohr-style conceptual analysis. By this process, which was also at the
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heart of the formulation of his complementarity principle, he was able to
reconcile apparent contradictions and link observations back to classical
concepts.
In discussing Heisenberg, we noted that he turned the debate on its
head, regarding solved problems as in fact anomalies and vice versa. Over-
whelmed by the many problems concerning the nucleus and the formula-
tion of QED, he thought that α decay (for which a sound quantum mechan-
ical explanation existed) was the anomaly for a yet to be constructed theory
of nuclear physics that would explain all problems of the nucleus. Inspired
by the quantum-classical divide, he proposed a new divide between the nu-
clear and the quantum (in his view, the atomic) levels, which allowed him
to construct new laws for this new level via an appropriate correspondence
principle – exactly the same process that led him earlier to the formulation
of his matrix mechanics.
The sixth and final physicist discussed was Pauli, who was put off by
Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s denunciations of energy conservation. Given his
personal history in relativity, he recognized the unifying power of fields as
ontological entities and the consequences of Noether’s theorem. Conserva-
tion laws, therefore, were at the heart of his ontology: as they seemed to
be violated in experiment, he understood that the only option was to add
something to the picture (something not yet observed) in order to balance
them. At the time, Rutherford’s early proposal of the neutron was already
in the air, and it could well be that Pauli, as argued above, used this earlier
idea in a slightly adapted form.
Having thus reviewed the various attempts to solve the β puzzle, and so
completed a case study of genuine variation in different patterns of hypoth-
esis formation, I will now draw some general conclusions by answering the
following two questions, based on the evidence brought forth by the case
study, which reflect the questions raised in the introduction. How did the
scientists in this case study determine which pattern of hypothesis forma-
tion they would employ? And do the patterns of hypothesis formation em-
ployed in this study have any common features that tend to be overlooked
in the literature on hypothesis formation?
The main conclusion of this study is that, in the examined case, the
scientists’ choice of pattern of hypothesis formation was always implicitly
made and directly determined by their personal perspective on their field
and on how the problem at hand should be situated in it. Even when sci-
entists work with the same formalisms and theories, they sometimes have
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different perspectives on how the various elements structurally hang to-
gether, and it is this perspective, which is often based on their personal
experiences, that implicitly determines which patterns of discovery the sci-
entist will judge suitable. In our case study, we saw that Ellis and Wooster’s
idea that the quantum of action resulted from classical stable orbits led
them to doubt the universality of the quantum postulate; that Rutherford
and Chadwick’s experimental bias prevented them from questioning the
laws of conservation, which were at the core of their experimental models;
that G.P. Thomson’s continued adherence to his classical intuitions concern-
ing electrons confused him, and led him to an incoherent conclusion; that
Bohr’s total perspective on science as describing the observational phenom-
ena in everyday concepts informed and motivated his method of tinkering
with higher-level concepts, yet led him to remain hesitant of allowing new
low-level phenomenological models (such as particles); that Heisenberg’s
reversal of solved problems and anomalies cleared an entire field for him,
for which a theory could be constructed; and that Pauli’s ontological per-
spective made him suspicious of all proposals to limit conservation laws.
This idea concurs to a certain extent with Henk De Regt’s (1996) point
that physicists’ philosophical remarks are not of much importance for the
philosophy of science, but can be understood as the justificational grounds
for their research heuristics in confrontation with their contemporaries.33
As a second conclusion, the case study also suggests that individual
real-life scientists apparently do not employ different patterns of hypoth-
esis formation when approaching a single puzzle: they tend to stick to a
pattern that best fits their perspective. This adherence to a certain method
has led many of the involved scientists to important results: Bohr’s com-
plementarity principle, Rutherford’s idea of the neutron and Heisenberg’s
matrix mechanics were all obtained by the same pattern of hypothesis for-
mation as they used in this case. Still, this tendency to adhere to a particu-
lar pattern is certainly not absolute; and none of the scientists involved had
any problem (eventually) acknowledging the subsequent results of others.
Finally, as different as the patterns and motives of these scientists were,
two properties of hypothesis formation patterns tend to appear promi-
nently that are not always adequately appreciated in the literature: the
adaptation of old ideas and the use of visual and intuitive models.
33See also Kojevnikov 2011 on the role of philosophizing for physics professors in the
1930s, the protagonists in this story.
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First, none of the scientists discussed presented a completely new idea;
all adapted an old idea for new purposes or drew an analogy with an ex-
isting idea. Ellis and Wooster reinterpreted Rutherford’s nuclear satellite
model; Rutherford and Chadwick drew an analogy with the research on iso-
topes conducted in their laboratory; G.P. Thomson employed the existing
Gaussian model for a free particle; Bohr had already relied several times
previously on the rejection of energy conservation; Heisenberg constructed
his nuclear-quantum divide by analogy with the quantum-classical divide;
and Pauli could well have been influenced by Rutherford’s older idea of the
neutron.
Second, all of the scientists discussed relied on visual or intuitive mod-
els. Ellis and Wooster’s model was clearly a visual nuclear model; Ruther-
ford and Chadwick used a causal process model, which allowed them to
derive an exhaustive list of possibilities; G.P. Thomson started from a vi-
sual identification of the β spectrum as a Gaussian curve, yet it was also
his visual classical intuitions about trajectories of particles that led him to
misunderstand quantum mechanics; Heisenberg introduced grid cells as
a form of lattice theory; and Pauli adhered to an ontology based on the
symmetries of fields. The only exception here might be Bohr, but if we un-
derstand how he tried to apply (restricted) everyday concepts to physical
phenomena, we realize that what he was doing was exactly re-introducing






In this part, I want to tie the research on hypothesis formation more closely
to the recent literature on scientific methodology and the philosophy of sci-
ence in general. In this literature, substantial progress has been made on
the topic of scientific discovery by paying close attention to the use of mod-
els in science and the practice of model construction. Therefore, if research
on hypothesis formation aims to be relevant for explaining scientific discov-
ery, we first need to understand how these two practices actually relate in
model-based science.
My main goal is to find out how model construction and hypothesis
formation connect in actual scientific practice. I will further show how one
of the conclusions of the previous part, i.e. that scientists adapt old ideas
for new purposes, can be better understood if we describe this practice in
terms of models.
The core assumption at the heart of this part of the dissertation is that
the use of models is a ubiquitous phenomenon in scientific practice, or, in
other words, that it is hard to make sense of science without the concept of
scientific models.
The assumption of the ubiquity of models coincides with the general
consensus in the literature. In Section 1.2, I already noted how scientific
models have received increasing attention in the literature of the philoso-
phy of science in recent decades, and the recognition of their use in science
has elicited many fruitful philosophical questions about their ontological
nature, the nature of their representational relation to the world, and by
virtue of which characteristics models are epistemically capable of leading
us to new scientific knowledge. A further introduction to this general lit-
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erature on the use of models is included in Chapter 9, the more general
chapter of this part.
strengths and weaknesses of the method
For this part, it is not that easy to list in a simple way the various strengths
and weaknesses of the methods applied, as this part does not employ one
specific method but rather a mixture of conceptual analysis and actual case
studies.
Mixing these two methods is clearly a trade-off. No conceptual analysis
will ever cover every case in actual practice, and neither will case studies
alone ever produce concepts sufficiently coherent to allow for conceptual
analysis. Somehow, sufficiently coherent concepts need to be formulated
that still cover as many actual cases as possible.
Yet by mixing these methods in this way, the strongest disadvantages of
the individual methods of conceptual analysis and of historical case stud-
ies (such as, for instance, those mentioned in the introductions to Parts I
and III) are at least somewhat tempered. But the problem of generaliza-
tion from individual cases can also now not be ignored. I deal with this
issue differently in each of the two chapters of this part. Chapter 8 fur-
ther elaborates a part of the case study from Chapter 7, which, as has been
extensively argued, can be considered as an exemplary case. Chapter 9
attempts to show that its analysis of the relation between models and hy-
potheses is generally applicable, by taking three cases from the same field
(astrophysics) with very distinct types of models.
A further advantage of connecting hypothesis formation to the use of
models is that it shows how forms of creative abduction can occur. If one
considers creative abduction merely from the point of view of hypothe-
sis formation, the newly hypothesized concepts or objects often seem to
appear out of nowhere. But in bringing hypotheses in connection with
models, it becomes more clear how, in model-based science, new ideas are
formed.
overview of my contributions
In chapter 8, I elaborate on the case study examined in the previous part
and show how one of its conclusions, i.e. that scientists adapt old ideas for
new purposes, can be better understood if we look at how scientists use
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models and how these models can lead them in particular directions. In
the included case study, I show how the gap in Pauli’s reaction model for
β decay could be filled by adapting Rutherford’s older neutron idea, which
was developed in the context of a completely different model. The concept
of scientific model employed is, although less developed, fully compatible
with the more detailed view of the latter chapter.
In chapter 9, I analyze in great detail the relation between hypotheses
and models in science. After delineating how I understand these concepts,
I start by identifying the various stances that can be found in the present lit-
erature and consider various objections to these. Next, by drawing on three
cases from astrophysics, I first distinguish between two types of hypothe-
ses, heuristic hypotheses and fully interpretable hypotheses, and show how
the relation between models and these two types of hypotheses in actual
scientific practice can be understood.

8The Adaptation of Old Ideas
This piece of history illustrates a general maxim:
that any hypothesis, however absurd, may be useful
in science, if it enables a discoverer to conceive
things in a new way; but that, when it has served
this purpose by luck, it is likely to become an
obstacle to further advance.
— Bertrand Russell, History of Western
Philosophy, 1945
This chapter is based on the paper “Pauli’s Idea of the Neutrino: how Models in
Physics allow to Revive Old Ideas for New Purposes”, published in L. Magnani (ed.),
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology: Theoretical and Cognitive Is-
sues (Gauderis, 2013c). I am indebted to Bert Leuridan and two anonymous referees
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
In this paper, I examine why models have proven to be a key catalyst for many
new ideas and hypotheses in science. More in particular, I identify a third reason why
models can perform such an important heuristic role, apart from the two main reasons
stated in the current literature, namely, that they allow one to mentally simulate many
scenarios and that they facilitate a wide cross-fertilization across various disciplines.
What these two reasons do not focus on is the functional design of models: the fact that
they are designed for a certain purpose. Hence, gaps in models are functional gaps,
which motivate scientists to vigorously explore older ideas (formulated for different
purposes) that can be adapted to fill these gaps. This idea is illustrated by explicating
Pauli’s neutrino suggestion in terms of the used models.
The content of the article is largely retained; although, in order to prevent overlap
with the previous chapter, I have reduced and adapted some parts (especially Section
8.4) and further made some small stylistic corrections.
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8.1 The Heuristic Role of Models in Science
Models perform an important heuristic role in scientific investigation (Red-
head, 1980; Morgan and Morrison, 1999). Their success in this role is
typically accounted for by reference to two widespread practices. On the
one hand, because of their dynamic nature, models allow one to exten-
sively explore and mentally experiment with existing theories. As such,
one can simulate various scenarios and identify and mediate lacunas or
anomalies in a given theory (Morgan and Morrison, 1999, p. 19; Nerses-
sian, 2008, p. 185). On the other hand, many simple abstract models have
been applied to a variety of contexts outside of their original field, a process
that has led to an extensive interdisciplinary cross-pollination.1 This shows
that scientists are actively looking for useful models that can be applied to
problems in their own field.
To this analysis, I want to add a third important heuristic practice in-
volving models. Models have a typical functional structure or, in other
words, they are designed with a certain purpose in mind. This means that
lacunas or gaps in a model are functional, i.e. that the model misses some-
thing that can fulfill a subfunction required by the rest of the model. This
invites the designer to actively explore old ideas (originally formulated for
different purposes) that might serve in a slightly adapted form to fill these
gaps and play the role of the missing cogwheel for the total model’s pur-
pose.
My aim in this chapter is to explicate and illustrate this third practice
(and its relation to the other two) by further exploring Pauli’s 1930 sugges-
tion of the particle later called the neutrino. In Section 7.8, I have argued
that this idea may not have been so original as Pauli thought it was. In fact,
it is perfectly possible to see it as an adaptation of Rutherford’s original idea
of the neutron, proposed in 1920. I will further substantiate this claim by
explicating the problems that both Rutherford and Pauli were working on,
as well as the models they employed for their purposes. This analysis will
interpret this history as an example of how an idea that arose in a certain
program managed to stay alive, even though the program grew obsolete,
and to be picked up ten years later as the missing piece in a model for
1There are numerous examples of this cross-fertilization. Some of the more spectacular
examples are the so-called genetic algorithms in artificial intelligence, which are based on
models of natural evolution (e.g. Goldberg, 1989), the use of Markov chain-models to identify
authors in philological studies (e.g. Khmelev, 2000) and the use of phase transition models
from physics to address problems in the social philosophy of science (e.g. De Langhe, 2013).
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another and much more prominent puzzle in the field.
I will start, in Section 8.2, by expanding on the role of models in scien-
tific discovery in order to show how the three heuristic practices identified
above can be understood in generic terms, although the scope of this anal-
ysis will be restricted to the heuristic use of models in physics. This will
provide us with a conceptual framework to analyze the case study, which
naturally falls into two distinct parts: Rutherford’s reasoning and models
in 1920 (Section 8.3) and Pauli’s reasoning in 1930 (Section 8.4).
8.2 Models and Scientific Discovery in Physics
As some scholars have noted, it is very hard to give a precise definition of a
model, even if we restrict ourselves to models in physics (Hartmann, 1995,
p. 52; Nersessian, 2008, p. 12). Such a definition is here not really needed,
however, and one can content oneself, as Nersessian proposes, with a loose
definition that is sufficient to capture the way physicists think of models.2
From the most general point of view, a model can be conceived as an
abstract imaginary system of interrelated parts that has as a whole certain
distinguishing characteristics. The most important characteristics of mod-
els are (1) their functional design, (2) their representational potential and
(3) their susceptibility to manipulation, all of which are uncontested in the
relevant literature.
Models in science are in the first place functional or, as Morrison and
Morgan state it, are designed or constructed to “function as tools or in-
struments” (1999, p. 11). The purpose of this design can be a variety
of scientific activities such as theory construction, explanation, prediction,
suggesting which data should be collected, etc.3
2In Chapter 9, I craft a more precise definition of a scientific model. Yet, the view de-
veloped in this chapter is compatible with and fits the more refined definition of the next
chapter.
3Epstein (2008) distinguished seventeen different reasons why one should model. Apart
from the most straightforward reasons prediction and explanation, he identifies models also
as a key method for e.g. finding gaps in the data and formulating new research questions.
While models are often constructed for several of these reasons, Epstein convincingly argues
that e.g. models for prediction and explanation are typically of a different nature. Not all of his
seventeen reasons, however, will necessarily motivate directly the design of particular models.
His paper aims mostly to convince scientists in fields where models are less common, and
some of his reasons such as “teaching us a scientific outlook” are little more than interesting
qualities that result from the regular use of models.
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The main reason why models can function as a tool for all these pur-
poses is their second property: they are meant to represent certain fea-
tures of the world, or as Nersessian explains it, “they are designed to be
structural, functional or behavioral analogues of their target phenomena”
(2008, p. 12).
Finally, the reason why models can be considered to be tools is their
susceptibility to manipulation, and in this they distinguish themselves from
mere representative descriptions. The design of a model is such that one
can interact with it mentally by manipulating certain features, adjusting
certain parameters or adding or removing certain parts, all of which repre-
sent interventions in the target field (Morrison and Morgan, 1999, p. 12).4
With this characterization in mind, we can explain how models play a
role in the three heuristic activities identified in the introduction. When a
scientist is confronted with a new target phenomenon or a collection of ex-
perimental data,5 she can try to structure this data by constructing a model.
She does not have to start this activity from scratch. Generally, some ini-
tial constraints are available from a general theory or from some related
models. For example, if a researcher tries to construct a model for a partic-
ular type of nuclear reaction, initial constraints are raised by her model of
nuclear constitution and by certain general theories, such as quantum me-
chanics. Still, it is obvious that there are no clear algorithms at this stage
and model construction, here, is more a matter of skill. In the literature,
this activity has been described as constructing with bits from different
sources (Morrison and Morgan, 1999, pp. 15-16), as matching representa-
tions to mathematical structures (Czarnocka, 1995, p. 30) and as construct-
ing a hybrid between target and source domains (Nersessian, 2008, p. 28).
The common denominator is that modelling is a piecemeal assembly pro-
cess. This assumes that scientists have certain simple blueprints at hand,6
simple mathematical models and structures that they have acquired over
the years and which they can combine with theory, experimental data and
various representations. The so-called model constructing skills consist,
then, in maintaining and expanding such a set of blueprints; and applying
4Because of this feature, the use of models has received a central place in the intervention-
ist view of science, going back to Hacking and Cartwright (Cartwright, Shomar and Sua´rez,
1995).
5For the distinction between phenomena and data, see Bogen and Woodward (1988);
Woodward (1989); Glymour (2000); Massimi (2007, 2011); Woodward (2011).
6My use of the notion ‘blueprint’ is not exactly the same as that of Cartwright (2007),
when she uses this notion in the context of models.
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this set to various problems is exactly the second heuristic practice that I
have identified.
Second, the susceptibility of models to manipulation allows scientists
to simulate and explore within the constraints imposed on the model both
by its internal (formal) coherence and by their knowledge of the target
domain. This hybrid construction gives the models a relative autonomy,
which allows scientist to identify lacunas and anomalies both in the theory
and in the model itself – the first heuristic practice stated above.
Now we can specify the third practice that makes models such a useful
heuristic tool. The functional design of a model ensures that every part of
the model has its own function. As such, if a lacuna is identified in a model,
it will be a functional lacuna, i.e. the model will be missing something that
can fulfill a function required by the rest of the model. Researchers can try
to form their own original ideas to fill these gaps, but, as the case study
will exemplify, researchers generally browse their field for ideas that have
the requisite properties. This is a different activity than the use of vari-
ous models from other fields. Where, in this latter activity, the abstract
structure of the model is borrowed and completed by adjusting the repre-
sentational elements to objects in the field the researcher is working in, in
the former activity, the researcher actively pursues ideas from her own field
that were proposed for different purposes or problems, some of which may
have already become obsolete.
To sum up, I have identified three scientific heuristic practices involving
models, which explain why the use of models is heuristically so successful.
First, models can be applied, by virtue of their partly formal structure, to
many problems situated in other fields, or at least shed some initial light
on these problems. Second, they allow for dynamic simulation on the basis
of which researchers can explore the various combinations of the model’s
parameters. Third, because of their functional design they invite scientists
to actively reconsider old ideas in order to spot an idea that has the right
characteristics to fulfill a particular function in the grand design of the
model.
In order to apply these concepts to the case study, I will first explain my
view on the two types of models that will be discussed in it, i.e. constitution
models and reaction/process models. Constitution models are the oldest
type of physical models and relate to ancient philosophical questions about
the nature of things. The main purposes of these models are explanatory:
by specifying the various parts and the total structure of the target phe-
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nomenon, one aims to explain certain properties of the whole, such as, for
instance, its stability or fluidity. As process and reaction models started to
emerge only since the scientific revolution, they are much younger types of
models. Their main purpose has been not so much to explain the nature
of the represented changes, but rather to explicate the necessary condi-
tions and the results to be expected. Experimentalists have used them as a
guideline to manipulate and control physical reality. In other words, these
types of models are primordially designed for prediction, not explanation.
At the same time, the scientific revolution and these experimental models
put more stringent conditions on the older constitution models: they had
to become compatible with (most of) the process and reaction models of
the target phenomenon and their descriptions had to be limited to qualities
that are in principle testable. Therefore, constitution models in physics are
generally limited to describing the various subentities and specifying the
forces or mechanistic properties that keep them together. Still, their main
purpose remains explanatory as they are not strictly needed for prediction.
Both types of models are dynamic in nature and allow the scientist to
interact with their various parts. For constitution models, this dynamics
lies mostly in the possibility of exploring what combinations of subentities
can possibly exist. To discuss the dynamics, I need to distinguish between
process and reaction models. I view reaction models as models that take
the represented change to occur instantaneously, e.g. models for radioac-
tive decay or chemical reactions. In contrast with process models, which
represent a gradual or stage-based change of the target phenomenon, reac-
tion models represent only the initial situation and the resultant situation,
considering the change as something that has happened at a certain point
in between. The main goal of these models is to specify, apart from the
conditions under which the reaction can take place, which characteristics
and entities are conserved and how the non-conserved properties change.
Their main dynamics lies in the fact that one can mentally explore various
situations to picture what the result of the reaction would be. Process mod-
els, which do not occur in the case study, draw one’s attention rather to the
change of the target phenomenon itself, and enable scientists to simulate
various scenarios of how they might control or accommodate this process.
By ascribing different purposes to these different types of models, while
still assuming their compatibility, I take models to be more or less au-
tonomous but related to each other. The autonomy of the models’ pur-
poses is also one of the reasons why Morgan and Morrison (1999) consider
models to be independent of physical theories, the other reason being that
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also the construction of models happens more or less autonomously from
theory, or, as Cartwright (1999) states it: “Theories do not provide us with
algorithms for the construction of models, they are not vending machines
into which one can insert a problem and a model pops out”. This rela-
tive autonomy will also help us to understand the role of theories such as
quantum mechanics and classical electrodynamics in the case study. The
semantic view (in which theories are superfluous families of models) and
syntactic view (in which the logically structured theory carries all scientific
value) are both too restricted to capture how theories and models func-
tion in the endeavors of scientists.7 Cartwright (1983) has described the
laws in a theory as “schemata that need to be concretized and filled in
with the details of a specific situation, which is a task that is accomplished
by a model”; and models, that may have been initially constructed in the
framework of a theory, can develop their own dynamics, which might lead
to the suggestion to withdraw a certain aspect of the theory (e.g. Bohr’s
suggestion to withdraw the energy conservation theorem, see Section 7.6).
8.3 Case Study A: Rutherford’s idea of the Neutron
In this and the next section, I take on the challenge of explicating how
my claim of Section 7.8, i.e. that Pauli’s suggestion might well have been
an adaptation of Rutherford’s older neutron idea, should be understood in
terms of the characteristics of the models both physicists employed. The
case study naturally falls into two parts. I will first, in this section, explain
Rutherford’s project around 1920, and show how the idea of the neutron
emerged from his model. In the next section, I will then consider Pauli’s
idea, which was presented in a completely different context, and show how
the model he had in mind led him to think that the neutron might be the
solution.
As described in Section 7.8, Rutherford suggested the idea of the neu-
tron for the first time in his Bakerian lecture (1920). The main reason why
he believed this idea to be valuable was that he thought that its existence
“seems almost necessary to explain the building up of the nuclei of heavy
elements” (p. 397). Translated into our present conceptual framework,
Rutherford perceived an incompatibility between his constitution model of
atomic nuclei and the theory of classical electromagnetism, because the
laws of the latter do not allow for the building up of the more heavy nu-
clei. This had led him to investigate further the constitution of nuclei,
7See Frigg and Hartmann (2012) for an excellent summary of these two points of view.
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partly by actual experiments, partly by mental simulation of the model. It
was exactly this type of mental simulation of the various possibilities that
convinced him that there possibly existed a neutron, although his concep-
tion of it was totally different from our current understanding. The fact
that this idea, yielded by simulation of the model, could fill the functional
gap in the model convinced him of the soundness of this idea, a conviction
that inspired him to look tenaciously for experimental proof over the next
ten years. Finally, in 1932, his close collaborator Chadwick managed to
assemble sufficient evidence to confirm its official discovery.
Let us first explain Rutherford’s nuclear model. Like many of his con-
temporaries, he believed that the nucleus consisted of “electrons and posi-
tively charged bodies” such as helium and hydrogen nuclei (p. 377). But, as
he had already suggested in 1914, the assembly of these positively charged
bodies can ultimately be considered a combination of positively charged hy-
drogen or H nuclei (which gradually came to be called “positive electrons”
or protons) and negatively charged electrons, which were kept together by
the electromagnetic force – the so-called p-e model (see Section 7.2.2).8
Yet although this model was at the time the only viable one, given
the common ontology of the day, it faced severe difficulties.9 As Ruther-
ford mentions, the apparent lack of magnetic moment of the intranuclear
electrons hints that these electrons must be somewhat “deformed” (1920,
p. 378) and that they are in no sense comparable to the extranuclear elec-
trons orbiting the nucleus. But his main problem was the constitution of
large nuclei. As soon as a nucleus contained a certain number of pro-
tons, the combined repelling Coulomb force would be just too large to let
another proton come close enough to swallow it. Rutherford was vividly
aware of this problem, as observed it on a daily basis in his experiments.
While he found it possible to shoot lighter elements with α particles or
He nuclei, initiating a collision, he found it impossible to penetrate larger
8Hanson (1963, pp. 157-159) explains the fact that for a long time scientists refused to
consider any other elementary particle besides protons and electrons by pointing to the fact
that these two particles were at the same time considered to be the elementary subunits of
the two types of electrical charge. As there was no other type of electricity, there was no
reason to presuppose another elementary particle. See also my analysis in Section 7.2.2 of
the self-evidence of this model.
9At this point, I only mention problems that were already known in 1920. The more
famous problems for this p-e model, which I have discussed in Section 7.2.3, such as its use of
the wrong type of statistics for the nitrogen nucleus and the Klein paradox, arose only during
the 1920s.
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nuclei due to their high electrostatic repulsive forces.10 It was exactly be-
cause part of the α particles were repelled from the gold foil in the famous
Rutherford-Mardsen-Geiger experiments of 1909 that Rutherford had in-
ferred the existence of the nucleus in the first place.
Rutherford thought he could cope with these problems by assuming cer-
tain substructures in the nucleus. Nuclei were not just a heap of protons
and electrons that all attract each other more or less equally. He thought
that protons and electrons were bounded in small stable substructures,
which in turn were grouped together to form the full nucleus. The rea-
son why he (and the physics community in general) had this idea was the
remarkable stability of the α particle. In experiments it turned out to be
impossible to break up this element by collisions (1920, p. 379). It was also
observed as an independent structure in α decay, which led several physi-
cists to assume that it was part of the nucleus as such. Around 1920, it was
Rutherford’s main experimental program to find more stable combinations
such as the α particle to complete the nuclear constitution model. Because
he was not able to reach the nucleus of heavier elements with α particles,
he conducted experiments mainly on the lighter elements (nitrogen, oxy-
gen, carbon) in order to produce collisions and study the remaining parts.
His first discovery were H nuclei or protons (Rutherford, 1919). This was
important because, although it was generally assumed that protons existed
independently in the nucleus, it was “the first time that evidence had been
obtained that hydrogen is one of the components of the nitrogen nucleus.”
(p. 385), and that, hence, the p-e model had some experimental ground.
Second, he discovered a certain atom, which he called 32X, with atomic
mass 3 and nuclear charge 2, which made it “reasonable to suppose that
atoms of mass 3 are constituents of the structure of the nuclei of the atoms
of both oxygen and nitrogen.” (1920, p. 391)
In order to figure out the substructure of this X atom, Rutherford rea-
soned that “from the analogy with the He nucleus, we may expect the
nucleus of the new atom to consist of three H nuclei and one electron”
(p. 396), which made this atom a snug fit in the p-e model. But when he
realized that this means that a single intranuclear electron can bind three
protons,11 it appeared to him “very likely that one electron can also bind
10This also nicely illustrates that Rutherford perceived experimental data, models and the-
ories all as more or less autonomous entities that should be made compatible with each other.
11An atom with a single intranuclear electron had not yet been observed so far: hydrogen
had, according to the p-e model, no intranuclear electrons, while the next element in the
periodic table, helium, already had two.
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two H nuclei and possibly also one H nucleus” (p. 396). In other words,
by mentally exploring what is also reasonable to expect according to the
p-e model, he came to the idea of a close binding of one proton and one
electron, an “atom of mass 1 and zero nucleus charge”. He expected this
combination, which he started to call the neutron only later on, to be a
very stable entity with “very novel properties”. Because there would be
hardly any electromagnetic field associated with this neutral combination,
it would be able to travel rather freely through matter. Therefore, it might
reach the nucleus of heavy atoms without suffering from a repelling force,
where “it may either unite with the nucleus or be disintegrated by its in-
tense field” (1920, p. 396).
The thought process by which Rutherford came to the idea of the neu-
tron is highly intriguing, because hardly any part of it is still acceptable
according to our present standards: the p-e model is plainly wrong; later
experiments did not confirm the existence of the X atom; the whole idea
that there exist certain substructures in the nucleus is flawed; and above all,
according to our present understanding, it is absolutely untrue to consider
a neutron as a combination of a proton and an electron.12 Still, judged
in light of Rutherford’s background knowledge, his thought process is a
very sane and sound piece of reasoning in which he improved his consti-
tution model by combining experimental data with mental simulation of
his model. And, although Pais (1986, p. 231) claims that this whole search
program for atomic substructure has left no mark on physics, I have argued
that this program did indeed lead to a valuable idea, which is not only the
forerunner of our current neutron, but possibly also, as I will show in the
next section, of our current neutrino.
8.4 Case Study B: Pauli’s idea of the Neutrino
As explained in Section 7.8, Pauli’s suggestion was an attempt to answer
two experimental anomalies: the continuous β spectrum, the severity of
which led Debye to say at the time that “it is better not to think about it
at all, just like new taxes” (cited in Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1316; see Figure
7.3), and the integer spin of nitrogen nuclei.
12The idea that neutrons were not close combinations of protons and electrons took some
time to gain traction. Even when Chadwick discovered the neutron in 1932, and Heisenberg
published four months later the first proton-neutron constitution model of the nucleus, they
did not consider the neutron already as an elementary particle (Bromberg, 1971).
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Let us first try to understand these problems in terms of the models in
which they were formulated and of Pauli’s perspective on them. This will
allow us then to explain how Rutherford’s older idea could be adapted to
fit the gaps in Pauli’s models.
Like all of his contemporaries, Pauli saw radioactive decay in terms of
a reaction model (as defined in Section 8.2) in which an unstable nucleus
(the initial situation) decayed spontaneously into a remnant nucleus and
an emitted α or β particle plus some γ radiation (the resultant situation).
For α particles, this model preserves both energy and electric charge dur-
ing the reaction, but for β decay, the surprising continuity of energies in
the resultant situation had already led to some very radical ideas such as
that this continuity already existed in the initial situation (Rutherford and
Chadwick, see Section 7.4) or that this model should be relieved of its
energy conservation constraint (Bohr, see Section 7.6). It was this final
suggestion that triggered Pauli’s engagement with this problem, as he con-
sidered, given his ontological views (see Section 7.8), retracting the energy
conservation constraint as a bridge too far.
In 1930, the accepted model for atomic constitution was still the p-e
model, yet its problems had only grown larger since 1920 (see also Section
7.2.3). In 1926, experimental research proved the spin of nitrogen nuclei
to be integer. Yet, according to the p-e model, which defines the total spin
of a nucleus as the sum of the spin of its constituents, the 147 N nucleus
consists of 14 protons and 7 electrons, and should, hence, have in total a
half-integer spin, as both protons and electrons have spin 1⁄2. This anomaly
hit the p-e constitution model right at its core: it seemed impossible that
nuclei were constituted only by protons and electrons.
As Pauli stated, he tried to address these problems by connecting them
(Pauli, 1957/1964, p. 1316). From an experimental perspective, this is no
mere trivial connection. β decay was studied in the context of radioac-
tivity, which focused typically on heavy elements. For instance, the initial
β spectrum by Ellis and Wooster was established for what was called at
the time Radium E (nowadays 21083 Bi, an unstable isotope of bismuth). Yet
from the perspective of a theoretical physicist like Pauli, who focused on
the involved models, the sizes or types of the involved nuclei do not matter
much. As radioactivity was conceived as a reaction model involving nuclei
in both the initial and resultant situations, it could easily be brought into
connection with the constitution model for any nucleus, as the latter model
must apply to all nuclei in the reaction model.
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Each of these connected models had a gap, which could be solved in
only a very limited number of ways. For the radioactivity model, given that
for Pauli the conservation of energy must apply, either the energy of the nu-
clei must be continuously varying in the initial situation, or else something
energetic was not included in the resultant situation. As Pauli deemed the
first option (Rutherford and Chadwick’s road) to be impossible, he was
obliged to accept a lacuna in the resultant situation of his model. Con-
cerning the constitution model for atomic nuclei, Pauli could, by mentally
manipulating the model, see that there was, mathematically speaking, no
possible combination of protons and electrons that could yield the right
nuclear mass, charge and spin for all types of nuclei. As both protons and
electrons have been experimentally discovered in nuclear experiments, and
as elementary particles were considered to be indestructable, Pauli could
only acknowledge that this constitution model was missing something that
carried some spin. Combining these models, he was left with a process
model for radioactivity that had two gaps: some spin was missing in the ini-
tial situation and some energy was missing in the resultant situation. The
simplest assumption was to assume that it was the same that was missing.
It now appears straightforward to conclude that, if Pauli had come to
realize all this, it would have been just a small step for him to hypothesize
an electrically neutral particle (as charge was conserved) with the requisite
spin, energy and momentum to fit these models. However, considering
this as a simple move is viable only from our present-day perspective; it
would be a historical fallacy to characterize it as ‘simple’ in the case of
Pauli. It is true that in our present-day ontology of fields and particles as
their manifestations, a missing or unobserved particle is a straightforward
hypothesis for any deviating characteristic. But in Pauli’s time, there was
a great reluctance to accept the idea of new particles and, even though
Pauli had a quite modern field concept, the connection between particles
and radiation was not yet fully understood (as the concepts of fields and
particles had not yet been unified).
That Pauli filled these connected lacunas by suggesting an electrically
neutral particle makes a lot more sense if we know that, at the time Pauli
was confronted with these incomplete models, there was a well-known
hypothesis in circulation about an electrically neutral constituent of the
nucleus, which was hard to detect and the object of a great deal of exper-
imental research effort. Hypothesizing a neutral nuclear constituent could
fill both gaps in Pauli’s models if it was, unlike the Rutherford neutron,
conceived as an elementary particle, and hence as having spin 1⁄2. In Sec-
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tion 7.8, I presented various reasons why this may indeed actually have
been how Pauli came to his idea, although I do not claim this to be factu-
ally proven.
But even without decisive factual evidence, if we explain the problem
that Pauli was trying to solve in terms of the functional gaps in his models,
it becomes clear that making the mental leap to the idea of a fitting neutral
particle would have been easier if he had already encountered and thought
about the other hypothesized neutral particle being considered at the time,
which proved to be so hard to detect. Although it had been suggested
in a completely different context and was aimed at another purpose, its
properties made it suddenly a viable candidate to fill the functional gap of
these new problems. The only thing Pauli had to do was conceive it as an
elementary particle, such that it had spin 1⁄2 and could have a mass that
was lower than a proton-electron combination.
Aftermath In 1932, Chadwick, a close collaborator of Rutherford at the
Cavendish laboratory, announced the experimental discovery of the (heavy)
neutron. In his article (1932) he stated explicitly that what he had found
was the particle Rutherford envisioned in his Bakerian Lecture in 1920.
This discovery was directly accepted by the physics community, and gave
rise to the first proton-neutron models of the nucleus later that year, which
were able to explain the anomalous statistics of nitrogen nuclei. Pauli’s
hypothesized particle, however, remained alive as a hypothesis for the β-
spectrum, and was dubbed the “neutrino” by Fermi in 1933 to distinguish
it from Chadwick’s discovery. As it was no longer necessary that the neu-
trino was a nuclear constituent (as the problem of the anomalous spin had
been solved by the neutron), it could now be conceived as a product of β
decay. Also, an experimentally improved measurement of the β spectrum
showed a shape that favored Pauli’s hypothesis over Bohr’s suggestion to
give up energy conservation (Brown, 1978). From this point on, Pauli’s so-
lution drew more and more adherents, while Pauli himself connected this
idea also with the conservation of angular momentum in β decay and the
problems of Dirac’s ‘hole theory’ (Massimi, 2005, pp. 133-134). Finally,
in 1934, Fermi’s model for β decay, which incorporated Pauli’s neutrino,
provided a solution to these various related problems. Consensus soon fol-
lowed, and Bohr himself admitted defeat in 1936. Experimental evidence
for the neutrino, in any case, was not found until 1956.
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8.5 Conclusion
In explaining the utility of using models for heuristic purposes, the func-
tional design of models is often left out of the picture. In this chapter, I
have shown by means of a conceptual analysis and consideration of a de-
tailed historical case that precisely this functional design of models forces
researchers to vigorously explore old ideas in order to adapt them for their
current purposes. In light of this, I have identified a third practice – in addi-
tion to the often-mentioned mental simulation of various scenarios and the
wide cross-fertilization between different fields – that explains the heuristic
success of models. At the same time, it provides a template for understand-
ing how certain forms of creative abduction can occur.
Old ideas are often reused, generally adapted or employed as analogies
or metaphors. The case study in this chapter explains in detail how Pauli
could fill the functional gap in his model for radioactive β decay by adapt-
ing an old idea that figured in Rutherford’s atomic constitution model. But
not only entities or objects can serve as ideas to be adapted for new pur-
poses; this is illustrated by Bohr’s suggestions that the energy conservation
principle be retracted. At least twice before, he had used this same idea to
solve a certain puzzle, each time with a completely different purpose.
Although it is in many cases impossible to tell, without a detailed case
study, whether a given case of hypothesis formation concerns the use of an
old idea or whether one came independently to the same idea, there is no
reason to suspect that most of these ideas were original. In light of this,
if we want to understand how scientists use models and reuse them, it is
important to be aware of how models invite scientists by their functional
structure to actively explore old ideas in order to adapt them for their own
purposes. Further case studies and formal analyses are needed, however,
to understand the implications of this for our current methodologies.
9Models and Hypotheses
Imagination creates events.
— Giovanni Francesco Sagredo,
letter to Galileo, 1612
This chapter is based on the article “Models and Hypotheses”, which is currently
under review (Gauderis, 2014b). I am indebted to Bert Leuridan and various other
members of the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts and presentations.
In this article, I have studied in depth the relation between models and hypotheses
in scientific practice. This analysis is based on an overview of the various stances that
have been developed in the literature as well as on three case studies from astrophysics,
which have allowed me to develop my own view on the matter, i.e. that, in model-
based science, hypothesis formation and model construction are mutually dependent
and supportive practices for scientific discovery.
The content of the original article is largely retained, except for some minor stylistic
adaptations.
9.1 Introduction
As a result of a shift in focus in the philosophy of science from dealing
largely with issues of scientific confirmation towards studying actual sci-
entific practices and the questions they give rise to, philosophical interest
in the use of models in science has steadily increased in recent decades.
Although early interest was mostly fueled by adherents of the so-called se-
mantic and structuralist views of theories,1 who tried to tailor their formal
1Until the 1970s, the received view of theories (also called the syntactic view) maintained
the Euclidean or Aristotelian ideal of a theory as a set of axioms and a suitable logic to infer
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analyses towards the type of models actually used by scientists, it is now
recognized that the structural set-theoretical meaning of models is best not
equivocated with the actual practices of model-based science,2 which elicit
many ontological and epistemological questions in their own right. The
study of these questions in relation to many actual scientific cases has led
many to appreciate that much of science can be adequately described as
model-based science, which should not be seen so much as a division be-
tween the various disciplines as rather a strategy that any discipline can
employ to address theoretical scientific research (Godfrey-Smith, 2006).
The construction, manipulation and refinement of models are also now
generally considered to be key scientific practices (Frigg and Hartmann,
2012).
The recognition of the use of models in science has elicited a substan-
tial amount of research to clarify the relation between this rather new ad-
dition to the jargon of scientific methodology and older inhabitants of this
conceptual jungle, such as the relation between models and theories (e.g.
the semantic view, Giere 1988), models and discovery (Redhead, 1980;
Morrison and Morgan, 1999), models and laws (Cartwright, 1983; Giere,
1999a) and models and data (Suppes, 1962; Harris, 2003). Yet, no sub-
stantial attention has been paid so far to the relation between models and
hypotheses in science. The main reason why this relation has been left
unattended may have to do with the fact that models and hypotheses are
generally considered to belong to the jargon of two mutually exclusive con-
ceptions of the scientific method, i.e. the inductive (model-based) view and
the hypothetico-deductive view.3
In this chapter, I investigate how hypotheses and models relate in actual
model-based scientific practice, show that both are necessary concepts in
all true sentences in an ideal scientific language, supplemented with a set of correspondence
rules to link theoretical terms to empirical observations. The heavy language-dependency of
this view has led various scholars to develop the so-called semantic view of theories, in which
theories are equated with a class of models, abstract mathematical structures for which the
theory is true (Suppes, 1960; Suppe, 1977, 1989; Van Fraassen, 1980). A related, structuralist
view of scientific theories was developed by, among others, Balzer et al. (1987). For a recent
paper incorporating these structuralist ideas, see Leuridan (2013).
2The two main arguments for this distinction are that many models from actual scientific
practice cannot be accommodated within the set-theoretical view of models (Downes, 1992)
and that, while the semantic view aims to analyze all of science in terms of models, not all ac-
tual scientific practice relies on the manipulation of models (Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Weisberg,
2007).
3This position is advanced, for instance, in the article of Glass and Hall (2008) that I
discuss in Section 9.3.3.
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understanding this practice, and show that they are mutually supportive.
Apart from touching upon recent debates in the literature on models, such
as those concerning the nature of their representational function and their
construction, this research will reinstate a modernized concept of a scien-
tific hypothesis, in line with model-based scientific practice, by shrugging
off some of the unrealistic intuitions with which it has been burdened by
the old Popperian hypothetico-deductive view.
After delineating my precise usage of the main concepts of this chapter
(Section 9.2), I will identify four stances on the relation between hypothe-
ses and models by examining the scattered remarks that have been made in
the literature and considering what objections might threaten these stances
(Section 9.3). Then, I will look into actual scientific practice and present
three case studies to expose the nature of the interplay between models and
hypotheses (Section 9.4). This will allow me to develop my own account
of how hypotheses and their role should be understood in the context of
model-based science (Sections 9.5 and 9.6).
9.2 Some Conceptual Issues
Before I present the main arguments of this chapter, some preliminaries are
in order concerning its scope and topic. More specifically, as ‘model’ and
certainly ‘hypothesis’ are often used as umbrella terms and as their meaning
is often thought to be more or less self-evident, I need to specify more
precisely the kind of hypotheses and models this chapter will deal with.
Unavoidably, this requires a trade-off between catching as much as possible
of the actual usage of these concepts in scientific practice and defining
sufficiently coherent concepts to allow for analysis.
Scientific Hypotheses I take scientific hypotheses to be (1) statements (2)
about the empirical world (3) that have an unknown or underdetermined
truth status and (4) are advanced as a tentative answer to a particular
research question.
Let me expand on each part of this characterization. First, scientific
hypotheses are linguistic statements or propositions, by virtue of which it
always makes sense to talk about their truth status.
Second, this chapter focuses only on hypotheses that make reference to
the empirical world. This excludes, along with mathematical conjectures,
also hypotheses that refer exclusively to parts of and relations within a
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particular model. Studying the internal properties of scientific models is
an important aspect of theoretical science, but conjectures of this kind are
generally not what scientists refer to with the notion ‘scientific hypothesis’.4
Third, although it makes sense to speak (typically in retrospect) of con-
firmed hypotheses, it is assumed that hypotheses are not known to be true.
Yet this does not exclude that scientists can have a firm and even justified
belief in them, certainly in later stages of research. Also, and although this
move may be less commonly accepted as it drastically extends a Popperian
notion of hypothesis, I do not assume that hypotheses are fully determined
or have an unambiguous reference. As the case studies in this chapter
show, many actual hypotheses in early stages of research unavoidably have
ambiguous or vague references. It is only afterwards, when the conceptual
apparatus, requisite models and governing conditions have been developed
in subsequent stages of research, that the intended hypothesis can be for-
mulated unambiguously.
Finally, scientific hypotheses are not mere conjectural statements; they
are advanced in an attempt to answer particular research questions. In
other words, they are truth-purposive. Scientists advance them with the
purpose of finding the answer to a research question by trying to deter-
mine the suggested hypotheses’ truth value, even if they know that any
particular hypothesis can be rejected or refined later on. Importantly, it is
not required that hypotheses be compatible with the agent’s background
knowledge: many valuable truth-purposive hypotheses presented in his-
tory have firmly contradicted large portions of the adopted set of beliefs
or (assumed) knowledge of those who suggested them. In such cases, the
agent thought that pursuing the truth value of the hypothesis he had in
mind might anyway lead to certain answers to his research question, even
when he was well aware that parts of his background knowledge would
need revision if this particular hypothesis turned out to be true.
With this final condition, I have excluded a large class of hypotheses
4This relates to Contessa’s (2010) distinction between external sentences (e.g. “The emis-
sion spectrum of hydrogen can be calculated with the Bohr model”) and internal sentences
(e.g. “In the Bohr model of the atom, electrons orbit around the nucleus in well-defined or-
bits”). I consider scientific hypotheses to be external, while internal sentences belong to the
model itself or a description of it. (On a side note, I disagree with Contessa (2010, p. 223)
when he states that the electrons orbit in well-defined orbits in Rutherford’s 1911 model:
Rutherford assumed only that the extra-nuclear charge was uniformly distributed throughout
a sphere (Rutherford, 1911, p. 671); well-defined electron orbits appeared only earlier in Na-
gaoka’s speculative 1904 model (also called the Saturnian Model) and afterwards in the 1913
Bohr model.)
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from my characterization of scientific hypotheses: explicit counterfactuals
and belief-negating hypotheses. Although these truth-denying hypotheses
have their role in science by virtue of, for instance, thought experiments
(De Mey, 2006), I consider them fundamentally different from the truth-
purposive hypotheses this chapter deals with, as (a) their truth value is
explicitly known or believed to be false and (b) they neither provide a
direct answer to any particular question, nor are they aimed to determine
their truth value (as it is already assumed to be false). Their purpose is
generally to set up a line of reasoning that can lead to certain sought-
for answers via a detour, such as a thought experiment or a reductio ad
absurdum argument.5
Scientific Models I take scientific models to be (1) abstract or concrete
artifacts (2) purposefully created in order to be manipulated to perform
particular scientific tasks (such as prediction or explanation) by exploiting
certain representational relations.
Although this characterization is in line with much of the actual use
of the notion ‘(scientific) model’ by scientists and with the contemporary
literature on models,6 I have made some restricting choices.
First, ontologically, I consider models to be either concrete or abstract
models, yet my focus will be on the abstract type. It is commonly ac-
cepted that the human imagination can create such things as abstract ob-
jects and that many scientific models, such as the ideal pendulum or the
Bohr model of the atom, should be understood as such. But the consen-
sus ends here,7 and the concept ‘abstract artifacts’ is still burdened with
5My distinction between truth-purposive and truth-denying hypotheses relates to Rescher’s
(1964) classic distinction between hypotheses with an unknown truth status, on the one hand,
and belief-negating hypotheses and counterfactuals, on the other. However, there is one
caveat: Rescher operates in a logical framework (which assumes logical omniscience). There-
fore, for Rescher, it makes no difference whether the agent explicitly believes (or knows) that
the hypothesis is false, or that this is only a consequence of her set of beliefs (or knowledge).
For my purposes, this distinction does matter. A hypothesis is truth-denying only if the agent
explicitly believes (or knows) that it is false. When the agent thinks it might be true, it is
truth-purposive, even if it is in contradiction with his set of beliefs (or knowledge). This situ-
ation actually occurs frequently in science: as many problems are overdetermined, scientists
are often willing to accept that part of their set of beliefs (or assumed knowledge) is wrong
in advancing a new hypothesis.
6This characterization is inspired by, amongst others, the views of Giere (2004, 2010);
Hughes (1997); Teller (2001); Bailer-Jones (2003); Nersessian (2008); Knuuttila (2011), and
fits the accounts of actual scientists reporting on their use of models (Bailer-Jones, 2002).
7Current debates focus mostly on the relation between scientific models and other abstract
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metaphysical riddles.8 However, as we are concerned with scientific prac-
tice, we can content ourselves that, even if an adequate account of abstract
artifacts is hard to achieve, abstract artifacts do exist as such in the folk on-
tology of scientists. Actual scientists do talk about models as if they were
abstract artifacts. So, even if it turns out that our analysis is confined to the
folk ontology of scientists, it can still give us some insights into scientific
practice itself, precisely because this practice is framed in terms of this folk
ontology.
As it is my purpose to determine the relation between models and hy-
potheses (which I take to be abstract propositions, rather than concrete
utterances or sentences, see Part I), my analysis will unavoidably focus on
abstract models. In principle, this would exclude from the analysis any
tangible model, such as plastic models, diagrams, descriptive texts or an-
notated drawings. But this should not unduly concern us, as most such
tangible concrete models can be straightforwardly interpreted as represen-
tations of a particular abstract model,9 while tangible models used for the
direct representation of real target phenomena, such as a wooden bridge
model, are not of concern to us here.
Second, functionally, I take models to be used to represent some target
objects such as fictional objects (Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Giere, 2009; Contessa, 2010). On the
other hand, this discussion has also been rejected as a non-issue, which deviates attention
from the more pressing questions about the use of models in scientific practice (Teller, 2001;
French, 2010).
8Although not yet fully explored in the context of scientific modeling, the artefactualist
view of abstract objects has some obvious advantages over the nominalist view (as it recognizes
abstract objects) and the Platonic view (as it sees them as having originated in time and as
ontologically dependent on the existence of a concrete creator). Yet, it also gives rise to
important questions such as the identity of models (e.g. are the Bohr model and the Bohr-
Sommerfeld model the same model?), the contours of models (what are the essential and
non-essential parts of a model?) and the nature of the creative act, as scientific models are
often constructed in successive stages by varying groups of scientists (See also the discussion
on creationism or artefactualism in Kroon and Voltolini (2011)).
9Interpreting concrete or tangible models as representations of abstract models makes
sense only if one adopts an (at least) three-place analysis of the representation relation: rep-
resentation is not purely a relation between a model M and a target T , but a relation of an
agent S who uses a model M to represent a target T for some purpose (Giere, 2004). As
such, concrete tangible models, such as a double helix made from cardboard, can be used
in two ways: either to represent directly a target phenomenon (actual DNA), or to represent
an abstract model (the Crick and Watson double helix model), which can itself be used to
represent that same initial target (actual DNA). Although the particular form in which an
abstract model is represented does influence the scientist’s actual manipulations (Knuuttila,
2011; Vorms, 2011), I will pay no further attention to individual (tangible) models in the
present chapter.
9.3. FOUR STANCES ON THEIR RELATION 223
system in the real (or empirical) world.10 This is what Giere (1999b) has
called the representational conception of models, as opposed to the instan-
tial conception of models used in the semantic and structuralist analysis of
theories. In the representational conception, the intended representational
relations can be exploited for predictive or explanatory purposes by manip-
ulating the model. In the case of abstract models, this kind of manipulation
can be done in several ways, for instance, by varying the model’s variably
designed parts or contrasting various concrete representations of it. This
representational conception also resembles to a certain extent the notion
of a model used in the model-based reasoning community (e.g. Nersessian,
2008), yet does not focus exclusively on the psychological issue (Godfrey-
Smith, 2006).
The target system the model is used for to represent can also be a set
of data points or measurements. Such models of data (Suppes, 1962) or
phenomenological models, which are generally constructed via statistical
methods of data analysis, are sometimes seen as temporary models requir-
ing further explanation by deeper explanatory or constitutive models (e.g.
the 1885 Balmer formula for the hydrogen emission spectrum lines was
explained by the 1913 Bohr model of the hydrogen atom). Yet, this type
of model is often employed in actual scientific practice, especially for pre-
dictive purposes (consider, for instance, the importance of the discipline of
data analysis) and is highly esteemed by scientists with a strongly induc-
tivist mindset (see e.g. Glass and Hall in Section 9.3.3). Therefore, it is
important that our analysis of the relation between models and hypotheses
should apply to this type of model as well.
9.3 Four Stances on the Relation between Models and
Hypotheses
In this section I review four stances that can be found in the literature.
However, it should be kept in mind that none of the authors I will associate
with these stances were explicitly concerned with specifying the relation
between hypotheses and models. In each case, the characterization was
embedded in a broader research goal.
10Although this characterization fits large classes of models in science, it does not fit all
models (Downes, 1992).
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9.3.1 Models are (a particular form of) Hypotheses
Although the stance that models are just a form of hypotheses is never
explicitly articulated in the current literature, it is often implied when
authors use the terms ‘model’ and ‘hypothesis’ more or less interchange-
ably. The idea is that models are just a particular form of hypotheses: they
are a bit more elaborate, and often have some figurative elements, but in
essence they are just hypothetical suggestions which can be tested to con-
firm whether they conform to reality. This view is particularly appealing to
people focused on explanatory and mechanistic models, as for this kind of
models the parts of the model are intended to have an accurate one-to-one
correspondence relation with the parts of the target system.
This stance, however, fails to take into account the important and cur-
rently hot issue of the representational relation between models and the
world. The representational relation between hypotheses and the world
is easier to specify: hypotheses are linguistic entities. Therefore, whether
they represent the world can be determined by finding out whether they
are true or false. But models are not linguistic entities.11 Therefore, one
cannot determine whether a model is literally true or false. When a model
is called true (or false), this attribution normally has to be understood in a
metaphorical or pragmatic sense: it indicates that the model meets the pur-
poses for which it was designed, such as accurate prediction or explanatory
power, not that it consists of literally true sentences.12 Even if one replaces
truth with a gradual notion such as accuracy, for many models it makes no
sense to assess whether or not they are accurate, both because they were
never intended to be so and because of their use of idealizations, simplifi-
cations and fictional entities.
The representational relation between models and the world is cur-
11There is a minority position that does take models literally as linguistic entities (Frigg and
Hartmann, 2012). This view, which is embedded in a syntactic view of theories, takes models
(just like theories) to be sets of statements about a target system, simplified or idealized for
certain purposes (Achinstein, 1968; Redhead, 1980). This position, however, has to cope with
similar concerns as the syntactic view of theories. For example, it faces the obvious objection
that there can be many different linguistic descriptions of the same model. How should the
canonical description be determined? As a matter of fact, I have found no recent adherents of
this position.
12Ma¨ki (2011) has, however, tried to define a literal truth relation for models (see also
Perini (2005) on the possibility of such a truth relation for pictorial representations), but,
in essence, Ma¨ki’s proposal boils down to defining the truth of a model as the truth of the
assertion that the driving mechanism of the model is the same as its target mechanism (which
makes him rather fit the stance discussed in Section 9.3.2).
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rently still under debate. But, although most contributors have understood
that any analysis of the representational relation must take the user and her
intentions into account,13 the discussion has somehow arrived at an im-
passe between structural accounts (following Van Fraassen, 1980, 2008),
which seem too strict to capture all models used in science, and similarity
accounts (following Giere, 1988, 1999b, 2010), which seem too minimalist
to explain the epistemic value of reasoning with models (Knuuttila, 2011,
p. 264; Downes, 2011). Although the view developed in this chapter in-
clines more towards a similarity account, we need not go further into the
details of this debate.
So, while most would nowadays agree that models are not pure lin-
guistic entities, it could still be argued that my characterization of scientific
hypotheses (in Section 9.2) is too narrow. Why could the concept of hy-
pothesis not be stretched to include particular non-linguistic entities, such
as models? After all, the predicate ‘hypothetical’ can be sensibly applied to
other objects.
In answer to this line of reasoning, it should be noted that the require-
ment that hypotheses be linguistic entities (or even propositions) is not
in fact a restriction of the concept. The core feature of any hypothesis is
that its truth value is either uncertain or underdetermined (in the case of
a truth-purposive hypothesis) or else that it is known or believed to be
false (in the case of a truth-denying hypothesis). Such truth values can
be literally ascribed only to linguistic entities such as stories, descriptions
or claims.14 Of course, it is a natural stretch to attribute the predicate
‘hypothetical’ to objects such as dark matter (truth-purposive) or Earth’s
second moon (truth-denying). But in these cases, the predicate refers to
the existence of these objects, and such attributions are equivalent to stat-
ing that “Dark matter exists” has an uncertain (or even underdetermined)
truth value and that “Earth has a second moon” is known to be false.
Let us now return to the question of whether models can be called
hypothetical. Clearly, models cannot be hypothetical in the same sense
as dark matter or Earth’s second moon. If one has a particular (abstract)
13See Footnote 9.
14For now, I leave aside attempts to expand the truth concept to non-linguistic entities. My
main reason for this is that it is hard to do so in an unequivocally accepted way. Definitions of
such an expansion (e.g. Ma¨ki, 2011) are based on an intuition of what should be considered
true, and these might differ from agent to agent. For instance, concerning Ma¨ki’s definition,
one might argue that the literal truth of models should be defined in terms of accurate pre-
diction, not in bringing forth the correct mechanism.
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model in mind, then it exists. Earth’s second moon does not, and about
the existence of dark matter one can read a mountain of scholarly articles
(see Section 9.4.3). If models are called hypotheses, this ascription refers
to their content, not their existence.
So, could it not be that models are linguistic after all, or, even more
minimalistically, that they maybe have a characterization defined in purely
linguistic terms? After all, many models in science are known purely from
a textual description, and Craver (2006), borrowing ideas from Railton
(1981), has introduced in the mechanism literature the notion of the ideally
complete description of a mechanism as the ideal for a mechanistic model.
Let us grant this for a moment, and assume that there exists for each model
in science an ideal, fully linguistic description that fully characterizes the
model. Such a description of a model would indeed have a truth value.
But it would be true only by reference to the model itself. If we were to de-
termine its truth value by reference to the world, it would always be false.
Models include fictitious entities (e.g. point masses or frictionless planes)
or describe unreal and simplified conditions (e.g. no air resistance or uni-
form mass density) and even if a model is very descriptive, as are particular
mechanism models in biology, its (ideally) full description would be false
by reference to the world because of the simplifications and abstractions it
incorporates. For instance, the description might state that one body part
is directly adjacent to another part, while in reality there are blood vessels,
tissues and fat cells in between.
Or, turning the argument around, if the ideally full description of a
model were to be completely true with respect to the world, there would
be no model defined, because the description would be just a direct de-
scription of this part of the world. In conclusion, we can state that if such
a thing as the (ideally) full description of a model existed, it would be true
only by reference to the model, and it would be literally false with respect
to the world. Hence, it would be counterfactual.15 Therefore, if we were
to use this construction to call models hypotheses, they would be truth-
denying hypotheses and not truth-purposive hypotheses, as their creators
had likely intended.16 In addition, such a construction (of an ideal descrip-
15This analysis relates to the analysis of the falsehood of models in Cartwright (1983) and
Wimsatt (1987/2007).
16An exception to the general idea that modelers aim to be truth-purposive might be the
construction of toy models, which are purposefully built not to represent much but rather to
experiment with the theoretical tools themselves. Toy models can therefore truly be charac-
terized as counterfactuals, and allow thus for analysis as a thought experiment.
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tion) also conflicts with the idea that we are looking at how models are
actually used in scientific practice.
9.3.2 Hypotheses are Statements about the Relation between
Models and their Target Systems
This is the idea Giere has been arguing for since his book Explaining Science:
a Cognitive Approach (1988). According to him, (theoretical) hypotheses
(which, he claims, overlap considerably with the use of the notion by sci-
entists themselves) are assertions of some sort of relationship between a
model and the system it is intended to represent. In his more recent work
(2004; 2008; 2010), Giere specifies this notion of hypothesis further, hold-
ing that hypotheses are claims that a fully specified and interpreted model
(a model of which each element is provided with a physical interpretation)
fits a particular real system more or less well, or any generalization of such
claims.
If one has come to appreciate that the relation between models and
the world is not simply a matter of truth (or falsehood), but may include
a plenitude of possible representational relations depending on the pur-
poses of the agent, it is quite natural to understand scientific hypotheses as
specifications of the nature and fit of these representational relations. For
instance, many hypotheses state that the values calculated using a partic-
ular model fit particular measurements of the target system of the model
(within certain error margins), or that the mechanism represented by a
particular simplified and idealized model is the same mechanism driving
a real target system. Perhaps because it is natural to understand hypothe-
ses in this bridging role, I have found no dissenting voices on this issue
amongst scholars working on scientific models.
However, although this analysis is compelling and very suitable to ac-
count for a number of hypotheses used in actual scientific practice,17 it
does not fit the majority of hypotheses advanced and argued for in scientific
practice. The reason for this is straightforward. Giere’s characterization of
a hypothesis depends on the existence of a model that can be fully inter-
preted. This means that this kind of hypotheses can be stated only once a
fully interpretable model has been developed, which is typically only in the
closing stages of the discovery process. Giere is not to blame for this. His
project is to analyze how accomplished science is structured – the starting
17In Section 9.5, I will call this class of hypotheses the fully interpretable hypotheses.
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point of his 1988 investigation was a mechanics text book. But if we want
to understand the role of hypotheses in scientific practice, we should take
into account that hypotheses are much more closely linked to the discovery
process than to the presentation of well-established science. In the process
of scientific discovery, advanced hypotheses are seldom well-specified and
fully interpretable (as the case studies in the next section show). Therefore,
although we can use Giere’s account for a subclass of scientific hypotheses,
i.e. the fully interpretable hypotheses, we must supplement it with an ac-
count of hypotheses used in the actual process of scientific discovery.
9.3.3 Radical Inductionism: Hypotheses should be avoided in
Model Construction and Refinement
Recently, Glass and Hall (2008) launched a well-argued attack in the top-
ranked journal Cell on the use of hypotheses in scientific practice. The use
of hypotheses, they argue, is a relic from the old hypothetico-deductive per-
spective on science, which denied induction as a valid form of reasoning.
According to them, the latest articulation of this obsolete view, Popper’s
Critical Rationalism, was successfully challenged in the second half of the
twentieth century by, amongst others, Kuhn and Nozick, while probability
and Bayesianism gave the inductivist better tools to defend his position.
Apart from summarizing the main historical and philosophical positions
in this well-known debate, Glass and Hall also argue on a pragmatic level
that scientists would do better to replace top-down hypothesis testing with
bottom-up inductive model-building. Framing research by hypotheses adds
severe biases. Not only are negatives less valued than positives (confirma-
tion bias), but also researchers are rendered blind to alternative routes, as
negatives are not differentiated (categorization bias). Furthermore, not all
interesting research (or research proposals) can be framed by a hypothesis.
A telling example was the Human Genome Project, of which, when pressed
to state a research hypothesis, J. C. Venter, a major player in the project,
stated that “it is our hypothesis that this approach will be successful” (Glass,
2006, p. 18).
Therefore, Glass and Hall suggest that research (and research propos-
als) should better start by asking an open research question, after which
data collection can begin. From this data, which is increasingly abundant
and elaborate in this era of Big Data, one can extract a first model via the
methods of statistical data analysis, which leads to new questions, further
data gathering and model refinement. Nowhere should one, according to
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this view, introduce unproven premises or hypotheses.
Glass and Hall’s argument has the merit that it points out to scientists
and funding organizations the danger of bias if research hypotheses are
given too much weight. In fact, their suggestion to frame research pro-
posals by open research questions instead of hypotheses (as is sometimes
required by funding agencies) is an interesting one, but, philosophically,
their suggestion to literally eradicate all hypotheses from scientific practice
in favor of model-building cannot be taken seriously. I distinguish three
main reasons.
First, at all stages of inductive model-building there are always some
often implicit but unavoidable hypotheses present. Even when the research
project is framed by a research question, choices will have to be made as to
which variables should be tested for in obtaining the first data set, and such
choices rely on (hidden) assumptions about which variables are plausible
and which are not. For instance, if one is looking for the causal factors and
catalysts of a particular disease, the data set will probably contain variables
such as water quality, diet or medical history of the test subjects, but not
whether these subjects are left- or right-handed or what their favorite ice
cream topping is. These decisions as to which variables to include rely
on initial hypotheses concerning what might plausibly be factors in the
investigated disease.
Further, inductive model-building or statistical data analysis is a disci-
pline crucially dependent on the introduction of assumptions to mold vast
data sets into models (of data) that can be manipulated for scientific pur-
poses. The discipline has been described as being “more an art, or even a
bag of tricks, than science” (Good, 1983). An often cited and telling ex-
ample is the curve-fitting problem: given the simplest data set of only two
variables, there are already an infinity of fitting mathematical functions.
Data analysts constantly have to make decisions (based on assumptions)
on how to handle outliers, on the tradeoff between simplicity and data
fitting, on how the data is best represented (as this influences model con-
struction), on how the variable is spread in the population (is it normally
distributed or not?), and so on.
Finally, Glass and Hall’s analysis is very focused on scientific experimen-
tation, and their generalization is based on the old inductive idea that the
whole process of scientific discovery can be reduced to inferences from
data. It was precisely against this view that Nickles (1980) and other
philosophers of scientific discovery have argued: discovery, they hold, is
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not separate from theoretical considerations and choices. As the examples
in the next section will show, many models originate from theoretical con-
siderations. Only later on, when sufficient detail is attained, can they be
compared with experimental data or models of data. In fact, precisely be-
cause of this, it could be said that Glass and Hall’s analysis applies only to
the models of data and phenomenological models mentioned above, not to
explanatory or constitutive models.
9.3.4 Heuristic View: Hypotheses are Necessary Guidelines in
Model Construction
A view opposite to the previous stance is that hypotheses somehow have
a heuristic and methodological role in the process of model construction.
Although this idea is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Nola and Sankey, 2007,
p. 25), it is often just implicitly assumed.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will give an explicit account of this
stance. In my view, heuristic hypotheses are direct attempts to initially an-
swer a research question, but, precisely because the research still needs to
be done, they unavoidably contain vague filler terms or black boxes and
can do little more than hint at a particular direction of research. Yet, by
this hinting they sketch an outline or rough blueprint, or even maybe just
identify the type of model(s) needed to substantiate the initial hypothesis.
As such, they reduce the initial research problem to the more specific prob-
lem of filling in the black boxes of the model outline, resulting finally in an
adequate model, of which a fully specified and interpreted hypothesis (in
Giere’s sense), if confirmed, can provide an answer to the initial research
question.
Before giving a detailed account of this position in Sections 9.5 and
9.6, I will first present in Section 9.4 three case studies that will provide
the benchmark for my analysis.
9.4 Three Case Studies from Astrophysics
In this section, I introduce three historical cases to illustrate my analysis of
the role of hypotheses in model-based science. I have chosen these cases,
related to important research questions in modern astrophysics involving
different types of models, to show how generally applicable the analysis
is. Due to space restrictions, only the first case will be fully elaborated; for
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the other two cases, only the key steps in my analysis will be indicated,
together with further references to the literature.
9.4.1 The Energy Source of the Stars (1920-1930s)
Around 1920, the source of stellar energy was still a mystery.18 By that
time, Eddington had crafted the basic structural model of a (stable) star,
largely confirmed by observations made at the time. His model represented
stars as spheres of gas in which, at each internal point, there was an equi-
librium between the inward gravitational pressure and the outward gas
and radiation pressure, resulting in concentric layers of increasingly lower
pressures and temperatures towards the surface.
But he did not know what fueled this radiant energy.19 Clearly, the solar
energy could not be the result of a chemical reaction, such as exothermic
oxidation (fire). Even if the sun would be totally composed of carbon, its
mass would be barely enough to radiate the sun’s current luminosity for
a few thousand years. To solve this problem, Von Helmholtz and Kelvin
had defended in the 19th century what was later referred to as the contrac-
tion hypothesis, which was in turn inspired by the nebular hypothesis for
the origin of our solar system, proposed by Kant and Laplace.20 This latter
hypothesis situates the origin of the solar system in the gravitational col-
lapse of a gaseous nebula. Inspired by this, Von Helmholtz and Kelvin took
as the source of solar energy the inward gravitational energy provided, at
first, by the accretion of the sun and, after the sun has started to radiate,
by the contraction of the sun as it cools down. Using this model, Kelvin es-
timated the age of the solar system to be of the order of 10 million years –
in contradiction to estimates based on the biological and geological record.
Darwin (1859/2009) suggested, for instance, in On the Origin of Species,
based on some geological calculations, that the earth was at least 300 mil-
lion years old, the time he thought to be needed for the evolution of our
current biodiversity. As a matter of fact, this whole situation led to a public
controversy between these two leading scientists.
18For a thorough and detailed version of this history, see Shiaviv (2010). For a good
introduction see Bahcall (2000) or Mazumdar (2005).
19This is why I do not call his model a mechanistic model. Clearly, it was his goal to arrive,
in the end, at such a mechanistic model.
20Although some predecessors had already proposed similar systems, Kant (1755/2012)
and Laplace (1796/1830) were the first to (independently) propose a model based on the
contraction of a nebulous cloud according to Newton’s law of Universal Gravitation.
232 CHAPTER 9. MODELS AND HYPOTHESES
At the dawn of the 20th century, better geological observations and the
discovery of radioactivity quickly discredited the contraction model. The
earth (and, hence, the sun) must be older than Kelvin’s estimate. There-
fore, the contraction model could not supply the requisite energy. Many
looked at the new physics that was emerging, hoping it could provide an
answer. Rutherford and the young Eddington suggested that radioactive
elements might be the source of stellar energy, and Jeans, upon learning
of Einstein’s E =mc2, suggested that in the extremely hot interior of stars,
protons and electrons might annihilate each other, turning their mass into
energy.
The experimental breakthrough that prompted Eddington’s initial sug-
gestion of nuclear fusion was Ashton’s measurements of the mass of He
and H nuclei, finding that the mass of a He nucleus was only 99,3% of the
combined mass of the four H nuclei it contained. This led Eddington to the
hypothesis of nuclear fusion:
Now mass cannot be annihilated, and the deficit can only rep-
resent the mass of the electrical energy set free in the transmu-
tation. [. . . ] If 5 per cent of a star’s mass consists initially of
hydrogen atoms, which are gradually being combined to form
more complex elements, the total heat liberated will more than
suffice for our demands, and we need look no further for the
source of a star’s energy. (Eddington, 1920, p. 353)
This suggestion, although defended fiercely, is clearly just a hypothesis.
Apart from Ashton’s measurements, he had little or no evidence to back
it up, nor did he understand how and when such a fusion process might
occur. After all, one should not forget that at the time, neither the neutron
nor any nucleus of atomic mass 2 or 3 had yet been discovered. Quantum
mechanics had not yet been developed and the amount of hydrogen in the
sun was not yet determined. So, Eddington’s hypothesis suggested that
somehow 4 protons and 2 electrons (which it was thought, at the time,
the He nucleus consisted of, see Section 7.2.2) met each other at a single
position at a single moment in time, something which Eddington knew was
probabilistically nearly impossible, as is illustrated by the following quote:
Indeed the formation of helium is necessarily so mysterious that
we distrust all predictions as to the conditions required. [. . . ]
How the necessary materials of 4 mutually repelling protons
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and 2 electrons can be gathered together in one spot, baffles
imagination. (Eddington, 1926, p. 301)
Therefore, it is understandable that throughout the 1920s his hypothesis
still met with competitors: Jeans kept defending a proton-electron anni-
hilation, while Bohr even thought that in stars the conservation of energy
was violated.21 It was only after numerous contributions of the likes of
Gamov, Houterman, Atkinson and Weizsa¨cker that Bethe (1939) finally
put forward a model of stellar energy production which was in satisfac-
tory agreement with the observational record and consisted of two well-
described processes that converted hydrogen into helium: the p-p chain
and the CNO cycle (the latter occurring only in stars more massive than
the sun).
Let us review the various characteristics of Eddington’s hypothesis of
nuclear fusion. Clearly, it fits our characterization: it is a claim about the
world with an unknown truth value in answer to a particular research ques-
tion. In fact, it would be better to state that its truth value is underdeter-
mined. Eddington had no idea how energy could be liberated by combining
atoms. There are many possible models – some even totally different from
Bethe’s model with completely different concepts, elements and forces –
that could still be seen as a specification of Eddington’s hypothesis.22
Still, the credit that Eddington received for this suggestion is justified,
as his suggestion was immensely important in redirecting research. In a
sense, it simplified the problem of what the source of stellar energy was
to the question of how hydrogen nuclei can combine so as to form helium
nuclei. This simplification is achieved by providing an initial answer to
the question of stellar energy, using a sketchy outline of a stellar model
containing a black box process that somehow turns present hydrogen into
helium. This is why his idea was so hugely important and why he kept on
defending it and urging research in that direction for twenty years, until,
finally, Bethe was able to crack open the black box.
21Bohr’s suggestion (1929/1986) that energy conservation should be renounced must be
linked primordially with the problem of the continuous β spectrum (see Chapter 7), but the
way in which Bohr combined it with this problem of astrophysics, a field to which he had not
contributed at all, shows how pressing the problem of stellar energy still was around 1930.
22Consider, for instance, also the history of the briefly mentioned nebular hypothesis. Our
current model of the origin of our solar system differs completely from what Kant had in
mind (Palmquist, 1987). Still, our current model can be seen as a specification of the severely
underdetermined original hypothesis, which is why we still attribute the nebular hypothesis
(partly) to Kant.
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So what is the nature of the relation here between model and hypothe-
sis? Eddington’s model was largely a black box or at most a rough outline,
so Giere’s characterization of hypotheses does not apply to his hypothesis,
as it was heuristic in nature. Only once Bethe’s model was available could
one say that Eddington’s hypothesis, refined by stating that the “combi-
nation of hydrogen atoms” has to occur according to Bethe’s model, is a
hypothesis in Giere’s sense: a claim that a fully interpreted model fits a
target system.
9.4.2 The Nice Model (2000s)
In 2001, simulations of the model specified by the nebular hypothesis (de-
scribing the origin of our solar system), with reasonable assumptions for
the initial conditions, confirmed the idea raised a few years earlier that
Neptune could not have become such a large planet at such a great distance
from the sun (Stewart and Levison, 1998; Levison and Stewart, 2001) – a
research problem that triggered, amongst other possible solutions, the hy-
pothesis that Neptune initially formed nearer to the sun and then migrated
out (Thommes et al., 1999). Yet this hypothesis was nearly meaningless,
as no available model showed how such a migration could have occurred.
In 2005, in a series of three papers in Nature, the Nice model23 was pre-
sented (Tsiganis et al., 2005; Morbidelli et al., 2005; Gomes et al., 2005).
This model postulates that 4 billion years ago there was a period in which
Jupiter and Saturn were in 2:1 orbital resonance,24 which led to a global
gravitational instability in our solar system that caused the outer planets to
move from orbits much nearer to the sun outwards to their current trajecto-
ries. Furthermore, simulations of this model showed that it also explained
many other curious features of our solar system, such as the Late Heavy
Bombardment (that caused the many lunar craters), the heavy eccentrici-
ties of the outer planets’ orbits, and the Trojan satellites locked in Jupiter’s
orbit. In subsequent years, improved simulations and new explanations of
23This model, named after the French Mediterranean city where the research was con-
ducted, is generally represented and explored via computer simulations. Philosophically, de-
bates continue concerning how models and simulations relate. On this see, among others,
Humphreys (2004); Frigg and Reiss (2009); Winsberg (2010).
24This means that, during this period, Jupiter completed two revolutions around the sun
in the same time Saturn completed a single revolution. The frequent and regular alignment of
these two bodies exerted an extra and periodic gravitational pull on the trajectories of other
nearby objects. In the case of Jupiter and Saturn, by far the two most massive bodies circling
around the sun, this can lead to serious disruptions in the trajectories of those nearby objects.
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further features of the solar system, such as the characteristics of the Kuiper
belt, have led to a general acceptance of the Nice Model (Crida, 2009).
The Nice model is clearly a very different type of model than the stellar
model discussed in Section 9.4.1. Whereas the stellar model was mainly
a very general theoretical model applicable to any star, the Nice model is
an applied model tailored to our solar system and established by numerous
computer simulations, in which mainly the initial conditions were sought
that, given the well-known principles of Newtonian dynamics, could result
in the observed specificities of our solar system.
Still, we find here the same type of relation between the model and
the heuristic hypothesis that led to its development. The initial suggestion,
i.e. that Neptune formed closer to the sun and then migrated out due to
gravitational forces in our solar system, provided a first tentative but di-
rect answer to the research question of why Neptune was so massive. Yet,
this suggestion was largely vacuous without an exact model or set of ini-
tial conditions to specify how such a migration might have occurred. On
the other hand, it was precisely the persuasive plausibility of this initial
heuristic hypothesis that motivated and coordinated a large research effort
to conduct the numerous computer simulations that led to the substanti-
ation of this claim by explicating the unknown mechanism of Neptune’s
migration. Only now that this model has been built can we reformulate
the hypothesis as a fully interpretable hypothesis in Giere’s sense: Neptune
formed closer to the sun and then migrated out according to the conditions
and the mechanism described by the Nice model.
9.4.3 Dark Matter (1930s-present)
Notwithstanding some earlier references to dark stars or matter, the start of
the modern search for dark matter is to be found in Zwicky (1933/2009).25
Having found that the rotation curves of galaxies in the Coma Cluster were
much too high to be explained by the mass of the visible stars, he sug-
gested that dynamical models of galaxies should incorporate the presence
of non-visible dark matter to explain the observed rotational speeds. In the
following decades, the problem was largely cast aside, although a grow-
ing number of studies for different galaxies confirmed the high rotational
speeds. Gradually, more galactic models incorporating dark matter were
advanced, attributing more and more features to it. For instance, Ostriker
25Classic histories of dark matter are Trimble (1987); Van den Bergh (1999); Rubin (2003).
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and Peebles (1973) calculated that, in contrast with visible matter which
is mostly found in the galactic disk, dark matter is mostly present in the
galactic halo. The enumeration of the various indications of its existence in
a highly-influential review paper of Faber and Gallagher (1979) convinced
most astrophysicists of its existence by 1980. In subsequent decades, we
have seen an enormous increase in the number of suggestions to charac-
terize dark matter, while some of these possibilities, such as neutrinos or
brown dwarfs and other massive dark astronomical bodies (so-called MA-
CHOs), have already been ruled out. At the same time, other hypotheses
have been raised to address the initial problem of the galactic rotation
curves (e.g. the MOND hypothesis proposed a modification of Newtonian
Dynamics), but we also see an increase in the use of the concept ‘dark
matter’ in other models that explain other features of our galaxy, such
as gravitational lensing and fluctuations in the cosmic background radi-
ation. Nowadays, the incorporation of the concept in virtually any success-
ful galactic or cosmological model is considered by almost everyone to be
sufficient proof of its existence. On the other hand, although some options
have been ruled out and some characteristics have been determined, there
is still no satisfactory account of the nature of dark matter. The best guess
at present is that it is an unknown weakly interacting massive particle (a
so-called WIMP).
This final case, about a not yet specified hypothetical entity, might seem
different from the other two cases. Yet, also here we can find the same in-
terplay between hypotheses and models, the only difference being that, in
this case, most of our present models cannot be fully interpreted and spec-
ified (in Giere’s sense), as dark matter is not yet fully understood. Zwicky’s
initial heuristic hypothesis, i.e. that there exists a large amount of dark
matter in galaxies, has, despite its neglect at the time it was proposed,
redirected much research toward specifying the nature of this unknown
type of matter and supplementing this claim with suitable models. But, al-
though galactic and cosmological models including dark matter have been
substantially refined over the years and have become the only widely ac-
cepted models, and even if these models can be operationalized for some
explanatory or predictive purposes, the notion ‘dark matter’ still remains
something of a black box in these models.
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9.5 Heuristic and Fully Interpretable Hypotheses
Before turning to the relation between models and hypotheses in model-
based scientific practice, let me first define more precisely the distinction I
have been hinting at between two types of hypotheses: heuristic hypotheses
and fully interpretable hypotheses. This distinction draws on Craver’s 2006
distinction between mechanism sketches26 and ideally complete descriptions
of mechanisms. How exactly my concepts relate to Craver’s concepts will
be discussed at the end of this section.
A fully interpretable hypothesis is a hypothesis the meaning of which
(or any part of which) leaves no room for vagueness or ambiguity. In other
words, expressions of such hypotheses do not contain any unexplained filler
terms, terms such as ‘process’, ‘to interact’, or ‘entity’ that have a broad and
generic meaning covering up some uncertainty, imprecision or unknown
details. Hence, these hypotheses are fully expressed in terms with a pre-
cise meaning, which is provided either by the conceptual framework of the
field the researcher is working in or by the researcher himself, by means of
suitable models. Heuristic hypotheses, on the other hand, do contain such
unspecified and generic filler terms.
The main idea is that heuristic hypotheses are both unavoidable and
useful in the early stages of scientific discovery, as they sketch an early
blueprint or incomplete model without committing one to too much (yet
unknown) detail. A heuristic hypothesis suggests that research should pro-
ceed in a particular direction, i.e. that it aims to fill gaps in the incomplete
model instead of trying to address the general research question directly.
Fully interpretable hypotheses, on the other hand, can be put forward only
after the construction of a full model that specifies how the hypothesis
(which is a claim about a part of reality) should be interpreted precisely
and under what conditions it should hold. Therefore, in principle, it is
possible to design a conclusive experiment to verify whether a fully inter-
pretable hypothesis holds, while heuristic hypotheses can seldom be tested
conclusively due to their vagueness and ambiguity. Experiments in this case
mostly aim to refine the model and reduce the vagueness and ambiguity.
Before I add some further remarks and consider some examples, it is
useful to explain first how these two types of hypotheses relate. As the
main criterion that distinguishes these two types is the level of precision in
26The notion of a mechanism sketch had already been introduced in the seminal paper on
mechanisms by Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000).
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the expression of the hypotheses, the two distinguished types are actually
the extremes of a continuum. Moreover, as it is an unwieldy (if even possi-
ble) task to specify all relevant conditions for a particular hypothesis, it is
clear that the idea of a fully interpretable hypothesis is actually an idealiza-
tion (as Craver could only speak of ideally complete descriptions of mech-
anisms). Therefore, at first sight, it seems as if there exist only heuristic
hypotheses, interpretable to a greater or lesser extent. In scientific prac-
tice, however, some hypotheses are clearly considered to be sufficiently
unambiguous and interpretable, allowing them to be tested conclusively.
Therefore, for our purposes, we can evade this conclusion by allowing for
a pragmatic threshold of precision sufficient for full interpretability. A hy-
pothesis can be considered sufficiently fully interpretable if it invokes no
disagreement in the research community as to which is its meaning. Yet
the flip side of adopting this social criterion is that a single researcher can-
not himself decide whether a hypothesis is fully interpretable. Also, that
a particular hypothesis is considered to be fully interpretable at a certain
point in time does not ensure that it will remain so in the indefinite future.
A few further remarks are in order concerning the concept of filler
terms, including some examples. First, what counts as a filler term is topic-
dependent. For instance, the phrase ‘exerting a force’ has a precise meaning
in physics, while in economics this would be a filler term for an unspecified
process of influence. Having said this, the fact that so many words in var-
ious fields can be considered to have a fully specified meaning is precisely
because of the cumulative processes of abstraction and concept formation
in these sciences. Therefore, whether a phrase counts as a filler term or
whether it has a precise meaning (in a particular reference framework) is
dependent on the stage of development in the field. Let me return to the
examples presented in Section 9.4. When Eddington in 1920 spoke of “the
combination of hydrogen atoms” and somewhat later even used the term
“nuclear energy”, these concepts were certainly filler terms. Despite hav-
ing good arguments for why focusing on a possible transition from nuclear
mass to energy could possibly solve the problem of stellar energy, he didn’t
have any account of how this energy could be released from the nucleus
and why this process occurred in stars. It was only after the acceptance of
Bethe’s 1939 nuclear fusion models for the p-p chain and CNO cycle that
the term ‘nuclear energy’ received a precise meaning in astrophysics.
Also, filler terms generally gain precision only gradually. For instance,
while the concept ‘dark matter’ was at first a pure filler term to indicate
the possibility of unobserved but present matter, the term has gained some
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precision and delineation in recent decades. It is now accepted that dark
matter mostly resides in galactic halos, that there is at least five times more
dark matter than regular matter, that it consists of weakly interacting mas-
sive unknown particles (WIMPs), which move at relatively slow speeds
(with respect to the speed of light) and are electrically neutral, etc. Yet
no astronomer at present would claim that the concept of dark matter is
fully understood and precisely defined.
Finally, the given examples might suggest that in the discovery process
filler terms themselves always gain a more precise meaning. This happens,
such as in the case of ‘nuclear energy’ or ‘dark matter’, but more often
vague filler terms are replaced with more meaningful descriptions, names
or acronyms, such as ‘nuclear fusion’ or ‘WIMP’.
So how do these hypotheses relate to models? For fully interpretable
hypotheses, as indicated in Section 9.3.2, I follow Giere in regarding such
hypotheses as claims that a fully specified model provided with a physical
interpretation fits a target system more or less well. This idea can now be
extended to heuristic hypotheses. They are also claims that a particular
model fits or might fit a target system, but in this case, the models are just
bare model sketches, containing black boxes labeled by filler terms. Still
in providing such a model sketch, the initial research question is already
partially answered, while at the same time the direction is shown for future
research, i.e. to fill in the black boxes.
Before I continue my analysis of the relation between hypotheses and
models in scientific practice, let me first explain how my distinction relates
to Craver’s (2006). The main difference is that I have a different target
set of objects in mind. Craver discusses a distinction for models describing
mechanisms, while I discuss a distinction for scientific hypotheses. Unlike
me, however, Craver does not distinguish between models and hypothe-
ses (as can be seen in his discussion on pp. 360-361). Hence, whether or
not his models are linguistic in nature does not seem to matter for him or
his purposes. We can therefore conclude that heuristic hypotheses, as de-
scribed above, would probably, according to Craver, qualify as mechanism
sketches if they describe a mechanism, while mechanism sketches qualify,
for me, as heuristic hypotheses if they are linguistic in nature. If the lat-
ter is not the case, any proposition stating that a particular (non-linguistic)
mechanism sketch fits a real system will then qualify as a heuristic hypothe-
sis. At the other end of the spectrum, Craver’s ideally complete descriptions
do include the claim that the model fits a particular mechanism. Therefore,
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these can be considered as (fully) interpretable hypotheses in my frame-
work, i.e. claims that the fully specified model fits the target mechanism
relatively well.
9.6 The Role of Hypotheses in Model-based Scientific
Practice
Let me now spell out the role of these two types of hypotheses in the pro-
cess of scientific discovery in model-based science. This view will incorpo-
rate the two theses I defended above, i.e. that hypotheses are necessary in
the process of model construction and that hypotheses that are not fully
interpretable are valuable and even necessary in this process.
In general, research aimed at constructing models is triggered by a re-
search question or trigger. In her monograph on abductive reasoning (the
inference from observations to explanatory hypotheses), Aliseda (2006)
distinguishes between anomalies and novelties as the two types of obser-
vational triggers for abductive reasoning. This classification can be adopted
for our current purposes provided we keep in mind the main criticism de-
veloped by Nickles (1980) and other scholars of scientific discovery against
the idea that abductive reasoning could be the logic of scientific discovery
(as suggested by Hanson, 1958), i.e. that abductive reasoning neglects the
triggering role of theory in scientific discovery: much research is fueled by
theoretical considerations. We can also here distinguish between questions
triggered by contradictions and questions triggered by lacunas. Therefore, I
conceive of four triggers for research aiming at the construction of models:
experimental (or observational) novelties, experimental (or observational)
anomalies, theoretical gaps or lacunas and theoretical contradictions.
In model-based discovery, these triggers or research questions are an-
swered at the end of the research process by proposing a model and claim-
ing that its similarities with the target system can be exploited to address
the research question, or, in other words, by stating a (sufficiently) inter-
pretable hypothesis that is sufficiently verified.
As the model is only linked to the trigger or research question through a
hypothesis claiming its fit, such a linking hypothesis, constituting the (par-
tial) answer to the research question, must be present through all stages of
model construction; though in the early stages it will be heuristic in nature,
not fully interpretable.
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Now we have to investigate the role of these heuristic hypotheses in
the research process itself. If we take a constraints-based view of scientific
discovery, which is the view Nickles (1978) developed in the tradition of
scientific research as problem solving, we can conceive of a scientific prob-
lem (or research question) as a set of constraints. Making progress on a
problem consists in manipulating these constraints such that the problem
turns into a problem that is somehow easier to solve, such as a less complex
or a more familiar problem.
In the case of suggesting a heuristic hypothesis as an initial partial an-
swer to a research problem, one deliberately adds a constraint: however
vague a heuristic hypothesis might be, it excludes particular solutions and
directs research in a particular direction. As such, one progresses on the
problem by reducing it to a simpler problem, though always at the risk that
one will not find a solution along these lines (if the heuristic hypothesis
turns out to have been a wrong path from the start). After reducing the
initial research problem to the simpler problem of finding a suitable model
to substantiate the filler terms, the heuristic hypothesis remains important
as the link between the reduced problem and the initial research question,
for it shows how the latter can be answered by means of the answer to the
reduced problem.
Let me illustrate this role of heuristic hypotheses with some of the cases
of Section 9.4.
Eddington reduced the open problem of stellar energy (a theoretical
gap) to the more restricted problem of how hydrogen could combine so as
to form helium. After the problem was reduced to finding a suitable model
for this combination, Eddington’s hypothesis remained the link that made
possible that a solution to this reduced problem, namely Bethe’s model of
hydrogen fusion, could be used to answer the initial research question of
where stellar energy originates. By the time Bethe’s model was developed,
Eddington’s hypothesis could be considered a fully interpretable hypothe-
sis.
Similarly, the research question of the improbable accretion of Neptune
(an observational anomaly) was reduced by the initial heuristic hypothesis
to the more straightforward problem of constructing a model and determin-
ing the initial conditions for an outward-directed gravitational slingshot of
a planet within our solar system. Only when such a model – the Nice model
– was constructed through numerous computer simulations could the orig-
inal hypothesis that Neptune initially formed much closer to the sun and
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migrated outwards be considered as the fully interpretable answer to the
initial research question or trigger.
A final thing to address is the fact that many research triggers have the
form of an anomaly or a contradiction. Heuristic hypotheses addressing
such research questions unavoidably sometimes contradict major parts of
the agent’s (assumed) background knowledge. Yet as history shows clearly,
this does not prevent scientists from developing heuristic hypotheses for
such overdetermined problems. In such cases, scientists reason according
to what Rescher (1964) has called belief-negating hypothetical reasoning:
they accept, within the context of this research, the hypothesis together
with all beliefs from their belief set that are compatible with it, while sus-
pending judgment on beliefs that are contradictory to it. For instance, in
the case of Neptune, researchers had at first to suspend judgment on the
idea that the planets in our solar system were formed at the same distance
of the sun where we observe them today. The beliefs still compatible with
the heuristic hypothesis, such as all of Newtonian dynamics, could then be
used as the basis for solving the reduced problem of constructing a suitable
model to interpret that heuristic hypothesis. Only once the model is verified
and the research question, hence, answered can the initially incompatible
beliefs on which judgment was suspended be revised.
9.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have addressed the relation between models and hypothe-
ses in model-based science. After reviewing and pointing out the shortcom-
ings of the various stances in the literature, I have presented my own view
on the matter.
First, a distinction has to be made between heuristic hypotheses and
fully interpretable hypotheses. Heuristic hypotheses are initial and partial
answers to research questions that necessarily contain vague filler terms,
yet sketch the outline for the type of model that might be needed to answer
the research question. Fully interpretable hypotheses, on the other hand,
are claims concerning how a fully constructed model can be used to provide
an answer to the research question.
Next, I have shown, by examining three cases from astronomy, how ini-
tial heuristic hypotheses fuel the process of model construction and how,
once the requisite models are built, they gradually evolve into fully inter-





Let me conclude this dissertation by readdressing the questions posed in
the introduction, which motivated this piece of research. This will show
us how far we have come in our understanding of hypothesis formation in
science, yet also reveal some prospects for future research by identifying
some of the strands that have been left open.
For centuries, following the example of Bacon, philosophers dreamt of
a universal scientific method, an algorithmic procedure that would enable
mankind to generate new scientific knowledge. Yet the rapid succession
of scientific theories from the 19th century onward showed that the right
method could never in itself guarantee the correctness of theories: the
scientific method has to consist of alternating phases of idea generation
and confirmation.
While the method of confirming new ideas became during the twentieth
century increasingly more mathematically stringent, philosophers never
raised high hopes of finding an equally stringent counterpart for idea gen-
eration – a so-called logic of discovery – due to the Romantic ideal of sci-
entific geniuses and the influence of Logical Empiricism. Eventually, this
hope was fully crushed in the second half of the twentienth century when,
due to the historicist turn in the philosophy of science, it became clear that
at most there could exist a multitude of discovery patterns.
At the same time, this historical turn in the philosophy of science reaf-
firmed an old idea that had lost much of its credibility in the wake of Logical
Empiricism, i.e. that the process of discovery is a rational affair and, hence,
that discovery was a respectable topic for philosophical investigation. Only,
one should focus not on finding one general method or logic but on char-
acterizing a multitude of individual methods, the various patterns of dis-
covery and hypothesis formation. This dissertation aims to contribute to
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this project by blending formal and philosophical methods and actual case
studies from the field of physics.
In part II, I have argued that a full and exhaustive list of such patterns
is out of our reach, even if we focus only on patterns that are fully formal
and contain, therefore, no discipline-dependent content. After all, such an
exhaustive analysis of hypothesis formation would draw on assumptions
about how our language and reasoning is structured, and, even had we
already obtained such knowledge, I see no reason why no other language
and reasoning forms can be developed in the future (with or without the
aid of artificial intelligence).
This non-exhaustiveness, however, does not too severely restrain us, as
we can always choose one particular approach that is sufficiently general to
represent many actual instances of hypothesis formation in science. In Part
II, I have shown that if we choose to represent hypothesis formation pro-
cesses in a Fregean formal language, we can identify some major patterns
of hypothesis formation that are used over and over again. At the same
time, by representing inferences of hypothesis formation in a Fregean lan-
guage, I have opened the way for these patterns to be modeled in terms
of non-monotonic predicate logics and succeeded in this for the patterns of
singular fact abduction (Chapter 4) and abduction of generalizations (Chap-
ter 6).
This project of formally modelling various patterns of hypothesis for-
mation is certainly not completed, and several ways are open to pursue it
further. For instance, once could, using the framework of adaptive logics
(which I used throughout Part II), devise a further logic for the pattern
of existential abduction, according to which we can hypothesize a new ob-
ject of a known class. Other patterns such as suggested belief revision and
inductive generalization are already (to some extent) modeled via other ap-
proaches, but it would be useful to investigate the relation between these
various approaches and try to present a unified account. The toughest nut
to crack would probably be conceptual abduction, in which a new concept
is hypothesized, as this seems to require a second-order logic, something of
which the framework of adaptive logics is (at present) not capable. Yet, it
should be possible to devise in this framework a first-order logic of concept
formation, i.e. a logic that models the attribution of various characteris-
tics to a new concept once it has been hypothesized. The step before this,
however, namely the creative act of pointing out a relevant similarity and
labeling it with a new concept, is in my opinion hard to model in a Fregean
247
framework. Aside from the fact that it would need to be a second-order
approach, it would also require that all the similarities between various
concepts, which are the premises for this kind of reasoning, be fully repre-
sented, and this could prove to be an impossible task.
A more fruitful way to understand the formation of new hypothetical
concepts is to adopt a richer framework and examine how such newly hy-
pothesized concepts structurally relate to the models used by scientists, a
project I pursued in Part IV. This gives us a chance to understand why
certain simularities are singled out as relevant and labeled with a new hy-
pothetical concept, even if one has not considered all logical possibilities.
In Chapter 8, I showed how gaps in a model often prompt an adaptation
of old concepts for new purposes, thus creating a new concept that fits the
requirements of the model. In Chapter 9, I then showed how hypothesized
concepts are, at first, seldom more than a container concept or filler term
denoting not much more than the fact that there is an entity or process.
Only in the ongoing interplay between hypotheses and models in scien-
tific practice does a concept receive a more precise meaning, a process that
relates to the research on concept formation.
The possibility of building formal models of hypothesis formation pro-
cesses also opens up the possibility of programming artificial agents to form
new hypotheses given a certain background theory, although it is clear that
the simulation of such patterns is still in an early stage. In the field of artifi-
cial intelligence, this problem is closely connected to (and even dependent
on) the problem of knowledge representation. One has first to learn how
to formally represent scientific knowledge in the way humans understand
it, including their models, observed similarities, drawn analogies, rich con-
cepts, and so forth. Therefore, AI approaches to hypothesis formation are,
at present, not aimed at simulating or performing actual scientific hypoth-
esis formation, but rather at more specific tasks based on precisely struc-
tured sets of background knowledge, such as planning or diagnosis. For
such tasks it is sufficient to focus on the pattern of singular fact abduction,
a project to which I have contributed in Chapter 5 by presenting a refor-
mulation of the logic developed in Chapter 4 that is apt for dealing with
rapidly growing knowledge bases.
Yet this dream of programming artificially intelligent agents capable of
hypothesis formation suggests, in a way, that the idea of a logic of discovery
has just managed to sneak in again through the back door. Let me spell this
out more clearly. By focusing on the history of science, the idea of a logic
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of discovery was abandoned in the second half of the twentieth century.
Yet in studying historical cases, one has observed not only that there exist
various patterns of hypothesis formation but also that hypothesis formation
is in fact a rational affair. Hence, we conceive of better and worse ways of
forming new hypotheses. But if there are better and worse ways, there
should also exist a best way to form hypotheses; in other words, a logic of
discovery.
The only way to evade this conclusion is by assuming that most of the
patterns we observe in actual practice are, taken independently of context,
equally rational. As such, there is no single best way, and, hence, no logic
of discovery. This should not imply that rational hypothesis formation is
an anything goes affair. Hypothesis formation can be rationally assessed by
asking which patterns of hypothesis formation are applicable to a certain
research problem, and then applying those. But this raises the important
question of how scientists choose a particular pattern of hypothesis for-
mation if multiple patterns are applicable and all are equally rational? In
other words, why do scientists suggest one hypothesis rather than another,
even if they have no evidence favouring the former?
This question has so far not been addressed in the literature. Here, I
have attempted to shed some initial light on this matter in Chapter 7 (Part
III). By empirically studying how scientists did in fact form hypotheses in
the case of the anomalous β spectrum, a problem that elicited a very di-
verse set of suggested hypotheses, I have found that (for the case under
investigation) this process depends mostly on how scientists prioritize and
structurally relate the various elements of theory and observations, rela-
tions that depend on their experience, metaphysical assumptions, and the
goals of science as they perceive them. But we also saw that scientists all
too often take too firm a stance towards a particular hypothetical position,
even when there is no rational reason to commit so much to one hypothe-
sis. It is clear, however, that further case studies from this perspective will
be needed to confirm these initial insights.
The issues encountered in the case studies lead us to the question which
attitude one should rationally adopt towards hypotheses. As there is no
logic of discovery, it is clear that one should endorse multiple and even
mutually exclusive options. In practice, we see that scientists and people
in general find it hard to rationally pursue several options, and that they,
hence, choose a preferred road, based on certain beliefs formed in their
experience and education, on which they further base their actions and
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pursuits. By investigating the epistemology of hypotheses (Chapters 2 and
3, Part I), I have attempted to characterize the attitude towards hypotheses
as an attitude that both allows one to entertain mutually exclusive ideas
and yet still provides an ample base for further actions and the pursuit of
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